| Subject: [EL] Electionlawblog news and commentary 10/25/10 |
| From: Rick Hasen |
| Date: 10/25/2010, 8:25 AM |
| To: Election Law |
E.J. Dionne's latest
column.
Politico offers this
important report. This is an unsurprising consequence of
the new campaign finance regime. I wrote in a Slate column a
few weeks back, "as I predicted,
funding to the Rove political group American Crossroads
skyrocketed when he opened up a 501(c)(4) affiliate, Crossroads
GPS, to take anonymous donations. The Chamber, meanwhile, is a
501(c)(6) trade association, and it, too, does not have to
disclose its members or their contributions publicly." That
earlier prediction
came in April, in a column entitled "Hushed Money: Could Karl
Rove's new 527 avoid campaign-finance disclosure requirements?"
The Washington Times offers this
report.
HuffPo reports.
Barry Burden and Ken Mayer have written this
NYT oped.
Gronke:
Early voting claims 'breathless."
McDonald:
Silver's claims "fatally flawed."
The Silver piece is here.
The Politico piece is here.
I think Jonathan Adler nails
it.
See here.
The profile is based in part upon a report described as follows:
"Common Cause and another liberal-leaning group, Public
Campaign, commissioned Klein Research Services to conduct the
study of Bopp's record, headlined 'The Man Behind Our Secret
Elections.' McClatchy obtained an advance copy." This
recent NYT story also referenced the report, but it does
not yet appear to be released.
The NY Times offers this
front page report, which begins: "The anonymously financed
conservative groups that have played such a crucial role this
campaign year are starting a carefully coordinated final push to
deliver control of Congress to Republicans, shifting money among
some 80 House races they are monitoring day by day."
The Washington Post offers this
report. The newspaper also offers Risky
career move paid off for fundraiser Rob Collins -- and the
Republicans.
[Here is the second of three guest posts by David
Schleicher.--RH]
It wasn't hard to predict the big stories of the 2010 election.
For instance, given the state of the economy and the uncommonly
large majorities racked up by Democrats in 2008, it is
unsurprising that this is a rough year for Democrats, or that a
large number of Democrats elected in swing districts in 2006 and
2008 are at risk of losing their seats.
One story, however, is surprising: the extent to which the
parties differ on the big issues of the day. Ordinarily,
following Anthony Downs, we might assume that parties would make
moderate policy offerings, chasing the ever-elusive median
voter. Nothing of the sort has happened this year, particularly
as Republican primary voters chose the more conservative
candidate (or scared the moderate out of the party) in no fewer
than 9 Senate races this year. Sometimes the media is right: The
story of the year is almost definitely Christine O'Donnell,
Sharon Angle, Alan Grayson and the absence of median voter
politics.
Judged by ordinary metrics, the degree of polarization in
Congress and the electorate has rising for decades -- the number
of ticket splitters and swing voters in the electorate and the
amount of agreement among Members of Congress from different
parties has been falling for about 30 or so years now. While
political scientists have spent the last twenty or so years
debating the causes of polarization, legal scholars have not
done too much with this trend. (Rick Pildes is a notable and
important exception; his must-read new piece, Why
The Center Does Not Hold explains the important role
played by the Voting Rights Act in creating our modern polarized
two-party system and much else as well -- make sure to check it
out.) To the extent polarization gets discussed by legal
scholars, it is usually used as a boogeyman, a fate to be
avoided and an argument for voting reform, like the adoption of
instant run-off voting or open or top-two primaries.
The national discussion of polarization could use a better
understanding of the role of election law, or more specifically
how legal institutions translate voter preferences into party
positions. The story of our growing polarization is at least in
part a story about election law, but it is not necessarily an
unattractive one (at least it does not necessarily make our
election laws seem unattractive.) But to see this we need to
look at American politics in comparative perspective.
Over the last decade or two, the rest of the democratic world,
including virtually every other country that like the United
States has first-past-the-post (FPTP) or plurality wins) vote
counting, has seen the development of new parties or substantial
success for existing smaller parties, including radical ones.
Party polarization -- here meaning not just parties that are
distinct from one another but parties that promote policies that
are distant from one another -- is likely the American version
of the whatever worldwide phenomenon produced new and successful
third (and fourth) parties in other countries.
The reason we see polarization in the United State instead of
the development of new parties is our election law system,
particularly the availability and openness of our primary
elections. When some portion of the population develops
preferences well outside the current mainstream defined by the
two major parties -- like this year's Tea Party movement -- the
availability of primary elections provides these voters and
activists with the option of contesting for the leadership of
one of the two mainstream political parties, rather than
starting out on their own.
Primaries thus allow for polarization rather than party system
fracture, and are probably the reason for the continued survival
of the U.S.'s two-party system in the face of widely divergent
popular opinion.
If we take FPTP vote counting as a given, having
polarization rather than fracture produces substantial benefits;
it provides clearer choices for voters and there are no wasted
votes. Further, having only two parties inside a FPTP system
preserves the crucial role in American election for the median
voter: determining who wins each general election. As a result,
we can expect a polarized two-party system to produce policy
that follows median voter preferences in the long run. However,
polarization means that there will be a high degree of variance,
as each election will produce a winner who does not promote
median-voter preferred policies. However, in the face of an
electorate (or at least the engaged part of the electorate) with
very widely divergent preferences, party fracture or party
polarization may be the only choices.
Robbin Stewart blogs
about a sentence in a recent NY
Times article reading: "On Friday, Mr. Guetzloe was
sentenced to 60 days in prison for a misdemeanor campaign
violation relating to an anonymous political flier he sent four
years ago, but his sentence does not start until after the
election."
The brief is here,
via a critical
Christian Adams.
"In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court chose the Republican
president. In Citizens United, the court may return Republicans
to control of Congress. So much for conservatives' professed
disdain of judicial activism. And so much for the public's
long-held trust in the impartiality of the nation's highest
court. "
---Maureen
Dowd
Peter Wallison blogs
at the AEI "Enterprise" blog.
This
lengthy post appears at the "Political Correction" blog of
Media Matters.
Politico offers this
report.