Subject: Re: [EL] Pildes guest post/more news III
From: "Elmendorf, Christopher" <cselmendorf@ucdavis.edu>
Date: 11/4/2010, 12:11 PM
To: "rick.hasen@lls.edu" <rick.hasen@lls.edu>, Election Law <election-law@mailman.lls.edu>
CC: "dschleic@gmu.edu" <dschleic@gmu.edu>, "Frank, Rick" <rmfrank@ucdavis.edu>

Regarding Rick's thoughtful post:
 
The underlying dynamics of why polarized parties would be associated with greater swings ("wave elections") are not entirely clear to me.  It is reasonable to suppose that more polarized parties would be associated with less performance-based retrospective voting, dampening rather than enhancing swings.  This would seem to follow from the standard model in which voters are assumed to value both "ideological goods" (on which the electorate is divided, e.g., abortion liberalization or restriction) and "valence goods" (which everyone likes, e.g., economic growth, non-corrupt government).  In a world of hyper-polarized parties, the cost, in terms of forgone ideological goods, of a valence/performance-based "vote for the other team," is greater than in a world in which the parties are less polarized.  Put differently, the recent-economic-conditions model of voting should become less predictive of swings in a hyper-polarized world.   
 
That said, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that in a world of hyper-polarized parties, *unified party government* will result in much greater swings by centrist voters to the other party in the ensuing congressional election (cf. 1994, 2010).  The more polarized the parties, the less satisfied centrist voters will be with the ideological policy outputs of government under unified party control.  So, even if the economy is humming along nicely, one might expect that highly polarized parties will result in centrist voters swinging dramatically to the out of power party in mid-term elections whenever the legislative and executive branches are under the control of one party.  I haven't looked that the data, but I understand from newsmedia reports that the swing of self-described independents from Obama (in 2008) to Republican congressional candidates (in 2010) was unprecedented.  This fits with the strategic ticket-splitting story.
 
The only time in which unified party government has persisted through an election cycle since the 1970s was the 108th and 109th Congress (2002-2006).  Perhaps this was an artifact of the war--with independents' confidence in Republicans on national security issues preventing what would otherwise have been a swing to the Dems to achieve divided government and ideologically preferable policy outputs. 
 
Off list, David Schleicher has suggested that polarized parties may lead to larger swings for another reason--the loss of "stabilizer" congresspersons who are elected on non-ideological grounds.  One potential stabilizer is the candidate who wins election on the basis of the personal vote (likeability).  The more ideological the parties, the greater is the cost (in terms of forgone ideological goods) of voting on the basis of likeability.  Relatedly, more polarized parties may lead to a shift in policy ouputs from universal logrolls to mininum-winning-coalition logrolls, which would reduce the voter's payoff for supporting a senior officeholder because of his or her seniority, rather than voting for a more ideologically congruent challenger. 
 
--Chris
 
Christopher S. Elmendorf
Professor of Law
University of California at Davis
400 Mrak Hall Drive
Davis, CA 95616
tel: 530.752.5756

From: election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu [election-law-bounces@mailman.lls.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Hasen [hasenr@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2010 5:03 PM
To: Election Law
Subject: [EL] Pildes guest post/more news III

Pildes: Political Polarization and the Nationalization of Congressional Elections

Here's a guest post from Rick Pildes:


Posted by Rick Hasen at 12:15 PM
-- 
Rick Hasen
William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
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rick.hasen@lls.edu
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