How is this possible?  In 2004, I modeled the congressional elections and
determined that Democrats needed a 7.5% national swing in their favor in
order to take control of the House.  I'll have to wait until the primaries
are over to do a similar analysis for 2006, but I expect that the 2006
number is similar.    

The table has been set for the Democrats, as they have better candidates in
more competitive and second-tier competitive seats and are apparently
out-fundraising Republicans.  There are still the strong structural
advantages of incumbency and redistricting that favor Republicans.  The
question is whether or not the Democrats will enjoy a large enough swing in
their favor to take control of the House.  Bob Erikson's paper presented at
the AAPOR conference over the weekend showed that in typical presidential
pre-election polls, the wide margin reported in the early trial heats always
tightens up towards the election as partisans, when forced to make the hard
choice, tend to come back to their home party.  So, despite the commanding
lead in these early generic party pre-election polls, it is very possible
that the Democrats will have a lesser ~5% national swing in their favor.
Yet, because of the structural advantages, they will still not take control
of the House (perhaps even if they win a plurality of the House vote, a
situation that also occurred in 1996).

Besides for anecdotes, there is no evidence for the "greedy" partisan
gerrymander hypothesis, first articulated by Burnham in the early 1970s.  In
fact, there is plenty of theoretical and empirical evidence to the contrary
(please read the sources I cite in my 2006 PS piece), and Burnham even
states that it is more often that parties don't miscalculate in the way Rick
and he suggest.  Furthermore, because of the closer balance in the House and
stronger partisanship in the electorate, 2000-1 was fundamentally different
than previous rounds of redistricting as parties were more risk averse
(besides, more districts were drawn under incumbent protection plans than
partisan plans).

I hope that just because early predictions are that the Democrats will take
back the House IF there is a massive swing in their favor that this is some
vindication that partisan gerrymanders are self-correcting.  As a couple of
people have put it: the districts are not so safe that a category 5
political hurricane can't swamp Republicans.  At the most disastrous level,
a party will pay an electoral price despite any structural advantages they
might have.  My feeling is that it should not literally take a bungled
response to a real category 5 hurricane (and other mishaps) for the House to
be in play.  Legislative elections should be more responsive to the voters.
Perhaps if the current majority had felt that they were at electoral risk
sooner, they would have pressed harder on some of the issues that they are
now taking a drubbing for in the polls.

------------
Dr. Michael P. McDonald 
Assistant Professor, George Mason University 
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution

                          Mailing address: 
(o) 703-993-4191          George Mason University 
(f) 703-993-1399          Dept. of Public and International Affairs
mmcdon@gmu.edu            4400 University Drive - 3F4 
http://elections.gmu.edu  Fairfax, VA 22030-4444

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu [mailto:owner-election-
law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu] On Behalf Of Jeffrey MA Hauser
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 11:57 AM
To: election-law
Subject: Re: Electionlawblog news and commentary 5/22/06

Rick writes, re the House bieng "in play:"

"How is this possible, given what we've heard about how effective
partisan gerrymanders have been in the states? Is it that redistricters
got too greedy, drawing lines with not enough margin for a shift in the
national mood from one party to another? And what does this potential
shift say about whether court intervention is necessary to promote
political competition in the face of such gerrymanders?"

This seems to me a classic "false choice."

We have had national polling for the ruling party at or below 1994
levels and we're just now accepting that a **15** seat margin is in
play.  Remember that in 1994 the GOP blew past their **40 seat** deficit
and picked up 54 seats.

Obviously, gerrymandering is critically relevant here, as the Democratic
tidal wave I hope for & expect will still likely leave them with
narrower control in 2007 than the GOP enjoyed in 1995, DESPITE (a) a
wave of similar proportions AND (b) the fact that the Dems started 25
seats ahead of the GOP.