[EL] 2nd try/Relationship between Contribution limits and third party expenditures

[David Mason]

I suspect you are not going to find studies of the sort you are asking
about because I doubt there many examples sufficiently isolated to these
facts to study and because looking at reported Independent Expenditures is
too narrow a lens.

What we do know for certain is that the inverse is true: when McCain
Feingold limited contributions to parties (by banning soft money), all
sorts of independent 527, c4, and Super PAC entities that had not
previously existed arose.  A lot of this happened before Citizens United:
that changed some rules but not the dynamic.

While most of these groups' expenditures were not Independent Expenditures,
they were surely political: lots of voter ID, GOTV, and, before 2012,
non-express advocacy advertising.

This demonstrates what everyone ought to understand: when you limit options
by legal fiat, buyers will choose the next best available substitute.

I suppose you could look to economic literature on price controls to see
all sorts of examples.

Dave Mason

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 8:57 AM, David A. Schultz
<dschultz at gw.hamline.edu>wrote:

> Since I received no responses on my previous query, let me try it again.
>
> I am curious to whether there are any studies examining the relationship
> between contribution limits and third party independent expenditures.
> Specifically, is there evidence that in cases where contribution limits to
> candidates are higher there is less third party spending?  Framed another
> way, I see some arguing that if we increase contribution limits to
> candidates it will channel spending away from independent expenditures and
> toward candidates instead.  Thus the case for raising contribution limits
> to candidates is seen as a means of reducing third party spending or at
> least redirecting it candidates.
>
> Is anyone willing to comment on this or direct me to any studies that
> support these claims?
>
> Here is my original post.
>
> Thank you.
>
> Let me pose a question in terms of a hypothesis.
>
> Raising contribution limits to candidates for office lessens the impact
> that third party (independent spending) has on campaigns.
>
> Conversely,
>
> By raising contribution limits to candidates it decreases the amount of
> spending by third parties.
>
> Does anyone have evidence or research that tests these or a similarly
> related hypothesis.
>
> Thank you.
>
> David Schultz, Professor
> Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
> Hamline University
> School of Business
> 570 Asbury Street
> Suite 308
> St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
> 651.523.2858 (voice)
> 651.523.3098 (fax)
> http://davidschultz.efoliomn.com/
> http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/
> http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/
> Twitter: @ProfDSchultz
> Named one of the inaugural 2012 FacultyRow SuperProfessors
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Law-election mailing list
> Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20121214/3dec706b/attachment.html>