Hey Dan, 
     Concededly, it is unwise to read features of our contemporary conceptual scheme into the conceptual scheme of the colonists/revolutionaries. However, I suspect that there are both conceptual and historical reasons for skepticism concerning separating consent in entering civil society and consent in self-government (including voting at least for some). My complaint, Dan, is not that it is wrong to distinguish between these two forms of consent, but that your manner of distinguishing them and denying that the latter applies to those who wrote and read the Declaration is too strong. Perhaps, the dispute is simply over the manner of making the point. 
     Let me briefly state the historical reason, to wit: it's difficult to understand some of the complaints the colonists had against the British Parliament without contending that they wanted a voice in legislative decisions that affected them, especially, of course, but not limited to taxation. Further, I do not take your point to be that Locke was the sole philosophical basis of the Declaration.  And if others, such as Hume, Montesquieu, Scottish skeptics, and others influenced the signers of the Declaration, it isn't obvious  that for the signers "consent" only applied to entering the social contract, or that "consent" was only Lockean consent, assuming for the sake of argument that you're right about Locke. But let me say no more about the history.
   The reason I think your original post on this matter is too strong is that there is a natural (conceptual)tie between consent in entering civil society and consent in being governed.  I think Locke saw this, but nonetheless stressed the former. If one can show that this conceptual tie exists, and that much of the writing and conduct of the colonists cannot be adequately explained without appealing to this conceptual tie, then separating them starkly(as you seem to)in our interpretation of how the colonists understood "consent" cannot be convincing.  In my view, there's much more to the story--historically and conceptually--than is captured by saying that the locution "consent of the governed," for the signers and readers of the Declaration refers only to entering the social contract. I'll end my part in this exchange by asking a rhetorical question.  Why would anyone, now or then, be committed to consent in entering the social contract if the terms of that contract gave t!
 hem no effective voice in the future operations of self-government?
Cheers,Bobby
Robert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware