Isn't this an end run around the need for a constitutional amendment to
change the way we elect a President? Why not just hit it head on and offer
up an amendment to do the job. If it doesn't fly, then leave things alone.
As a voter, I would be offended if my state were to dilute the influence of
my vote by allowing other states to dictate for whom my state's votes would
be cast. Of course, I live in California and I'm a Democrat.
Larry
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scarberry, Mark" <Mark.Scarberry@pepperdine.edu>
To: <election-law@mailman.lls.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 9:40 PM
Subject: [EL] A hypo about a different kind of electoral college vote
compact --cross posted to conlawprof and electionlaw lists
I wonder what we could learn about the constitutionality of the National
Popular Vote Compact by thinking about a variation on it.
Suppose states controlling 270 or more electoral votes entered into a
compact requiring each of the compacting states to choose electors who
would support the presidential candidate who received the most votes in
the compacting states. Call this the Compacting States Popular Vote
Compact (CSPVC).
The CSPVC, if followed, would render the choice of electors in the other
states irrelevant, and thus would render voting in presidential elections
in those other states pointless.
Is it clear that there are constitutionally relevant differences between
the hypothetical CSPVC scheme and the actual NPVC scheme?
Even if we treat the CSPVC as the kind of compact that requires
congressional approval, should congressional approval be sufficient to
make enforceable a compact that would make such a basic change in how we
choose presidents?
Again, is it clear that there are constitutionally relevant differences
that would require treatment of the CSPVC differently from the NPVC with
regard to whether congressional approval is or is not needed, and with
regard to whether congressional approval would be sufficient to validate
the compact?
If the CSPVC would make so basic a structural change that it could only be
implemented by constitutional amendment, where is the line between
structural changes that require constitutional amendment and those that
(at least according to NPVC supporters) do not?
Perhaps these points (or something like them) have already been discussed
somewhere. If so, cites would be appreciated.
Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine
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