"Five Republicans and four Democrats chosen for Redistricting Committee"

News from Nebraska.

"Meg Whitman spent $178.5 million -- $43.25 per vote -- in gubernatorial bid"

The Oakland Tribune offers this report.

"Academic round-up: Recent articles describe how the Court can change direction without expressly overruling existing precedent."

Amanda Frost has this post on SCOTUSBlog discussing Barry Friedman's excellent piece on stealth overruling, and my draft in progress on other ways that Supreme Court Justices can move the law. One of the ways I discuss in the paper is through "inadvertence," and Amanda adds some astute observations of her own on inadvertence.

Josh Blackman also asks whether these are new phenomena or tools of common law judges from time immemorial. In fact, in the paper I make it clear that these are not new phenomena, and I give examples of pre-Roberts Court uses of the same tools. Indeed, the term "time bombs" comes from the recent Brennan biography, and comes from a complaint that Justices Powell and O'Connor shared about how Justice Brennan wrote some of his opinions.

"Commissioner Statements Deeply Split Over Interpreting Campaign Finance Laws"

BNA offers this report. I've written about the same issue recently in Slate.

"Could the GOP Grab Control of Redistricting in Virginia?"

The Fix explores.

"The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law (and Why the Canadian Approach is Superior)"

Dan Tokaji has posted this draft on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of equality as a democratic value that may sometimes justify limits on campaign spending. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has long voiced skepticism of egalitarian rationales for campaign finance regulation, it has sometimes allowed equality to come in through the back door, disguised as an anticorruption rationale. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission obliterates equality as a rationale for regulation in any form. Its prohibition on egalitarian justifications applies to both the inputs and the outputs of the democratic process. In other words, spending limits may not be used to equalize citizens' ability to elect candidates to office ("electoral equality") or to equalize citizens' influence on decisions made by those in office ("policymaking equality"). The consequence of equality's banishment is an impoverished political dialogue about campaign finance regulation in the United States. Those in the public sphere are unable to talk honestly about the most important value that regulation might serve.

The article traces the roots of equality's banishment from campaign finance discourse, explains how Citizens United makes things worse, and suggests a path toward a more constructive U.S. jurisprudence. In so doing, it uses Canadian campaign finance law as a counterpoint, one that highlights flaws in the American approach. The two countries stand at opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to equality. Canada's Parliament and Supreme Court have embraced an egalitarian vision of democracy with the same gusto that the U.S. Supreme Court has disowned it. This difference has major consequences on the public discourse surrounding campaign finance regulation and the very structure of democracy.

The article starts with a discussion of Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, including cases that subtly depart from that decision’s anti-egalitarian refrain. It distills from this line of precedent four democratic values: (1) liberty, (2) equality, (3) anti-corruption, and (4) competitiveness. Historically, the battles over campaign finance in the U.S. have mostly focused on the values of liberty and anti-corruption. But the really important question is how to promote equality without diminishing fair competition. After assessing the Court’s renewed anti-egalitarian turn in Citizens United, the article contrasts Canadian constitutional law, showing how it does a better job of affirming the sometimes competing values at stake in the regulation of campaign finance. It closes by assessing the prospects for a rebirth of equality as a rationale for regulation, should the composition of the U.S Supreme Court change.

Highly recommended!

"Who Killed Public Financing?"

Eliza's latest.

"Citizens United and the Myth of a Conservative Corporate America"

Ideological Cartography offers this post with an interesting accompanying graphic.

"Shelby County v. Holder: Oral Argument Preview"

David Gans has written this post for Text & History.

--
Rick Hasen
Visiting Professor
UC Irvine School of Law (Spring 2011)
rhasen@law.uci.edu

William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
(213)736-1466
(213)380-3769 - fax
rick.hasen@lls.edu
http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.html
http://electionlawblog.org