[EL] Herman Cain and Black Democrats

[WewerLacy at aol.com]

I actually have done legal work for a nonprofit Herman Cain chaired during  
the mid 2000's and I was an early contributor to his Presidential 
exploratory  committee last January so far be it from me to address Professor 
Lowenstein's  question from a political as opposed to a strictly election law  
perspective....
 
But I think it is a good question.  Where there is an open primary, is  a 
result that voters of another party cross lines to affect the outcomes of the 
 opposition party either out of affinity with a candidate of the other 
party, or  to enhance the outcome in the general for their favored candidate by 
supporting  whom they might consider to be the weaker opposition candidate?
 
It seems to me that perhaps in some settings, such as the south, where  
Herman is from and has been known as a Baptist minister, African Americans,  
particularly Baptists, who are also Democrats, might find reason to vote for  
Herman Cain out of affinity.
 
It seems to me that urban African Americans in large states like Illinois  
and New York, to the extent they vote, and to the extent the primaries are 
open,  and who already support Obama out of shared ideology and more common 
affinity,  might also vote for Cain in the open primary for several reasons; 
1) the assure  that the next president is an African-American regardless of 
which party wins  the general election; 2) and perhaps of a perception, 
still to be proven, that  Cain might be the weaker of the Republican candidates 
in the general  election.
 
James V. Lacy
Wewer & Lacy, LLP
visit our website at _www.wewerlacy.com_ (http://www.wewerlacy.com) 
 
This of course goes to the core of what is wrong with an open primary  
system, as it creates an opportunity for manipulation of outcomes by voters who  
do not really support the platform of the party whose primary election they 
are  raiding.  In California, the promoters of the open primary system 
stated  they thought the system would moderate outcomes in both parties.  The 
price  to be paid for moderation is less emphasis on a platform of idea and 
significant  intervention by voters who do not share those views.  Creating  
opportunities for clever, well-funded consultants to further manipulate  
outcomes through advertising.
 
 
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