One reason why there is an upward limit to competition may be due to partisan segregation. Bruce Oppenheimer has some work showing that more and more Republicans live near Republicans and Democrats near Democrats. So it may be difficult to draw districts with a good number of both R and D voters.
As for the finding that optimal partisan gerrymandering leads to safe districts, I would like to add one wrinkle. Chad Murphy and I published a couple of articles (2009 Political Geography and forthcoming Political Research Quarterly) in which we show that partisan mapmakers are able to target out-party districts in a different way, by inducing population instability. So for instance, it may be the case that an out-party Republican incumbent's district is composed mainly of Republican constituents both prior to and following redistricting (i.e., it's a safe district in terms of partisanship). However, when many "old" Republican constituents are replaced with "new" Republican constituents, it creates an environment propitious to a competitive election. That's what we found happened in 2002. By looking mainly at partisanship, optimal gerrymandering models potentially miss an important source of heterogeneity which leads to competition.
Antoine
--------------------
Antoine Yoshinaka
Assistant Professor
Dept. of Political Science
2217 Watkins Hall
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, CA 92521
Tel:(951)827-4688
Fax:(951)827-3933
Email: antoine.yoshinaka@ucr.edu
Website: http://politicalscience.ucr.edu/people/faculty/yoshinaka/index.html
---- Original message ----
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:00:53 -0400
From: election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu (on behalf of Michael McDonald <mmcdon@gmu.edu>)
Subject: Re: [EL] Redistricting answer
To: "'Election Law'" <election-law@mailman.lls.edu>
Owen and Grofman (Political Geography 1988) create a formal mode and find
that partisan and incumbent protection gerrymanders are the same in terms of
competition. I illustrate this simply in my redistricting chapter for the
Marketplace of Democracy edited volume (edited with John Samples). My
dissertation took this one step further and formally showed that to maximize
expected number seats or maximize probability of majority control in the
presence of greater volatility (i.e., partisan gerrymandering), the optimal
response is to draw safer districts. I published elements of this in:
Michael P. McDonald. 2008. "Redistricting and the Decline of Competitive
Congressional Districts." in Mobilizing Democracy: A Comparative Perspective
on Institutional Barriers and Political Obstacles.
I would not disagree on the second part about the upward limit. Read my
Midwest Mapping Project report, which you can download at
http://elections.gmu.edu/Redistricting.html, which generally shows something
similar. To see what might happen if one were to directly incorporate
competition into the redistricting criteria and balance it against other
goals, including the Voting Rights Act -- and not demote it below the other
criteria as Arizona did -- I recommend reading the results of the 2009 Ohio
Secretary of State redistricting competition at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/redistricting.aspx. This competition shows
that reformers' and the voting rights community's goals are not as at odds
with one another as one may think, that is it is possible to simultaneously
draw a Cleveland voting rights district and to draw districts that are more
fair and competitive than the current Ohio congressional redistricting plan.
This competition illustrates why I favor broad public participation in
redistricting, so that we may have a better sense of the trade-offs between
various goals and have an informed debate about those goals and the types of
districts that may result.
============
Dr. Michael P. McDonald
Associate Professor, George Mason University
Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Mailing address:
(o) 703-993-4191 George Mason University
(f) 703-993-1399 Dept. of Public and International Affairs
mmcdon@gmu.edu 4400 University Drive - 3F4
http://elections.gmu.edu Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
-----Original Message-----
From: election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu
[mailto:election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu] On Behalf Of nate@persily.com
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 8:05 PM
To: Douglas Johnson; Election Law
Subject: Re: [EL] Redistricting answer
Since 2002, about 18 percent of congressional seats have changed hands (that
is, a D and an R have held the seat). Jason Kelly and I have a paper on this
that we will post once we incorporate the 2010 election results. As far as
I can tell, the seats that changed hands were proportionally distributed
among partisan and bipartisan gerrymanders. For every successful bipartisan
gerrymander (e.g., California) there were others that were less successful
(e.g. New York). Same is true for partisan gerrymanders (compare Florida
with Pennsylvania).
I guess one could say that gerrymanders become more unstable over the course
of a decade, all else equal. But each decade seems to differ from the last.
Compare the 2002 and 2004 elections with 1982 and 1994, for example.
I would say (perhaps inviting controversy) that absent intentional efforts
to draw competitive districts, it might be difficult to draw more than about
a third of House districts that would be likely to change hands throughout
the decade. However, a lot could happen in terms of shifting party ID over
the next ten years.
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
-----Original Message-----
From: Douglas Johnson <djohnson@ndcresearch.com>
Sender: election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 2010 14:46:29
To: <rick.hasen@lls.edu>; 'Election Law'<election-law@mailman.lls.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] Redistricting answer
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