In theory, to maximize the number of districts that lie within the 7% point
range in California, the commission will have to draw as many districts as
possible that are just within the 7% range, leaning to the Democrats. The
remainder will get soaked up into overwhelming Democratic districts. In
Republican leaning Arizona, the reverse was true. Since favoring
competitiveness appears to aid the minority party that would otherwise face
the brunt of a partisan gerrymander, not surprisingly, Democrats were behind
the reform effort in Arizona and at least some California Republicans now
favor reform.
Although drawing many packed Democratic districts is part of an effective
Republican gerrymander, as is cracking some Democrats across heavily
Republican districts (see Owen and Grofman 1988, Political Geography),
favoring competitiveness is sub-optimal for Republicans on two accounts.
(1) Republicans will not be able to draw safe districts at their optimal
level of partisan support: a 53.5% point Democratic district is not their
optimal district, perhaps a 43% Democratic district is. (2) Fewer packed
Democratic districts can be drawn than optimal for Republicans, since
Democrats that would have been in packed districts must be shifted to
competitive districts.
Whether or not the resulting map is theoretically closer to the optimal
Democratic or Republican gerrymander depends on the probability of a
Republican winning a 53.5% Democratic district. (It more generally depends
on the function that converts % partisan registration into the probability
of a party winning a district, so as to establish the optimal partisan
gerrymander...finally, a use for the formal theory in my dissertation.)
In California, the overall Democratic lean will be tempered by the creation
of overwhelming Democratic VRA districts. In Republican leaning Arizona,
VRA districts conflicted with competitiveness since their creation reduced
the pool of Democrats that could be used to create competitive districts.
In California, once the VRA districts are drawn, the 8.3 percentage point
difference in party registration will be reduced, perhaps under 7 points.
In practicable (sic), we found in Arizona that creating competitive
districts depends on the local political geography. Once the VRA districts
are carved out and the other goals of the commission were met, there really
won't be as much room for the commission to work as theory would suggest.
However, requiring the commission to favor competitive districts might mean
that in a few areas of the state, two competitive districts will be drawn
where a safe Republican and safe Democratic seat would have otherwise been
drawn. I would hope that a commission would realize the value in evenly
balancing out these two hypothetical districts rather than mechanically
drawing two districts, each just within the 7% spread for Democrats in one
district and Republicans in the other.
==================================
Dr. Michael P. McDonald
Brookings Institution, Visiting Fellow
George Mason University, Assistant Professor
Dept of Public and International Affairs
4400 University Drive - 3F4
Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
Office: 703-993-4191
Fax: 703-993-1399
mmcdon@gmu.edu
http://elections.gmu.edu/
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu
[mailto:owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu] On Behalf Of J. Morgan
Kousser
Sent: Friday, January 14, 2005 5:31 PM
To: election-law@majordomo.lls.edu
Subject: ACA 3
I'm a bit stumped not only by Karin's question about how the retired
judges are supposed to make the districts competitive without (apparently)
using partisan registration statistics, and how the judges will weigh
compactness against competitiveness, but with a fundamental physical
question: The statewide registration disparity between the Democratic and
Republican parties in October, 2004 was 8.3 percentage points. But ACA 3
requires districts as nearly as practicable to differ by 7 percentage
points. What happens to the surplus Democrats? Do we saw off San
Francisco and Marin and let them float out to sea? Do we force Bay Area
folks not only to move to Modesto, but to change party registration when
they do?
Morgan
Prof. of History and Social Science, Caltech
snail mail: 228-77 Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125
phone 626-395-4080
fax 626-405-9841
home page: <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~kousser/Kousser.html> (Newly
Revised!)
to order Colorblind Injustice: http://uncpress.unc.edu/books/T-388.html
"Peace if possible, Justice at any rate" -- Wendell Phillips