Subject: Changes in Latitude, Changes in Attitude
From: DANIEL TOKAJI
Date: 6/30/2006, 12:45 PM
To: David Epstein
CC: Rick Pildes <PILDESR@juris.law.nyu.edu>, Heather Gerken <gerken@law.harvard.edu>, election-law@majordomo.lls.edu

Quoting that great student of democracy Jimmy Buffet, one could say that both now matter in measuring a group's "compactness." ;-)

Daniel P. Tokaji
Assistant Professor of Law
The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law
614.292.6566
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/


----- Original Message -----
From: David Epstein <de11@columbia.edu>
Date: Friday, June 30, 2006 0:11 am
Subject: Re:

I agree that the most novel part of the case is Kennedy's 
assertion that the
new District 25 did not satisfy Section 2. In addition to the 
usual notion
that a district has to be geographically compact, he has added the
requirement that it be "socially compact" as well, to coin a 
phrase. Unless
the minority residents within the district are sufficiently 
homogeneous,they will henceforth not qualify as a single 
"community of interest" and
hence will flunk the first Gingles prong.

One way to interpret this standard is to say that although the 
district had
a majority of Latino voters, the two groups had preferences that 
were so
disparate that they could not unity behind a single candidate. On 
this,then, does anyone know the story behind Lloyd Doggett's 
victory in the new
25th in 2004? Did he appeal to both Latino communities? Did he 
have a Latino
challenger? The opinion glides over this issue entirely.

Kennedy tries mightily to limit this ruling, saying that "We 
emphasize it is
the enormous geographical distance separating the Austin and 
Mexican-border
communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these
populationsÑnot either factor aloneÑthat renders District 25 
noncompact for
¤2 purposes." I think he intends this to be a one-off ruling, 
since the
changes to the 23rd district really bugged him and he didn't like 
the shape
or the theory behind the new 25th.

But how successful is this? Surely a Section 2 violation cannot 
rest on
differences in latitude alone. Why can't this standard be applied to
districts like the one in Georgia, uniting black populations from 
Atlantaand adjacent rural areas? Or even populations that live 
quite close to each
other, but are socioeconomically distinct and, say, rarely mix 
with each
other? If taken seriously, this standard would come heavily into 
play with
every single minority opportunity district drawn from now on.

Another question is whether this is a step back or forwards for 
the desired
movement to a system where race matters less. Roberts clearly 
thinks that
it's a step backwards. In a quote destined to be a classic, echoing
O'Connor's earlier reference to "political apartheid", he states 
"I do not
believe it is our role to make judgments about which mixes of minority
voters should count for purposes of forming a majority in an electoral
district, in the face of factual findings that the district is an 
effectivemajority-minority district. It is a sordid business, this 
divvying us up by
race." (emphasis in original)

But there is an opposite view, which says that by recognizing 
differenceswithin the minority community, the Court is moving away 
from a view of
society in which monolithic minority voters are opposed by an equally
homogeneous white majority. The implication is that the Latino 
voters in the
new 25th that live near the border would share some common 
interests with
other low-income voters, while Latinos in and around Austin could make
common cause with others from that area. As the line from "The 
Incredibles"goes, "When everyone's special, nobody is."




On 6/29/06, Rick Pildes <PILDESR@juris.law.nyu.edu> wrote:

 I feel obliged to respond to Heather Gerken, which I can do quite
briefly, regarding Justice Kennedy's views in the Texas case and 
the future
of the VRA.  To my mind, nose-counting and speculation about 
opinion drafts
miss the essential point I mean to convey.  We all assume 
Justice Kennedy
defines the center Ñ is the defining Justice Ñ in closely 
contested VRA
cases before the Court.  And the central theme of "the music" 
played in his
opinion is that, as he puts it in one passage:  "We do a 
disservice to these
important goals [of the VRA] by failing to account for the 
differences> between people of the same race."  In this case, he 
does not address
whether failing to do so might violate the Constitution; he 
comes close to
saying it violates the VRA (whether he did so conclude in an 
earlier draft
is also not particularly significant, in my view), but does not 
actually so
hold.  But the precise legal resolution is not important.  
What's important
is the principle or viewpoint expressed in that passage and 
similar ones.
That viewpoint is going to have ramifications* throughout* the 
Court's> interpretation and application of the VRA, not just on 
the narrow issue of
whether districts must be "coherent" as well as "compact."   
Sometimes, this
viewpoint will get expressed in terms of how racially-polarized 
voting> should be defined, the conventional definition of which I 
believe will come
under increasing pressure; sometimes I believe it will come in 
through how
the "totality of the circumstances" is analyzed; sometimes it 
will emerge
through Kennedy's application of Shaw; sometimes, through how 
Section 2 is
interpreted in other ways.  The viewpoint essential to his 
opinion in Texas
will find various specific legal expression, not all of which 
can be
anticipated at this stage.  But this is not a throwaway view in this
particular case.  It's a foundational principle.

As long as Justice Kennedy remains at the center of the Court on VRA
issues, that is why I believe this decision is pregnant with 
profound> implications.  I do agree with Heather that if Justice 
Kennedy turns out not
be at the center of the Court Ñ if, for example, Justice Scalia 
turns out to
be more receptive to maintaining prior interpretations of the 
VRA than does
Justice Kennedy, then of course, all bets are off.

Richard H. Pildes
Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law
Co-Director, NYU Center on Law and Security
NYU School of Law
212 998-6377




-- 

**************************************
David Epstein
Professor of Political Science
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027
212-854-7566
http://www.columbia.edu/~de11
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