[EL] 2nd try/Relationship between Contribution limits and third party expenditures

[David A. Schultz]

Since I received no responses on my previous query, let me try it again.

I am curious to whether there are any studies examining the relationship between contribution limits and third party independent expenditures.  Specifically, is there evidence that in cases where contribution limits to candidates are higher there is less third party spending?  Framed another way, I see some arguing that if we increase contribution limits to candidates it will channel spending away from independent expenditures and toward candidates instead.  Thus the case for raising contribution limits to candidates is seen as a means of reducing third party spending or at least redirecting it candidates.

Is anyone willing to comment on this or direct me to any studies that support these claims?

Here is my original post.

Thank you.

Let me pose a question in terms of a hypothesis.

Raising contribution limits to candidates for office lessens the impact that third party (independent spending) has on campaigns.

Conversely,

By raising contribution limits to candidates it decreases the amount of spending by third parties.

Does anyone have evidence or research that tests these or a similarly related hypothesis.

Thank you.

David Schultz, Professor
Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
Hamline University
School of Business
570 Asbury Street
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http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/
Twitter:  @ProfDSchultz
Named one of the inaugural 2012 FacultyRow SuperProfessors


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