<x-flowed>I didn't mean to suggest that Bullock and Gaddie were playing "hide and
seek" with the data. I have respect for both of them and their ultimate
conclusion -- that racially disparate rates of turnout have declined
markedly since 1965 -- is unassailable. For those who are interested,
the 2004 census survey turnout data are available at the following link:
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/cps2004/tab04b.xls
As these are self reported, they undoubtedly overstate turnout, as the
authors recognize. So I agree that the state provided registration
stats are a better source.
Nate
Rick Hasen wrote:
Keith Gaddie sends along the following response to one aspect of
Nate's posting:
"Prior to 1998, the Census Bureau did not report separate figures for non-Hispanic whites. Therefore if one is to have
comparable data from 1980 - 2004, you cannot separate out the Hispanics. In AL, LA, MS and SC (along with TN), the difference in turnout in 2004 is less than 1.5 percentage points between White and White non-Hispanic.
The only states in which comparing the White non-Hispanic with black turnout leads to a different conclusion than comparing white with black turnout are GA and TX.
Nate brings up an interesting criticism, though the problem is one that is inherent to attempting to analyze the time series, because of how the census bureau at certrain points in time. And, it is not problemmatic in years where we are able to disentangle the white and non-Hispanic white participation reports. We also direct readers to our use of state-reported racial turnout data in addition to the census bureau estimates whenever available.
We'll also be working up a set of tables for Judiciary that corrects for Nate's concern, as we are not trying to play 'hide the ball' here.
Keith"
nathaniel persily wrote:
I have posted the following to the electionlawblog:
I. Highlights from WednesdayÕs hearing
WednesdayÕs hearing did not have many surprises. Senator Leahy
started the hearing, alone, and each witness delivered their
testimony. Fred Gray talked about the history of the VRA and its
continuing relevance as a deterrent in Alabama. (I have to say it was
pretty impressive to have Rosa Parks and Martin Luther KingÕs former
lawyer testify at these hearings.) Drew Days talked about the
constitutional issues, but I donÕt think he added anything to PamÕs
discussion the day before. Abigail Thernstrom was as advertised Ð
meaning she spent most of her time criticizing Òracial sortingÓ and
ÒapartheidÓ that results from the intentional creation of
majority-minority districts. (She got into an entertaining tussle
with Senator Durbin during the question period.) Armand Derfner gave
testimony similar to GrayÕs, attesting to the continued need for
section 5 in the South. I tried to focus my discussion on what the
Òability to electÓ standard might mean and how it would be applied.
(Consider my testimony directed to the election law and redistricting
nerds out there.) Warning that overconcentration (packing) of the
minority community will likely prove the greater threat in the
proposed 25 year span of the bill, I wanted to make sure that the
legislative history was clear that this new retrogression standard
prevented that as well. I also wanted to emphasize that the standard
is not code for majority-minority districts and would not require
that minority percentages in districts be frozen for the next 25
years. I also tried to give a list of factors that would go into this
new retrogression determination. My testimony is available at the
following link:
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1894&wit_id=5362
Two interesting developments at the hearing Ð
(1) John Lewis sent a letter to the hearing room, which Leahy read
and inserted in the record. The letter expressed LewisÕs sadness that
his testimony in GA v. Ashcroft had been taken out of context by some
witnesses to suggest that he was against this bill or reauthorization
more genrally.
(2) After a recess once we delivered our testimony, Senator Hatch
chaired the remainder of the meeting. He focused his questions on the
Thernstrom critique. He did so by referring to Stuart TaylorÕs recent
National Journal article that was critical of majority-minority
districting and the coverage formula. His main concern, however, was
the relationship between the creation of such districts and
polarization in the House. He has asked us (and I suppose any of you
who are interested in submitting testimony) to submit additional
testimony on the issue whether section 5 is leading to greater
political polarization by creating safe minority districts and more
heavily conservative districts in white areas. (I didnÕt want to
burst his bubble and ask what might then explain rising polarization
in the Senate if gerrymandering is to blame?) Incidentally,
Washington Post reporter Juliet EilperinÕs new book Ð Fight Club
Politics Ð blames gerrymandering for polarization in the House, but
she spends only a few pages on majority minority districts.
II. Politics
I think David Epstein has the politics about right when it comes to
the reauthorization debate. I am not so sure that either the civil
rights groups or the DemocratsÕ hand will be any weaker though, if
this stretches beyond the midterms. If this bill becomes unraveled on
the floor because of amendments etc. (an unlikely event), I could
easily see the plug being pulled, the issue being used in the
midterms, and then a resolution afterwards.
The most likely change I could see happening on the floor would be a
shortening of the 25 year period. That would be the ÒcompromiseÓ
offered to the few Republicans who object, perhaps in the name of
trying to save it from being struck down by the courts.
III. The TriggerÕs the Thing
I think everyone involved recognizes that the trigger may be the most
vulnerable part of the bill to constitutional attack. I could easily
see a Supreme Court decision (i.e., Justice Kennedy) saying Ð well,
the bill otherwise may be constitutional but not with this
incongruent and disproportionate coverage formula. The best
justification for the current trigger, I think, would be that
racially polarized voting in the covered areas is Ð in general Ð
greater than in the non-covered areas. I should say that my gut tells
me that must be right but I have no idea whether that is proven.
Sure, that wouldnÕt justify covering townships in Michigan and New
Hampshire, etc., but the trigger has always been over and
underinclusive. (Incidentally, the fact that ÒpartyÓ may explain this
polarization in the South Ð per the Bullock & Gaddie studies Ð does
not dispose of racial polarization as the justification for the
coverage formula. Whether racially polarized voting would be
sufficient to justify the trigger as a constitutional matter is a
separate question, of course. More on this below.)
One thing that has become clear to me is that a potential debate over
the trigger really becomes a proxy for the larger debate over what
the VRA is really about Ð barriers to access, vote dilution, racially
polarized voting, discriminatory and/or partisan enforcement of
election law etc. Having that debate would certainly lead to the
unraveling of this particular bill.
So why not just change the coverage formula? Leaving aside the
political difficulties and the potential constitutional pitfalls of
expanding coverage, it is extremely unclear what kind of trigger akin
to Òtest plus low voter turnoutÓ would work these days. Having a
record of section 2, 5 or other violations in the last decade or two
would probably cover too few jurisdictions. The data presented in
Michael McDonaldÕs excellent article Ð which does the best job of
trying to use historic methods for a contemporary coverage formula Ð
suggests that 2004 election data could be used to supplement rather
than substitute for the current coverage and doing so would capture
more of Florida (as well as a lot of other jurisdictions, like
counties in Idaho, that I found surprising). But I doubt most people
think current barriers to minority participation and influence
manifest themselves in lower voter turnout jurisdiction-wide and
probably donÕt manifest themselves in racially disparate rates of
voter turnout. (Incidentally, the Bullock-Gaddie articles on the AEI
website attempt to evaluate rates of turnout by race to show that
African Americans often vote at higher rates than whites. There is a
big mistake throughout their studies though at least with respect to
their reference to census data. They accidentally lumped in Hispanics
with whites instead of using non-Hispanic whites as the proper
comparison group.)
Since expanding coverage nationwide is also administratively
impossible (or at least really, really expensive) and would likely
run into political and judicial constraints, it is no wonder that the
bill sticks with the currently covered jurisdictions. At least that
is the devil we know, and who knows whether the status quo is more or
less likely to be declared unconstitutional than any given proposal.
If I had my druthers and was forced to work within the current
section 5 regime, though, I would legislate two coverage formulas Ð a
primary one that was more expansive and a backup Ð akin to that used
in the BCRAÕs issue advocacy provisions. The primary definition of
coverage would be updated for 2004 while the backup would be the one
currently in the bill.
That said, of course there are problems with the section 5
architecture in general, and like everyone who has weighed in on the
debate, I would throw myself behind national election reform, which
is, alas, politically impossible at the present time for reasons
David Epstein explains. At some point in the next 20 years though, I
suspect that something along the lines of the following deal will be
brokered. (This is just a prediction, not an endorsement):
1. National rules of voter registration that give a right to vote in
federal elections to all citizens of voting age who are not
incarcerated.
2. A national voter I.D. card (probably not with a photo or
fingerprint but maybe) affirmatively provided by the federal
government (or maybe just a spiffed up social security card) that
will be a legal minimum for voting Ð i.e., no one could be refused
the vote if they bring this card with them, but states could allow
for other forms of ID (or just a signature) as well.
3. Repeal or modification of section 5 and/or section 2 of the VRA.
4. Perhaps a uniform ballot to be used for federal elections. (Yes Ð
I understand the federalism questions/concerns/dangers with all of
these.)
5. Some attempt to craft a body like the FEC or EAC to be more
independent and effective with respect to oversight of federal
elections.
Like I said, this is not even on the horizon right now (nor in some
respects should it be), but after the next electoral meltdown it
might be.
III. /GA// v. Ashcroft /and the /Ashcroft-/fix in the current bill
I think academics have had a healthy debate over the potential
virtues or drawbacks of the holding of /Georgia v. Ashcroft/. My own
view is that the biggest problems with /Georgia v. Ashcroft/, alas,
are its facts and its holding. The facts are a problem because they
are unique Ð a Democratic gerrymander (really egregious by the way)
supported by African American elected officials, with control of the
state senate at stake, and a denial of preclearance (or really a
declaratory judgment) to districts right around the 50% mark that are
decreased ever so slightly. The holding is a problem because it
cannot possibly be limited to those unique facts and as far as I can
tell, allows jurisdictions to choose packing or cracking as a
strategy for gerrymandering but merely justify it as creating
ÒcontrolÓ or ÒinfluenceÓ districts. By my read, the decision
basically told DOJ to preclear almost any kind of redistricting plan
or, alternatively, provided some justification for objecting to
almost any kind of redistricting plan. I think this conclusion is
bolstered by the behavior of both the political appointees and the
line attorneys in the Texas gerrymandering case Ð both of which have
a plausible reading of the decision in my view. Therefore, I think
some clarification of the decision was necessary if section 5 was
going to keep DOJ in the business of preclearing redistricting plans.
Now the question is whether the /Ashcroft/-fix fixes /Ashcroft /and
even if so, does it do other kinds of damage. The bill under
consideration would prevent Òdiminishing [minoritiesÕ] ability . . .
to elect their preferred candidates of choice.Ó One plausible
interpretation is that no reductions in minority percentages in
current districts will be allowed for the next 25 years, or that this
forces the creation or freezing in place of majority-minority
districts. I reject that interpretation and do not think it is the
intent of the drafters of this law. See my testimony for a fuller
discussion of this. More importantly though, I think it is important
that DOJ look at this bill as preventing the kind of
overconcentration that will likely prove to be the greater threat to
minority influence in the coming years as racial polarization
declines. (See my testimony on this as well.) It would be a cruel
result, indeed, if the new retrogression standard prevented the most
common form of Democratic gerrymandering (cracking) but gave its
blessing to the most common form of Republican gerrymandering (packing).
IV. Constitutional Questions
I recognize why there has been so much discussion of the
constitutional questions regarding this bill and the importance of
developing the record. But I think I part company with my fellow
travelers in these debates in that I just donÕt think any of this
will ultimately matter to Justice Kennedy, who will be the decisive
vote. I think he already knows what he is going to do.
In the end, he (and maybe even the Chief Justice) will need to decide
whether they feel comfortable striking down THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
previously the gold standard or point of comparison for the other
decisions interpreting the enforcement clauses of the 14^th and 15^th
amendments. If they do strike it down, it will be the most
significant law stricken down by the Court at least since the New
Deal if not before. (Look for a good named plaintiff that can be
converted easily to a verb like Ð /Lochnerizing/.) I think this is
probably true even if they just say they are striking down the
coverage formula, the time period (25 years) or Òthe ability to
electÓ standard.
It will be the federalism revolution realized. The other cases
concerning the enforcement clauses (Morrison, Garret, Kimel, Florida
Prepaid, etc.), commerce clause (Morrison, Lopez), commandeering
(Printz, NY v. US), or the various 11^th amendment cases are not
remotely even in the same league. Of course, none of these other laws
have anything approaching the federalism costs that the section 5
regime does either. In the end, I suspect Justice Kennedy will simply
need to decide whether he is willing to take the heat, how important
the precedent in this area is, and whether the Court wants to
overturn a law that will almost be unanimously supported by Congress.
--
Rick Hasen
William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
(213)736-1466 - voice
(213)380-3769 - fax
rick.hasen@lls.edu
http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.html
http://electionlawblog.org
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