I've always disliked this metaphor of "paying one's debt to society." Here are two among its many problems:
(1) It doesn't explain why one's "debt to society" should be simply some number of years in prison, as opposed to some numbers of years in prison plus continuing disqualifications. If it is the latter -- as the law provides -- then the felon's debt to society is not paid off once he's released. Part of his debt includes enduuring limits on his right to own guns, enduring limits on his right to vote, continued exclusion from certain jobs (enforced by the threat of negligent hiring liability), and so on.
(2) More importantly, I just don't see why it's sound to think of a crime as creating a "debt." Rather, the conviction for the crime gives society certain information -- information that the person has done something bad, information that he is likely a continuing threat (hence the incapacitaation justification for imprisonment), and information that he is not a trustworthy sort of person. We may for various reasons (justice, mercy, a desire to save money) release the person from prison after some number of years. But that doesn't mean that we must somehow forget the information we learned about him, and stop acting on that information. We may decide not to let him own guns, or vote, or be employed in certain jobs, or whatever else. And metaphors about "paying a debt to society" should, I think, be irrelevant to this analysis.
That some others (who, I take it, weren't even selected as a scientific sample of any profession, right?) are comfortable with enfranchising felons is interesting, but it isn't terribly helpful for me to make up my own mind. Different people balance the factors different ways; some may not be as troubled as I am even by untrustworthy people having a say in how we are governed; others may have different moral judgments about entitlement to vote.
Finally, if you could show me that the majority of felons -- or even a huge minority -- have been convicted only of marijuana possession (of non-distribution-quantity amounts), then I would be more open to the argument (though my preference would then be to limit the disqualification to people convicted of other felonies, a limitation which I'd gladly support in any event). But do we really have reason to think that this is so?
Eugene
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu
[mailto:owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu] On Behalf Of
jonathan.gass@1webmail.net
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2005 12:48 PM
To: election-law@majordomo.lls.edu
Subject: RE: NY Times and Felons
ΚΚΚ "I am indeed uneasy about comparing ex-felons, how
had committed crimes -- sometimes horrific (e.g., rape,
child molestation, etc.), often brutal, and sometimes
merely serious -- to innocent children"
I see the root of the problem, particularly insofar as
we're talking about people who have "paid their debt to
society," i.e., who are not in prison and no longer on
probation or parole. What percentage of those people are
rapists? What percentage committed some crime we would agree
was "brutal"? Indeed, what percentage committed a crime that
a good chunk of the population not only wouldn't consider
"serious" but has engaged in (without getting caught)
themselves, e.g., marijuana possession?
If you assume that the question is whether we want
rapists running the country, that tends to bias you
toward a particular outcome. If you actually work with
ex-felons and have seen them act almost like actual human
beings, holding down jobs, paying taxes, and so on, you tend
to be biased towards a different outcome.
Judging from the evidence in the various
felon-disenfranchisement lawsuits around the country, the
people who actually know what they're talking about--not just
the do-gooders and the bleeding-hearts, but also the
penological experts, the prison wardens, the law enforcement
people--as a group seem to be much more comfortable with the
enfranchisement of ex-felons than do people who know
ex-felons only as a faceless group of bad people who've done
bad things.