in reply to Kelner, Mann and Ornstein,

I think measuring the impact of the BCRA is a valuable enterprise. I am 
interested in getting some "expectations" that we could test.  As Kelner 
points out, there are predictions about how the behavior/levels of 
influence of different actors will change (parties more or less 
influential, incumbents more or less safe, nonprofits more or less 
politically important,etc) and then there are 
predictions about whether these changes move us closer to certain 
reform goals (less or more appearance of corruption, less or more
fund raising time spent by incumbents, less or more special influence
over legislation, etc).  AS Kelner suggests, no one questions that there 
will be some shifts in the first category, but many are skeptical 
about the second.  reform could not be sold to the public or the Court if 
it were only about the first category.  the infringement on first 
amendment rights in BCRA can only be justified in the Court's reasoning if 
it lessens corruption and the appearance of corruption (ie the reform 
goals).  so i am wondering if proponents are willing to venture 
predictions of either type so we can benchmark the progress we have made.
i take the suggestion that MCs will do less solicitation of soft money as 
the first prediction.  will it then lead to any prediction in the second 
category? 


Bruce Cain


On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, Kelner, Robert wrote:

The point that opponents of BCRA make is not, as Tom Mann suggests, that
BCRA "won't make any difference."  It is that it won't make any
difference in the respect intended by its sponsors (e.g., reducing the
"appearance of corruption" or the appearance that special interest
groups "buy access" to Members of Congress).  BCRA will not make a
difference in that respect because, among other things, the game has
simply shifted away from political parties toward all manner of
"outside" groups who may use Members to raise unlimited (and often
undisclosed) soft money for electionering purposes.  But BCRA most
certainly will make a difference in regard to the relative position of
broad-based political parties versus single-issue interest groups in the
election process.  And that is the difference of greatest concern.

-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Mann [mailto:TMANN@brookings.edu] 
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2003 10:06 AM
To: bruce@cain.berkeley.edu; marty.lederman@comcast.net
Cc: Rick.Hasen@lls.edu; election-law@majordomo.lls.edu;
RBauer@perkinscoie.com
Subject: Re: McConnell v. FEC: The big picture


In reply to Bruce Cain,

Virtually all of the scholarly evidence on money and corruption is
limited to analyzing the relationship betwee hard money contributions
(usually from PACs) and individual votes in the House and Senate.  This
research is largely irrelevant to the arguments about party soft money
and the policy process.  The expert reports and majority opinion provide
ample argumentation and some documentation on this matter.

Nor have the sponsors or defenders of the new law predicted dramatic
reversals in policy.  Realism pervades the trial record and majority
opinion.  The same can't be said of critics and journalists who after
initially claiming McCain-Feingold would never pass and then that it
would never be upheld by the courts now rush to say it won't make any
difference.  Give us a break!  Let's all systematically monitor the
implementation of the new law and retain the capacity to be surprised by
our findings.

Tom Mann