On 12/3/10, David A. Schultz <dschultz@gw.hamline.edu> wrote:

However, I am still looking for evidence of increased detection of fraud
as a result of IDs.

Quite the opposite.  Fake IDs are quite common, so common that
cashiers, bouncers, and others have to get trained in them. Even
still, below is some data of the enormous amount of (check) fraud
specifically WITH IDs, and with employee training, in the form of the
problem of ID fraud in check cashing (which is reported by merchants
as constituting 17% of all bad checks, according to a survey cited
below)

By definition "ID fraud" does not exist without an ID requirement to
pass a check.

Of all bad checks accepted by merchants of all sizes, fully 17% of
those millions of bad checks slipped by by virtue of ID fraud, despite
the requirement of ID, despite the checking of that ID by clerks or
cashiers all trained to a substantial extent. See Table 24 on page 66
of http://www.jnc-kk.com/publicity/pdf/fmi2008.pdf

We can always expect criminals to get fake IDs, can't we?  Perhaps
someone can explain why volunteer pollworkers in precincts would be
better than cashiers at detecting ID fraud (I'll give one reason to
think this may be so, below, yet voter ID is still not justifiable
given options...)

Tellingly, the mom and pop stores and very small chains with less than
10 stores reported 0% ID fraud even though they had substantial
numbers of NSF checks and "check fraud" cases not involving ID issues.

On page 66 of the linked survey/study of merchants that follows, it
notes that for the year 2007 ID fraud in independents, small stores
(0-10 locations) and stores with annuals sales less than $100 million
is zero percent, even though they have substantial rates of NSF checks
and "check fraud" or writing a check knowingly on a closed account.
Still  no ID fraud.  http://www.jnc-kk.com/publicity/pdf/fmi2008.pdf
One must wonder why.

Given the dramatic differences in rates of ID fraud between smaller
and larger businesses, I gather a rather strong inference that either
the greater personal knowledge that small proprietors and their
employees have of their largely local customers, or the fear of this
knowledge on the part of potential perpetrators along with policies
like "only local checks" acts to reduce ID fraud to essentially zero
for very small businesses.

The precinct system in elections is supposed to, and often does,
operate on such a basis where neighbors recognize neighbors.  A
precinct can be thought of as a very small neighborhood-based
business.  Moreover, part of pollworker training can easily be to
learn to recognize their neighbors and fellow precinct members. It is
well within human ability for, say, five pollworkers to already know
or learn 100 faces apiece and thus recognize all 500 precinct
registered voters.  Even if such a training effort at recognizance
were well publicized it would exert a substantial deterrent effect --
even if the training were in fact poor.

These facts could be seen as cutting both ways, both in favor of ID
and against, if precincts are analogized to mom and pop local stores.
But the personal recognizance of the local mom and pop store deters
ALL kinds of fraud, not just ID fraud.  The argument then, it seems,
turns on the true burden of ID (which doesn't particularly deter crime
at all, like check crimes)

The current approach of requiring IDs suppresses the vote of the
several percent who either can't locate or don't have "proper" ID at
the time of the election, as well as those who fear they don't
resemble the traditionally poor facsimile seen in a driver's license
photo. They only deter honest people who've misplaced or had their ID
stolen and these people are disproporationately from identifiable
demographics.  As a consequence, the politics of picture ID are quite
predictable because the demographic effect on the elections can be
projected with more than enough certainty to excite the political
imagination and political wheels, regardless of whether it completely
satisfies political scientists in every respect.

If I may use the only data I could readily find (1990 data) on the
above 2007 percentage, in 1990 merchants accepted 482 million bad
checks in 1990 totaling $14 billion dollars.  Seventeen percent of 482
million is 81,940,000 cases of ID fraud.  Expressed another way, in a
2003 survey, 4.7% of the nation or around 10 million people had
discovered that their Identity has been stolen (which often involves a
fraudulent use of ID) which is millions of Americans.
http://www.identity-theft-help.us/identity.theft.bad.checks.htm A
"credit freeze" or other remedies will not stop fake ID at the polls
since credit reports, of course, are not checked at the polls. (Is
anyone proposing that, yet?)

The number one risk for stores in this study remains, as always,
employee (insider) theft, which Employee theft [read: insider
fraud/theft) still tops the list of security concerns for all food
retailers, and accounts for 41% of all theft losses including bad
checks. See p. 5 at .  http://www.jnc-kk.com/publicity/pdf/fmi2008.pdf

If there truly is a problem with voter fraud as opposed to insider
fraud in elections, then those truly interested in such fraud will
just as readily get fake IDs as their check-passing counterparts, and
thus ID requirements, just as with checks, will "reduce" [sic] voter
fraud among a hypothetical 100 million voters to a mere 17 million
votes.  How is anybody supposed to feel good about voter ID
requirements? --
Paul R Lehto, J.D.
P.O. Box 1
Ishpeming, MI  49849
lehto.paul@gmail.com
906-204-4026 (cell)
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