<x-flowed>This thread began with a news report of a Finnish computer science
expert untraceably altering election results on a GEMS server, the vote
tallying software used by both OS and DRE systems. H. Brown then opined
that a massive conspiracy would be required to exploit this obvious
vulnerability in "real world" elections.
I rejected this proposition and offered personal observations from my
quixotic efforts to obtain recounts of two elections conducted on DRE
systems (one Sequoia, one Diebold) for clients out here in California.
I made two points:
1) "Real world" elections do happen at the county level, whether
because of the myriad, big-money issues decided by county government or
because of the role that swing counties play in determine the outcome of
larger elections; and
2) Election laws must be reformed to protect the right to examine
publicly the workings of this new electoral technology.
My comments were not directed to confirm or deny any specific example of
official malfeasance or error, but rather to emphasize the general
proposition that long-standing post-election rights and remedies --
reserved by the People as a means of ferreting out and correcting
official error or malfeasance -- must be vindicated by immediate legal
reform in any jurisdiction where DREs ares used. Thanks in part to
relentless activism and law suits, some such reforms are slated to take
hold in California in 2006 -- assuming of course that election officials
will, at long last, follow the mandates of the Elections Code, which
they have thus far ignored. Whatever happened in Ohio, I can report
first hand on the fact that, until necessary reforms are implemented --
/and enforced/ -- all post-election rights and remedies have been
effectively eliminated for DRE based-elections in California by
administrative fiat.
I recommend that persons interested in this issue stop assuming that the
problem of election verifiability is solved through adequate system
design, ie, the argument that "the system generates redundant data,
audit logs, logic and accuracy tests, and (soon) a VVPAT, so everything
is fine". For those who missed it: requests for public examination of
such materials in recounts under the broad authority of the California
Elections Code section 15630 have been universally denied, despite the
fact that elections officials and DRE vendors touted these capacities as
the primary reasons we should rely on DRE systems, and despite the fact
that the 1990 and 2002 FEC Guidelines insist that such materials are
"essential for voter confidence [and] for recounts". Elections
officials even refuse to produce the most rudimentary, and time-honored
election material: chain-of-custody records, despite the fact that they
continue to produce such records for votes cast on paper. Thus, as a
matter of first hand knowledge, I report to you that DRE elections have
been conducted behind an impenetrable veil of secrecy in California. I
can neither confirm nor deny the proposition that nasty, conspiratorial
things took place behind this veil, because Californians have been
denied access to the
/only/ tools by which they may detect such fraud or
error. Reprinting "ballot-images" from data of unknown integrity is a
pointless charade that does nothing to confirm the accuracy of vote
tallies. This is neither a partisan nor a trivial problem.
I know that the practices of election officials are saner in New Mexico,
and that the Florida ALJ prevented the Secretary of State from summarily
issuing regulations to exempt DRE systems from the recount provisions of
law, but many jurisdictions continue to court disaster by leaving the
power to write election law in the hands of temporal, local election
officials.
And for this least partisan of issues, I also recommend that we avoid
pure misinformation. It is demonstrably incorrect to deny that the
alteration of election results is possible or that it poses an
insignificant threat. And it is demonstrably incorrect to assume that
adequate post-election remedies are in place to discover and remedy
fraud or error.
The law has not yet caught up with the deployment of DRE technology.
All of us should insist that it do so.
Gregory Luke
John Birrell-Levine wrote:
Was anyone on this thread actually there? Sadly, I think we are at a
point in this country where first hand knowledge may be the only truly
reliable source.
It's interesting to me when we choose to believe the media and when we
don't.
Is it not reasonable to assume that objective reporting has gone the
same way as objective supreme court judges and that liberal reporters
write articles (even news articles can be written with a partisan
edge) to point out flaws in the opposition and conservative reporters
do the same.
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Larry Levine <mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>
*To:* Mike Krempasky <mailto:mkrempasky@redstate.org>
*Cc:* John Birrell-Levine <mailto:jlevine_1@hotmail.com> ; Howard
J. Brown <mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com> ; Gregory G. Luke
<mailto:gluke@strumwooch.com> ; Paul Goodwin
<mailto:paulg@goodwinsimon.com> ; Lisa Hansen
<mailto:Lhansen@council.lacity.org> ; Jeffery J. Daar
<mailto:jdaar@daarnewman.com> ; election-law@majordomo.llsedu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu> ; gbandassoc@aol.com
<mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>
*Sent:* Monday, December 26, 2005 8:45 PM
*Subject:* Re: diebold, etc hacks
Ah, me, such a source.
And what of the mainstream reporters who said they were afraid for
their safety during that scene. But then, that's just the liberal
media at it again, huh?
Larry Levine
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Mike Krempasky <mailto:mkrempasky@redstate.org>
*To:* Larry Levine <mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>
*Cc:* John Birrell-Levine <mailto:jlevine_1@hotmail.com> ;
Howard J. Brown <mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com> ; Gregory G.
Luke <mailto:gluke@strumwooch.com> ; Paul Goodwin
<mailto:paulg@goodwinsimon.com> ; Lisa Hansen
<mailto:Lhansen@council.lacity.org> ; Jeffery J. Daar
<mailto:jdaar@daarnewman.com> ; election-law@majordomo.llsedu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu> ; gbandassoc@aol.com
<mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>
*Sent:* Monday, December 26, 2005 7:52 PM
*Subject:* Re: diebold, etc hacks
Ah, here we go with the "gang of thugs" myth again. Never mind
that the ballot counting process - by law required to be open
to the public, was abruptly moved behind closed doors with no
access for partisan appointed observers.
Al Sharpton's shrieking notwithstanding - to say that they
intimidated elections officials into closing an office ignores
the facts.
I commend to you Sheila Moloney's article about the incident:
http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.12464/article_detail.asp
(scroll down a bit)
On 12/24/05, *Larry Levine* <larrylevine@earthlink.net
<mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>> wrote:
It doesn't take sci-fi to recall a gang of thugs taking
over an elections
office, intimedating elections officials in to closing
down the office and
halting the counting of ballots in Florida in 2000. That's
a real world
election. And if they would do that, then there is no
reason to believe they
wouldn't resort to any means available to accomplish the
same goal - be
those means electronic or otherwise.
Larry Levine
----- Original Message -----
From: "John Birrell-Levine" <jlevine_1@hotmail.com
<mailto:jlevine_1@hotmail.com>>
To: "Howard J. Brown" < hbrown@jamestownr.com
<mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com>>; "Gregory G. Luke"
<gluke@strumwooch.com <mailto:gluke@strumwooch.com>>;
"'Larry Levine'" <larrylevine@earthlink.net
<mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>>; "'Paul
Goodwin'" <paulg@goodwinsimon.com
<mailto:paulg@goodwinsimon.com>>; "'Lisa Hansen'"
<Lhansen@council.lacity.org
<mailto:Lhansen@council.lacity.org> >; "'Jeffery J. Daar'"
<jdaar@daarnewman.com <mailto:jdaar@daarnewman.com>>;
<election-law@majordomo.llsedu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu>>; <
gbandassoc@aol.com <mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>>
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 10:51 PM
Subject: Re: diebold, etc hacks
> Couple points...
>
> 1) Influencing an election isn't that unrealistic. The
negative vote
> pre-programming method described doesn't have to cap at
100. It could
> be -10,000 or -100,000 - it just needs to be a number
that is low enough
to
> make a difference but high enough to ensure the end
result is not only not
> negative (that would be a big oops) but realistic. So
an election in a
> location with 100,000 people that is projected via polls
to be 55/45
> (55,000/45,000) only really needs a shift of 6k votes
to/from each
candidate
> to swing the election to be 51/49 the "un-projected"
way. That's really
not
> complicated. The hardest part is getting access to the
cards - at
> manufacturing time won't work because the distribution
of the cards is
> unknown - it would have to be done when the cards are
allocated to the
> precincts or after they arrive - that limits the
likliehood but with
social
> engineering I'm very confident it could be done - all
you need is a
Diebold
> uniform and some official paperwork that gives you
access to "verify the
> integrity of the machines" prior to the start of the day.
>
> 2) Does any of the above really matter? Even if you
only make one yes a
no
> or one no a yes the system has been corrupted. It's
really not about
being
> able to swing an election so much as it's about mucking
up the integrity
of
> the voting process which is already fragile given recent
elections.
>
> my 02
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Howard J. Brown" <hbrown@jamestownr.com
<mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com>>
> To: "Gregory G. Luke" < gluke@strumwooch.com
<mailto:gluke@strumwooch.com>>; "'Larry Levine'"
> <larrylevine@earthlink.net
<mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>>; "'Paul Goodwin'" <
paulg@goodwinsimon.com <mailto:paulg@goodwinsimon.com>>;
> "'Lisa Hansen'" <Lhansen@council.lacity.org
<mailto:Lhansen@council.lacity.org>>; "'John Levine'"
> < jlevine_1@hotmail.com <mailto:jlevine_1@hotmail.com>>;
"'Jeffery J. Daar'" <jdaar@daarnewman.com
<mailto:jdaar@daarnewman.com>>;
> <election-law@majordomo.llsedu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu>>;
<gbandassoc@aol.com <mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>>
> Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 7:20 AM
> Subject: Re: diebold, etc hacks
>
>
> > Dear Mr. Luke,
> > my statement may be untrue, but your outlook is
unrealistic.
> > if you wanted to target swing counties history shows
that using absentee
> > ballots is a tried and true method not requiring a
science-fiction
> > scenario
> > of pre-programming DRE's.
> > H Brown
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Gregory G. Luke" <gluke@strumwooch.com
<mailto:gluke@strumwooch.com>>
> > To: "'Howard J. Brown'" < hbrown@jamestownr.com
<mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com>>; "'Larry Levine'"
> > <larrylevine@earthlink.net
<mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>>; "'Paul Goodwin'" <
paulg@goodwinsimon.com <mailto:paulg@goodwinsimon.com>>;
> > "'Lisa Hansen'" <Lhansen@council.lacity.org
<mailto:Lhansen@council.lacity.org>>; "'John Levine'"
> > <jlevine_1@hotmail.com
<mailto:jlevine_1@hotmail.com>>; "'Jeffery J. Daar'"
<jdaar@daarnewman.com <mailto:jdaar@daarnewman.com>>;
> > < election-law@majordomo.lls.edu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu>>;
<gbandassoc@aol.com <mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>>
> > Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 6:19 PM
> > Subject: RE: diebold, etc hacks
> >
> >
> >> Mr. Brown,
> >>
> >> Your statement is simply untrue, unless you confine
your definition of
> >> "real-world elections" to multi-county elections
operating different
> >> vote counting technologies, in which case the
complexity of altering
> >> aggregated results does increase exponentially.
> >>
> >> It is important, however, to recall that many
multi-jurisdictional
> >> elections are close enough that altering the outcome
of a small number
> >> of jurisdictions may change the aggregate
outcome. Targeting such
swing
> >> counties is not the stuff of science fiction.
> >>
> >> Further, within any given county, there are always
elections involving
> >> "real-world" contests, issues, and consequences.
> >>
> >> The Hursti hack demonstrates that all one needs to
alter results on
GEMS
> >> servers undetectably (used both by almost all OS and
DRE systems) is
> >> access. Such access does not require a broad
coordinated conspiracy.
> >> Mere incompetence would suffice, and the record of
recent DRE elections
> >> here in California is enough to give one pause.
> >>
> >> In Alameda and Riverside Counties (CA), for instance,
it is the policy
> >> of elections officials to deny requests for system
access
> >> ("chain-of-custody") and other records in connection
with DRE recounts,
> >> despite the plain mandate of CA Elections Code 15630,
which provides
> >> that "[a]ll ballots, whether voted or not, and any
other relevant
> >> material may be examined as part of any recount if
the voter .... so
> >> requests."
> >>
> >> Denial of public access to such plainly relevant
election material (now
> >> the subject of two parallel legal challenges) lays
bare an essential
> >> danger: attention to DRE system design &
functionality is not
sufficient
> >> to protect long-standing, public post-election rights
and remedies.
> >> Just as the election laws around the country adapted
to the use of
> >> mechanical lever voting machines (which also do not
preserve ballots),
> >> so must they now adapt to the use of DREs if citizens
hope to preserve
> >> their right to verify election results.
> >>
> >> Recent AVVPAT mandates contribute to such
verifiability, but, as the
> >> California Association of Clerks and Elections
Officials has warned (in
> >> opposing such paper trail mandates), the VVPAT does
not close the loop
> >> against all forms of electronic data/vote tally
manipulation.
> >>
> >>
> >> Gregory Luke
> >> Strumwasser & Woocher LLP
> >> 100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1900
> >> Santa Monica, CA 90401
> >> Phone: (310) 576-1233
> >> Facsimile: (310) 319-0156
> >> gluke@strumwooch.com <mailto:gluke@strumwooch.com>
> >>
> >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: This message is intended for the
use of the
individual
> >> or entity to which it is addressed and may contain
information that is
> >> privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure
under applicable
> >> law. If you read this message, and you are not the
intended recipient,
> >> or the employee or agent responsible for delivering
this message to the
> >> intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination,
> >> distribution, or copying of any part of this
communication is strictly
> >> prohibited. If you have received or read this
communication in error,
> >> please notify the sender immediately by e-mail reply
or by telephone
and
> >> immediately delete this message and all its
attachments from all data
> >> storage media.
> >>
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Howard J. Brown [mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com
<mailto:hbrown@jamestownr.com>]
> >> Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 11:33 AM
> >> To: Larry Levine; Paul Goodwin; Lisa Hansen; John
Levine; Jeffery J.
> >> Daar; election-law@majordomo.llsedu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu>;
gbandassoc@aol.com <mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>
> >> Subject: Re: diebold, etc hacks
> >>
> >> and the chances of a broad enough coordinated
conspiracy to do the
> >> hacking
> >> described in the article, sufficient to affect a
real-world election,
> >> approach zero.
> >> H Brown
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: "Larry Levine" <larrylevine@earthlink.net
<mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>>
> >> To: "Paul Goodwin" <paulg@goodwinsimon.com
<mailto:paulg@goodwinsimon.com>>; "Lisa Hansen"
> >> <Lhansen@council.lacity.org
<mailto:Lhansen@council.lacity.org>>; "John Levine"
<jlevine_1@hotmail.com <mailto:jlevine_1@hotmail.com>>;
> >> "Jeffery J. Daar" <jdaar@daarnewman.com
<mailto:jdaar@daarnewman.com>>;
> >> <election-law@majordomo.llsedu
<mailto:election-law@majordomo.lls.edu>>;
> >> <gbandassoc@aol.com <mailto:gbandassoc@aol.com>>
> >> Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 1:08 PM
> >> Subject: Fw: diebold, etc hacks
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >> > ----- Original Message -----
> >> > From: "Barry Wellman" < wellman@chass.utoronto.ca
<mailto:wellman@chass.utoronto.ca>>
> >> > To: "Lloyd Levine" <levine4assembly@hotmail.com
<mailto:levine4assembly@hotmail.com>>;
> >> < Lloyd.Levine@asm.ca.gov
<mailto:Lloyd.Levine@asm.ca.gov>>
> >> > Cc: "larry levine" <larrylevine@earthlink.net
<mailto:larrylevine@earthlink.net>>; "beverly wellman"
> >> > < bevwell@chass.utoronto.ca
<mailto:bevwell@chass.utoronto.ca>>
> >> > Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 6:05 AM
> >> > Subject: diebold, etc hacks
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > got 'em by the scrotum now!
> >> >
> >> > Barry
> >> >
_____________________________________________________________________
> >> >
> >> > Barry Wellman Professor of
Sociology NetLab Director
> >> > wellman at chass.utoronto.ca
<http://chass.utoronto.ca> http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~wellman
<http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/%7Ewellman>
> >> >
> >> > Centre for Urban & Community
Studies University of Toronto
> >> > 455 Spadina Avenue Toronto Canada M5S
2G8 fax:+1-416-978-7162
> >> > To network is to live; to live is to network
> >> >
_____________________________________________________________________
> >> > http://www.wired.com/news/evote/1,69893-0.html
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Welcome to Wired News. Skip directly to: Search
Box, Section
> >> Navigation,
> >> > Content.
> >> >
> >> > Wired News
> >> > Search:
> >> > Text Size: Small Text Normal Text Large Text
Larger Text
> >> > [Home][Technology][Culture][Politics][Wire
> >> Services][Blogs][Columns][Wired
> >> > Magazine]
> >> >
> >> > Diebold Hack Hints at Wider Flaws
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Breaking News
> >> > Breaking News from AP and Reuters
> >> >
> >> > * NYC Transit Union Chief Hints at Talks
> >> > * Japanese minister calls China a threat
> >> > * Israel kills West Bank gunmen
> >> > * Italy probes US marine for murder in Iraq
> >> > * Signs of Tamiflu resistance no cause for
alarm: WHO
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Special Partner Promotion
> >> > Find local technology jobs.
> >> > *
> >> > See Also
> >> >
> >> > * Can State Ignore Its E-Vote Law?
> >> > * Another Blow to E-Voting Company
> >> > * An Introduction to E-Voting
> >> > * E-Vote Guidelines Need Work
> >> > * Pull the lever on Machine Politics
> >> >
> >> > By Kim Zetter Kim Zetter | Also by this reporter
> >> > 2005-12-21 08:35:00.0
> >> >
> >> > Election officials spooked by tampering in a test
last week of
Diebold
> >> > optical-scan voting machines should be equally wary
of optical-scan
> >> > equipment produced by other manufacturers,
according to a computer
> >> > scientist who conducted the test.
> >> >
> >> > Election officials in Florida's Leon County, where
the test occurred,
> >> > promptly announced plans to drop Diebold machines
in favor of
> >> optical-scan
> >> > machines made by Election Systems & Software, or
ES&S. But Hugh
> >> Thompson,
> >> > an adjunct computer science professor at the
Florida Institute of
> >> > Technology who helped devise last week's test,
believes other systems
> >> > could also be vulnerable.
> >> >
> >> > "Looking at these systems doesn't send off signals
that ... if we
just
> >> get
> >> > rid of Diebold and go to another vendor we'll be
safe," Thompson
said.
> >> "We
> >> > know the Diebold machines are vulnerable. As for
ES&S, we don't know
> >> that
> >> > they're bad but we don't know that they're (good)
either."
> >> >
> >> > Thompson and Harri Hursti, a Finnish computer
scientist, were able to
> >> > change votes on the Diebold machine without leaving
a trace. Hursti
> >> > conducted the same test for the California
secretary of state's
office
> >> > Tuesday. The office did not return several calls
for comment.
> >> >
> >> > Information about the vulnerability comes as states
face deadlines to
> >> > qualify for federal funding to replace punch-card
and lever machines
> >> with
> >> > new touch-screen or optical-scan machines. In order
to get funding,
> >> states
> >> > must have new machines in place by their first
federal election after
> >> Jan.
> >> > 1, 2006.
> >> >
> >> > Optical-scan machines have become the preferred
choice of many
> >> election
> >> > officials due to the controversy over touch-screen
voting machines,
> >> many
> >> > of which do not produce a paper trail. Optical-scan
machines use a
> >> paper
> >> > ballot on which voters mark selections with a pen
before officials
> >> scan
> >> > them into a machine. The paper serves as a backup
if the machine
fails
> >> or
> >> > officials need to recount votes.
> >> >
> >> > The hack Thompson and Hursti performed involves a
memory card that's
> >> > inserted in the Diebold machines to record votes as
officials scan
> >> > ballots. According to Thompson, data on the cards
isn't encrypted or
> >> > secured with passwords. Anyone with programming
skills and access to
> >> the
> >> > cards -- such as a county elections technical
administrator, a savvy
> >> poll
> >> > worker or a voting company employee -- can alter
the data using a
> >> laptop
> >> > and card reader.
> >> >
> >> > To test the machines, Thompson and Hursti conducted
a mock election
on
> >> > systems loaded with a rigged memory card. The
election consisted of
> >> eight
> >> > ballots asking voters to decide, yes or no, if the
Diebold
> >> optical-scan
> >> > machine could be hacked.
> >> >
> >> > Six people voted "no" and two voted "yes." But
after scanning the
> >> ballots,
> >> > the total showed one "no" vote and seven "yes" votes.
> >> >
> >> > Diebold did not return several calls for comment.
> >> >
> >> > Thompson said in a real race between candidates
someone could
pre-load
> >> 50
> >> > votes for Candidate A and minus 50 votes for
Candidate B, for
example.
> >> > Candidate B would need to receive 100 votes before
equaling Candidate
> >> A's
> >> > level at the start of the race. The total number of
votes on the
> >> machine
> >> > would equal the number of voters, so election
officials wouldn't
> >> become
> >> > suspicious.
> >> >
> >> > "It's self-destroying evidence," he said. "Once ...
the machine gets
> >> past
> >> > zero and starts counting forward for Candidate B,
there's no record
> >> that
> >> > at one point there were negative votes for
Candidate B."
> >> >
> >> > Thompson said a second vulnerability in the cards
makes it easy to
> >> program
> >> > the voting machine so that it thinks the card is
blank at the start
of
> >> the
> >> > race. This is important because before voting
begins on Election Day,
> >> poll
> >> > workers print a report of vote totals from each
machine to show
voters
> >> > that the machines contain no votes.
> >> >
> >> > "The logic to print that zero report is contained
on the memory card
> >> > itself," Thompson said. "So all you do is alter
that code ... to
> >> always
> >> > print out a zero report (in the morning)."
> >> >
> >> > David Jefferson, a computer scientist at Lawrence
Livermore National
> >> > Laboratory and chair of California's Voting Systems
Technical
> >> Assessment
> >> > and Advisory Board, said that programming software
on a removable
> >> memory
> >> > card raises grave concerns.
> >> >
> >> > "The instant anyone with security sensibility hears
this, red flags
> >> and
> >> > clanging alarms happen," Jefferson said. "Because
this software that
> >> is
> >> > inserted from the memory module is not part of the
code base that
goes
> >> > through the qualification process, so it's code
that escapes federal
> >> > scrutiny."
> >> >
> >> > The vote manipulation could conceivably be caught
in states where
> >> election
> >> > laws require officials to conduct a 1 percent
manual recount to
> >> compare
> >> > digital votes against paper ballots. Parallel
monitoring, in which
> >> > officials pull out random machines for testing on
Election Day, might
> >> also
> >> > catch vote manipulation.
> >> >
> >> > But Thompson says machines could be programmed to
recognize when
> >> they're
> >> > being tested so as not to change votes during that
time. And a manual
> >> > recount that only examines 1 percent of machines
might not be broad
> >> > enough.
> >> >
> >> > "The question is, if you have altered a memory card
in just one of
the
> >> > polling places or even just on one machine, what
are the chances that
> >> the
> >> > machine would fall under that 1 percent?" Thompson
said. "That's kind
> >> of
> >> > scary."
> >> >
> >> > [Print story][E-mail story] Page 1 of 1
> >> > Ads by GooglePadgett Communications
> >> > Audience Response Specialists
> >> > providing wireless voting keypads.
> >> > www.pcipro.com <http://www.pcipro.com>
> >> > UK/EU Audience Response
> >> > UK/EU Powerpoint Compatible
> >> > Electronic voting systems
> >> > www.teamtalk.co.uk <http://www.teamtalk.co.uk>
> >> > New Democratic Party
> >> > Get Today's Top Election News Free!
> >> > Compare News Articles & More at AOL
> >> > www.aol.ca <http://www.aol.ca>
> >> > Innovision Incorporated
> >> > Wireless Audience Response and
> >> > Interactive Meeting Technologies
> >> > www.innovisioninc.com <http://www.innovisioninc.com>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Wired News: Contact Us | Advertising | Subscribe
> >> > We are translated daily into Korean and Japanese
> >> > C Copyright 2005, Lycos, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
LycosR is a
> >> registered
> >> > trademark of Carnegie Mellon University.
> >> > Your use of this website constitutes acceptance of
the Lycos Privacy
> >> > Policy and Terms & Conditions
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
</x-flowed>