Subject: Electionlawblog news and commentary 3/16/06 |
From: Rick Hasen |
Date: 3/16/2006, 9:59 AM |
To: election-law |
The Washington Post offers this
report, which begins: "House Republican leaders proposed changes in
lobbying laws yesterday that would include a crackdown on independent,
big-money committees that heavily aided Democrats in the 2004
elections. The proposed ethics package would increase the amount of
information that lobbyists must disclose and would, at least
temporarily, cut off privately financed travel for lawmakers. The bill
would also force lawmakers to disclose the pet projects they are
seeking for their home districts." BNA Money and Politics Report offers
more details
on the legislative process (paid subscription required).
The Sacramento Bee offers this
report, which begins: "Legislation to strip California lawmakers of
their power to draw state Senate, Assembly and other political
boundaries narrowly passed a legislative committee Wednesday." The
article is well worth reading by anyone interested in the various
options for proposed "citizen" input into the redistricting process.
Ed Still collects the news from the states here
(MIssouri), here
(Minnesota), and here
(Pennsylvania).
The Ventura County Star offers this
report.
Roll Call offers this
report (paid subscription required). It begins: "As uncertainty
reigns over what new rules will govern the lobbying business, the head
of the Center for Responsive Politics, a leading campaign finance and
lobbying watchdog, is cashing out, joining the political-law practice
at the firm Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom. Larry Noble, the
CRP's executive director for five years, will be a counsel in a
practice area that's booming amid the fallout from some of the biggest
lobbying scandals in history."
Roll Call offers this
report (paid subscription required). It begins: "The House Rules
Committee decided Wednesday to defer its vote on a contentious measure
that would determine whether Internet communications ranging from paid
advertisements to Web logs should be free from campaign finance
regulations, leaving the issue unresolved as the Federal Election
Commission prepares to issue its own rulemaking on the matter." Why? It
apparently came down to the question whether the bill would be debated
with an open rule (allowing amendments) or a closed rule (not allowing
amendments). Meanwhile, as The Hill reports,
"The Federal Election Commission (FEC) yesterday postponed a
controversial decision on subjecting Internet political speech to
campaign-finance regulations, raising the stakes for today’s
scheduled House vote on a bill that exempts all blogs, Web ads and
other online communications." Now the FEC will need to take up its
final rule (the contents of which remains a mystery).
For reactions to the turn of events in Congress, see Bob Bauer,
Brad Smith,
and Kos.
(I would link to posts by those opposing 1606 and supporting the CDT
alternative, 4900, but I haven't found any such posts or press releases
yet.)
Of particular interest, given Adam Bonin's questions
about whether 4900 would regulate Daily Kos and similar blogs, is this
snippet from the article in The Hill:
Allen did not dispute that possibility. He noted that his bill would allow websites unrestricted operations as long as their annual expenditures did not exceed $10,000.
"They might well have to file," Allen said of blogs as large as
Daily Kos, "but that’s the point. If the Internet becomes more
important, the types of financial abuses that occurred within the
campaign-finance system in general" are more prone to occurring.
Richard Briffault has posted The
527 Problem...and the Buckley Problem (George Washington Law
Review) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This Article traces the history of the 527s, examines their role in the 2004 election, and considers the constitutional questions raised by pending proposals to regulate them. It finds that although the explosive growth in 527s in 2004 directly followed BCRA's limits on political party soft money, gifts to 527s did not simply substitute for money that otherwise would have gone to the parties. Whereas many soft money gifts to the parties were clearly intended to win the donors influence with elected officials, the goals of 527 givers were more ideological. Corporations gave 527s far less money than they had previously given to the parties, while a handful of super-wealthy individual megadonors gave 527s far more than their previous soft money gifts. 527s do not clearly implicate the corruption concerns triggered by soft money, but they do raise important questions about the role of extremely large donations in our political system.
Pending proposals to treat 527s as political committees under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), and apply FECA's disclosure requirements and limits on corporate and union donations to 527s are likely to be found constitutional. The far more difficult question is whether Congress can limit the size of contributions to 527s. Surprisingly, that has little to do with the nature of the new 527s, but rather traces back to an unresolved tension at the heart of Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Court upheld contribution limits because they present a danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption but invalidated expenditure limits because expenditures raise no corruption danger. The Court has never clearly addressed whether it is constitutional to limit contributions to organizations that only make independent expenditures and do not give money to candidates.
Capping donations to 527s that only make expenditures does not fit easily under Buckley's anti-corruption paradigm. The Article presents three theories that would support limits on very large individual donations to 527s: (i) empirically, treating the web of informal relations between 527s and political parties as demonstrating that at least some 527s are arms of the parties, so that they can be regulated like parties; (ii) broadening the definition corruption to include the consequences of the gratitude a candidate is likely to feel for spending that benefits him, even if the spending is not coordinated with his campaign; and (iii) reconsidering Buckley's rejection of controlling the political role of wealth inequality as a basis for limiting spending. The third argument would be the most radical departure from Buckley, but it comes closest to capturing the particular challenge posed by the 527s.
-- Rick Hasen William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law Loyola Law School 919 Albany Street Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211 (213)736-1466 - voice (213)380-3769 - fax rick.hasen@lls.edu http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.html http://electionlawblog.org