<x-flowed>I thought some on this list might be interested in this post I just
penned... -Joe
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Complications with Sequoia's VVPATs, tapes in CA counties
<http://josephhall.org/nqb2/index.php/2006/05/31/casequoiavvpat>
A recent article from the North County Times here in California
reports that at least three counties -- Riverside, Napa and San
Bernardino -- do not plan on posting results reports in each polling
place, contrary to California law.
Riverside has asked for an exception to the provision in the
California Election Code ([¤19370][1] and possibly [¤10260][2]) which
mandates the posting of results tapes at each precint (from [*"County
in good (and bad) company"*][3]):
Riverside County elections officials say privacy concerns and a range
of logistical hurdles prevent them from tallying and posting each
precinct's votes at the polling place, but a dozen other counties
around the state do so with little problem, according to officials in
those counties. [...]
Riverside County Registrar of Voters Barbara Dunmore gave several
reasons for deciding not to post the results. For one, she said,
there's nothing to keep people from walking off with the tallies. More
importantly, observers might be able to deduce how particular people
voted at polls where only a handful of voters cast ballots, violating
a central principle of American elections, she said.
In addition to arguing above that results posting could implicate
voter privacy, Barbara Dunmore, Registrar of Riverside Co., argues
that people can "walk off" with these reports, eliminating their
usefulness. First, there should definitely be concerns about
precincts so small that all ballots cast might be identical.
Researchers here at Berkeley, Christopher Crutchfield, David Molner
and David Turner, point this out in a forthcoming paper entitled
"Approximate Measurement of Voter Privacy Loss in an Election With
Precinct Reports", forthcoming at the [NIST/NSF Voting Systems Rating
Workshop][4] next week in Washington, D.C. One idea for solving that
problem is to consolidate precincts where one of the precincts would
have cast uniform ballots otherwise.
Second, people shouldn't be taking the results reports from the
precincts. In fact, it is illegal (CA Elec. Code [¤18570(a)][5])
under California Law to "remove or deface" a results report within 48
hours of the close of polls.
It's clear to me that these counties have chosen to de-emphasize the
importance of this provision of California Law, not because of
concerns with voter privacy or the utility of posting results records
but because the design of their voting machinery. The counties
mentioned in this story all use the Sequoia AVC Edge <abbr
title="Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine">DRE</abbr> with
VeriVote printer (for paper-trail compatibility according to CA law).
Instead of designing a printer where poll workers change paper rolls
or cartridges, Sequoia has designed the system such that entire
printers are meant to be swapped out. These printers are difficult to
open. The state's consultant who reviewed the system for the
California Secretary of State, Paul Craft, had the following to say in
February (from [*"California Secretary of State
Consultant's Report Sequoia's Voting Systems"*][6]):
The poll opening zero tape and the results tape can only be printed on the same
paper tape within the VeriVote Printer component. Zero tapes will be at the
beginning of the record at the center of the spool. If a jurisdiction
wishes to have
pollworkers sign the results tape, it must provide a procedure for opening the
VeriVote Printer.
I also don't buy the argument floated in the North County Times
article that the part of the Election Code (¤19370) that requires
results to be posted applies only to lever voting machines:
Some elections experts and officials in some counties say the posting
requirement, which was written in 1961, can no longer apply:
Surrounding parts of the elections code appear to deal with procedures
specific to the outdated lever machines, they note. [...]
In the 1960s, when casting a ballot meant pulling a mechanical lever,
poll workers at most voting stations tallied and posted their own
results before carting the ballots off to a central location. The law
that required the procedure then is still on the books, but remains
embedded in a part of the elections code that appears to deal
specifically with the lever machines, which are obsolete.
The full language of the relevant paragraph of ¤19370 reads:
**If the machine is provided with a recording device, in lieu of opening the counter compartment the precinct board shall proceed to operate the mechanism to produce the statement of return of votes cast record** in a minimum of three copies, remove the irregular ballot, if any, record on the statement of return of votes cast record. The irregular ballot shall be attached to the statement of result record of votes cast for the machine and become a part thereof. **One copy of the statement of return of votes cast for each machine shall be posted upon the outside wall of the precinct for all to see.** The statement of return of votes cast for each machine for the precinct shall constitute the precinct statement of result of votes cast. *(emphasis added)*
The language is clear to me and it is clearly in contrast to the
language of the preceding paragraph which refers to specific features
of lever machines such as "counting compartments" and "counter
numbers". This paragraph was intended to cover "Elections Using
Voting Machines" (the title of that chapter of the code) that are
conducted on voting machines other than lever machines or those based
on counters.
I have a hard time believing that the Registrars in Riverside, Napa
and San Bernardino counties are being as forthcoming as they should be
in their moves to waive or disobey this aspect of California election
law. I would really like to hear what their real concerns are. Are
the procedures for opening the printer too complicated? too
complicated for the aging poll worker population? Does opening the
printer subsystem at the end of the day unreasonably compromise the
chain of custody for the paper trail inside? Basically: On what basis
are these decisions really being made?
[1]:
http://leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=elec&group=19001-20000&file=19370-19371
[2]:
http://leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=elec&group=10001-11000&file=10260-10266
[3]:
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2006/05/31/news/californian/21_51_075_30_06.txt
[4]:
http://vote.cs.gwu.edu/vsrw2006/workshop.html
[5]:
http://leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=elec&group=18001-19000&file=18560-18578
[6]:
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/sequoia_consultant_report.pdf