[EL] ALEC Boycott
Mark Schmitt
schmitt.mark at gmail.com
Thu Apr 12 11:44:03 PDT 2012
Let's compare the fundraising pitches of the Brennan Center and ALEC.
Here's Brennan, from the "donate" page of its web site:
"The Brennan Center is the best organization to push for deep reforms.
We are independent. We get results. We base our advocacy on facts, not
partisan talking points. We need your help."
Compare ALEC. Instead of asking for plain old no-strings donations, ALEC
invites corporate contributors to become "private-sector members" at
several levels, with specific benefits at each level, from "Washington
Circle" to "Jefferson Circle." Here's the pitch:
"One of ALEC’s greatest strengths is the public-private partnership.
ALEC provides the private sector with an unparalleled opportunity to
have its voice heard, and its perspective appreciated, by the
legislative members."
Those are totally different approaches to donors. It makes it very
explicit that ALEC is a lobbying network selling access, not just "good
work." ALEC also engages in political speech (such as promotion of Stand
Your Ground), and the boycott made the companies question whether it was
political speech they wanted to be associated with. Apparently many of
them didn't.
Mark Schmitt
Senior Fellow, The Roosevelt Institute <http://www.newdeal20.org>
202/246-2350
gchat or Skype: schmitt.mark
@mschmitt9 <https://twitter.com/#%21/mschmitt9>
On 4/12/2012 9:23 AM, JBoppjr at aol.com wrote:
> Why would someone say this obviously erroneous statement:
> "No corporation gives to ALEC because it "does good work" in the
> abstract."
> Of course they would. ALEC is pro free enterprise and most companies
> like the free enterprise system. There are, of course, conservative
> businessmen out there who like conservative policies and legislators..
> I assume the corporations that give to the Brenan Center also do so
> because they do "good works" in the view of the donor. Jim Bopp
> In a message dated 4/11/2012 10:32:28 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> schmitt.mark at gmail.com writes:
>
> The problem with that theory is that ALEC isn't a public good.
> Corporate giving to ALEC is entirely transactional -- companies
> give because corporate sponsors get X number of seats at the
> annual conference, and opportunities to weigh in on some of the
> task forces. If you don't give, you lose that access. No
> corporation gives to ALEC because it "does good work" in the
> abstract.
>
> To some extent, in demonizing ALEC, the left has exaggerated what
> it is. It's just a network for lobbyists connected to a network of
> legislators.
>
>
> Mark Schmitt
> Senior Fellow, The Roosevelt Institute <http://www.newdeal20.org/>
> 202/246-2350
> gchat or Skype: schmitt.mark
> @mschmitt9 <https://twitter.com/#%21/mschmitt9>
>
> On 4/11/2012 4:36 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
>>
>> It’s possible, but this might also be a classic
>> public goods situation – even if a corporation thinks ALEC is
>> doing superb work, the marginal effect of that corporation’s
>> withdrawal of its contribution is likely to be fairly modest, so
>> that the corporation might stop contributing.
>>
>> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
>> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] *On Behalf
>> Of *Mark Schmitt
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 11, 2012 12:50 PM
>> *To:* law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [EL] ALEC Boycott
>>
>>
>> It's interesting how quickly some of the corporations have
>> abandoned ALEC based on a very small boycott. That suggests to me
>> that the corporations didn't feel they were getting much value
>> from their involvement with ALEC, or not enough to offset the
>> very small cost of a little of bad publicity in a limited
>> community. A boycott effort by colorofchange.org is simply not
>> going to prevent a company from doing something it really wants
>> to do.
>>
>> Most likely, no one at a particularly high level of the companies
>> had even been involved in the decision to fund ALEC. It was
>> probably a decision made by the company's DC office, as a way of
>> ensuring access to the ALEC member legislators, rather than an
>> act of political speech.
>>
>> The effect of the boycott, then is to make the corporation notice
>> what its lobbyists are doing and ask whether it makes any sense.
>> That seems like a healthy development.
>>
>>
>> On 4/10/2012 12:15 PM, Rick Hasen wrote:
>>
>> These are all excellent questions, and I'd recommend Economic
>> Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat to First Amendment Protected
>> Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed
>> <http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2776&context=llr>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 4/10/2012 8:57 AM, Smith, Brad wrote:
>>
>> “While I’ve heard some conservatives saying that political
>> activism from liberals to get groups to not support ALEC is
>> intimidation, it looks to me likeprotected First Amendment
>> boycott-like activity <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=31462>.”
>>
>> Of course, it can be both. One question we are going to have to
>> ask ourselves is whether we want the meanness of the society that
>> is shaping up. While boycotts have some honorable history and can
>> be a useful tool, nobody really much wants to live in a boycott
>> world. Labor law has long prohibited secondary boycotts, largely
>> for that reason.
>>
>> We’ll also have to address more honestly whether the government
>> has a compelling interest in forcing people to disclose activity
>> that may subject them to boycotts and other forms of harassment.
>> Notice that those boycotting and organizing boycotts are not
>> required to disclose themselves, neither their identity nor their
>> sources of financing.
>>
>> Justice Scalia has voiced concern that a world without compulsory
>> disclosure would be particularly nasty. I think he’s got it
>> backwards – compulsory disclosure, supported primarily because it
>> enables opponents of speech to engage in boycotts and other
>> harassment, is creating an increasing nasty political environment.
>>
>> One can certainly see something as protected First Amendment
>> activity while recognizing it as intimidation as well. And that
>> raises the question as to what interest the government has in
>> enabling intimidation.
>>
>> /Bradley A. Smith/
>>
>> /Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault /
>>
>> / Designated Professor of Law/
>>
>> /Capital University Law School/
>>
>> /303 East Broad Street/
>>
>> /Columbus, OH 43215/
>>
>> /(614) 236-6317/
>>
>> /bsmith at law.capital.edu <mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu>/
>>
>> /http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp/
>>
>>
>>
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