<x-flowed>Dear friends -- My corporate law colleague Julian Velasco has posed an interesting election law question which I could not answer off the top of my head.  Here it is:  "Would it be very difficult for me to find support -- whether it be case law, law review articles, or treatises -- for the proposition that the right to vote in an election should mean, at a minimum, the right to vote "no" or otherwise reject a candidate?"  He's asking "because elections of directors in corporate law are conducted by plurality vote; it is literally impossible for a director candidate not to be elected unless there is a challenger (which is extremely rare).  There is a big push to move towards majority voting, so that director candidates could be rejected even without a challenger."  He would like to say that, as a matter of common sense, this is necessary to "take shareholder voting rights seriously" and make them "meaningful."

Thanks for any help that you can provide. -- John



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