<x-flowed>To reply to Eugene Volokh:

To be sure, there are discrete examples where the law treats a released criminal, free from probation conditions, in a guarded way because of a perceived threat.  We have laws requiring child molesters to register when they move in to a new town, for example.  But for the most part, the criminal law is set up in such a way that a finding of continued threat would justify continued incarceration or continued probationary conditions.  So we should be careful in assuming that because someone was once convicted of a felony, they are regarded by the law, or should be regarded by us as a policy matter, as a continuing threat.  I think the system sets up a presumption that there is not a continuing threat.  It can be rebutted by special circumstances--e.g., child molesters can have a particularly high recidivism rate, and their offenses can be legitimately viewed as the inevitable (at least absent chemical castration) result of a condition the offender suffers from.   But it seems to me the burden should be on the person saying that they should be regarded as a continuing threat, despite having fulfilled all conditions of the conviction (prison sentence, supervised release, etc.).
Which brings to mind Jonathan Glass' question:   where is the evidence that these people are threats, either in general or with respect to the franchise? SJM


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