Regarding Rick's thoughtful post:
The underlying dynamics of why polarized parties would be associated with greater swings ("wave elections") are not entirely clear to me. It is reasonable to suppose that more polarized parties would be associated
with less performance-based retrospective voting, dampening rather than enhancing swings. This would seem to follow from the standard model in which voters are assumed to value both "ideological goods" (on which the electorate is divided, e.g., abortion
liberalization or restriction) and "valence goods" (which everyone likes, e.g., economic growth, non-corrupt government). In a world of hyper-polarized parties, the cost, in terms of forgone ideological goods, of a valence/performance-based "vote for the
other team," is greater than in a world in which the parties are less polarized. Put differently, the recent-economic-conditions model of voting should become less predictive of swings in a hyper-polarized world.
That said, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that in a world of hyper-polarized parties, *unified party government* will result in much greater swings
by centrist voters to the other party in the ensuing congressional election
(cf. 1994, 2010). The more polarized the parties, the less satisfied centrist voters will be with the ideological policy outputs of government under unified party control. So, even if the economy is humming along nicely, one might expect that highly
polarized parties will result in centrist voters swinging dramatically to the out of power party in mid-term elections whenever the legislative and executive branches are under the control of one party. I haven't looked that the data, but I understand from
newsmedia reports that the swing of self-described independents from Obama (in 2008) to Republican congressional candidates (in 2010) was unprecedented. This fits with the strategic ticket-splitting story.
The only time in which unified party government has persisted through an election cycle since the 1970s was the 108th and 109th Congress (2002-2006). Perhaps this was an artifact of the war--with independents' confidence
in Republicans on national security issues preventing what would otherwise have been a swing to the Dems to achieve divided government and ideologically preferable policy outputs.
Off list, David Schleicher has suggested that polarized parties may lead to larger swings for another reason--the loss of "stabilizer" congresspersons who are elected on non-ideological grounds. One potential stabilizer
is the candidate who wins election on the basis of the personal vote (likeability). The
more ideological the parties, the greater is the cost (in terms of forgone ideological goods) of voting on the basis of likeability. Relatedly, more polarized parties may lead to a shift in policy ouputs from
universal logrolls to mininum-winning-coalition logrolls, which would reduce the voter's payoff for supporting a senior officeholder because of his or her seniority, rather than voting for a more ideologically
congruent challenger.
--Chris
Christopher S. Elmendorf
Professor of Law
University of California at Davis
400 Mrak Hall Drive
Davis, CA 95616
tel: 530.752.5756
From: election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu [election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Hasen [hasenr@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2010 5:03 PM
To: Election Law
Subject: [EL] Pildes guest post/more news III
Pildes: Political Polarization and the Nationalization of Congressional Elections
Here's a guest post from
Rick Pildes:
As demonstrated again in the 2010 elections, the single most significant fact about American politics over the last generation is the emergence of hyperpolarized political parties. The parties are both internally more unified than in prior decades and more
sharply differentiated from each other. This is not a transient fact. This polarization has began roughly in the 1980s and has been increasing constantly ever since. Indeed, the 2010 election cycle saw an even further purification of the parties, as a number
of more centrist or moderate figures were eliminated during the primary process. As I have
written about, this hyperpolarization will have numerous consequences for both elections and governance, one of which was played out yesterday: congressional elections are likely to be more nationalized. They will be much more referenda on the political
parties and their leaders than individualized judgments about particular House and Senate candidates. Candidates will rise and fall with the fate of their political parties more than in the past. And the fate of the parties will be heavily determined by public
judgments about the party's leaders, particularly, for the party in power, the President. That is the best explanation, I believe, of why we have now experienced three cycles in a row of "wave" elections, with yesterday's being the most dramatic example.
Here's the data to support the view that "wave elections" are becoming more common. From 1976-2004, there was only one year in which the shift (or "swing," in the more technical jargon) in the aggregate, nationwide vote for the parties from one election cycle
to the next exceeded 5% (for data, I am relying on this paper by
Nagler and Issacharoff). That was in 1994, when the Republicans took over the House. On average during this period, the swing between the parties was 2.18% (if we include the dramatic 1994 election) and 1.89% (if we exclude 1994). But in 2006, the swing
from 2004 was 7%, in favor of the Democrats. That is because the 2006 elections were a national referendum, in effect, on the Bush presidency at a moment at which that presidency had become widely unpopular, as demonstrated in Gary Jacobson's analysis of those
elections. Initial
analysis from Nate Silver of yesterday's results indicate that there was a swing of 6.7% for the Republicans from the prior election. The 2010 election, again, was a nationalized referenda, this time on the first two years of the Obama administration. Though
individual factors influenced many races, the general pattern was again one in which candidates rose and fell with their party moreso than in earlier decades. From 1964-2004, there were only two elections with a swing of 6% or more, 1966 and 1994. We have
now had at least two elections involving this kind of swing in the last four years.
Why are "wave elections" becoming so much more common? My hypothesis is that it's because of the intense polarization of the parties that has emerged. This polarization does not guarantee that we will see much more dramatic swings for and against the parties;
voters might have stable preferences between the parties over long periods of time, even if the parties are sharply polarized. But this polarization makes wave elections more likely. When the party labels represent clearly identifiable brands that are sharply
distinct from each other, voters are more able, and more likely, to link the fates of individual candidates to each other through the party label. Hence, polarization, nationalization of elections, and waves of shift in support between the parties all go hand
in hand.
The rise of more nationalized elections, through polarization of the parties, has implications for many aspects of elections and governance. Briefly, here's one -- I get asked frequently why, if congressional districts are so gerrymandered, has there been so
much turnover in the House in 2006, 2008, and now, 2010? Didn't the gerrymandering that followed the 2000 Census make congressional districts much safer and hence less competitive? The answer is yes: congressional districts were safer, in that it took a much
larger swing of support from one party to the other to throw out those elected in the districts designed for this decade. But, the nationalization of elections has made these much larger waves possible and more likely. Thus, congressional districts were more
insulated, but the tidal waves of swings for and against the parties have been high enough -- much higher than in the past -- to overcome this insulation, when voters turn on one party or the other. That's a brief answer, and I'll elaborate in another post
if that's not clear enough. But for now, the larger point is that the intense polarization of the parties leads to greater nationalization of congressional elections. That greater nationalization enables "wave elections" of the sort we are now experiencing.
Posted by Rick Hasen at
12:15 PM
--
Rick Hasen
William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
(213)736-1466
(213)380-3769 - fax
rick.hasen@lls.edu
http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.html
http://electionlawblog.org