Subject: Electionlawblog news and commentary 5/23/06 |
From: Rick Hasen |
Date: 5/23/2006, 9:55 AM |
To: election-law |
I'll be out of the office without regular Internet access on
Wednesday and Thursday. See you then!
Now they are trying in Loma Linda and Rosemead.
This post
appears at CLCBlog. Unsurprisingly, Bob Bauer disagrees.
Brad Smith has this
post on Redstate.
The Dallas Morning News offers this
editorial.
The Hill offers this
report,
which begins: "More proof of the symbiotic relationship between K
Street and Capitol Hill: a government watchdog found that lobbyists and
their PACs have contributed at least $103 million to the campaigns of
members of Congress since 1998." You can find the Public Citizen report
relied upon in this article here.
Abigail
Thernstrom sends along the following thoughts via email on Voting
Rights Act renewal:
Nate can rather dismissively label my concern with the perpetuation of racial classifications (in the form of race-based districting) as predictable, but I suspect it's a matter that a majority on the Supreme Court will continue to find troubling. As it should. I also expect that those who worry that at least five Justices will have serious doubts about the constitutionality of the proposed VRARA are rightly flashing yellow warning signals that the civil rights community ignores at its peril.
In 1965 the Voting Rights Act was perfect legislation. (I cannot think of another statute I would label as such.) But on the question of renewal and amendment more than four decades later I disagree--in varying degrees--with everyone writing for this wonderful blog site. Here are a few thoughts in response to them, to the experts who testified last week, and to the Senators who have already signed on to the proposed bill. These points are based in part on notes I took during the hearing.
1. The record presented by Gray/Derfner/Days was, to put it mildly, thin. Anecdotes mostly--some quite old. There was a moment I found mildly hilarious in which Sen. Durbin said he was talking about “hard reality†(something like that) in contrast to my data. Well, Senator…oh, never mind.
2. Using the existing trigger--or any trigger that rests on
registration and turnout--no longer makes sense. In his testimony, Sam
Issacharoff says: "Had the coverage
formula been applied to the 1968 presidential election rather than the
1964 presidential
election, not one of the originally covered states would have fallen
under the preclearance
regime." But that seems to miss a crucial point: those who wrote the
'65 act knew precisely which states they wanted to cover and worked
backwards--finding a statistical formula that would target them. The
level of political participation (both black and white) was
circumstantial evidence of the use of a fraudulent literacy test. In
subsequent years, when literacy tests were banned, the logic of using
turnout figures to finger jurisdictions deliberately keeping blacks
from the polls was lost. Three boroughs in New York City, when they
came under coverage in 1970, were not the equivalent of Mississippi,
and even the NY Times thought the trigger had become arbitrary.
Which it had--and is, by now.
3. Another seemingly lost point: Preclearance was part of a package of
temporary emergency provisions--equivalent to a curfew after a riot. Is
black disfranchisement a permanent emergency? In 1965, no one dared
suggest it should last even a decade. And that was not because the
framers of the act were naive about the determination of southern
racists. Moreover the retrogression test was the only one that squared
with the original vision of the provision as a means of ensuring that
the effect of the ban on literacy tests stuck. Preclearance was a
prophylactic measure--a device to guard against renewed
disfranchisement. Against backsliding, in other words. Any other
interpretation involves legal standards inevitably inappropriate to a
process of swift administrative review. The notion that voting section
attorneys (and their equal opportunity specialists) should be sorting
out basic questions of electoral equality and applying (totally murky)
constitutional standards in discerning discriminatory purpose is simply
beyond me. White v. Regester
et al were a mess. Aside from the fact that the definition of "purpose"
disintegrated into a failure to draw max-black and max-Latino plans.
4. I am a little bewildered by the references to a politicized Department of Justice. This is a story I wrote about with respect to the 1980s (and I did have access to the internal memos of the voting section), and that Maurice Cunningham lays out in great detail in his history of enforcement in the 1990s. Leaving aside, of course, the tale in Miller v. Johnson et al. More politicized today? I’m sorry; not credible, in my view.
5. And a couple of last points, since I am sitting in bed with a fever and am undoubtedly wearing down the patience of readers: One, resting coverage on the record of section 5 objections might be fair if we could all agree that DOJ objections did, in fact, signal bad things going on, but DOJ objections have been ideologically driven for decades. Two, insisting that covered jurisdictions prove a negative--the absence of discrimination--made sense in the southern context in 1965; today? And finally, the meaning of "racially polarized voting" needs to be revisited. It is one topic among many that warrants a sophisticated discussion somewhere in the course of these hearings. Not holding my breath.
Abigail Thernstrom
-- Rick Hasen William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law Loyola Law School 919 Albany Street Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211 (213)736-1466 - voice (213)380-3769 - fax rick.hasen@lls.edu http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.html http://electionlawblog.org