Subject: Re: [EL] Electionlawblog news and commentary 9/28/10 |
From: Lloyd Mayer |
Date: 9/29/2010, 5:44 AM |
To: "JBoppjr@aol.com" <JBoppjr@aol.com>, "lehto.paul@gmail.com" <lehto.paul@gmail.com> |
CC: "election-law@mailman.lls.edu" <election-law@mailman.lls.edu> |
The news reports I have seen suggest two , more subtle ways that
CU may be increasing corporate spending. The first is spending by corporations
that pre-CU avoided any election-related spending because it was not cost effective
for it to hire sophisticated election lawyers to help them craft ads that
avoided express advocacy and its functional equivalent. Having been on
conference calls with up to six lawyers parsing through election-related ads, I
can certainly understand the pre-CU reluctance to start that meter running. After
CU, however, such corporations now only have to worry about complying with the
disclosure requirements.
The second is targeted spending, where a corporation focuses its
resources on a race it has identified as critical for its interests. Think
Capteron, except with Massey buying the independent expenditure ads, not its
CEO.
From: election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu
[mailto:election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu] On Behalf Of JBoppjr@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 2010 7:57 PM
To: lehto.paul@gmail.com
Cc: election-law@mailman.lls.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] Electionlawblog news and commentary 9/28/10
Geez, I am thrilled by the result in CU
and have hardly minimized its impact, particularly on the law, but what I was
talking about was the practical effect and I was trying to be
candid. I said an only modest effect on business corps, more of an impact
on advocacy corporation, like CU, but the total net effect is now
indeterminate. I only know what I currently know. Jim Bopp