[EL] 2nd try/Relationship between Contribution limits and third party expenditures

[Greenberg, Kevin]

This is not a study, but practical experience that might suggest an intelligent experiment.

In Pennsylvania we have almost no rules regarding expenditures on state races (some timing issues for judicial candidates, ban on corporate contributions - if that is sustainable, and disclosure requirements) but, obviously, federal limits and, since 2007, limits for City of Philadelphia races.

Historically, and as continues on unlimited races, most expenditures are made either through the candidate or through the state/county parties.  Where an IE has been undertaken, it has generally been either because (i) an institutional player - like a union or a Chamber of Commerce type group - thinks the direct spender would spend less competently, or (ii) an attempt to delay disclosure until after the election (this happened prominently in the 2008 Attorney General race and in a few judicial races).  This does not happen often and those of us who practice election law here pretty much know the back story of each instance, at least once disclosures are eventually made.  In Pennsylvania, six figure contributions are not unheard of.

On federal races, we are inundated by IE expenditures.

And in Philadelphia, the experiment continues.  We have not had a meaningfully contested citywide race post-Citizens United.  There will be a small one in 2013 (City Controller) and significant races (including an open mayoral race) in 2015.  The Philly election law bar is very small, and, judging solely by preliminary inquiries I have fielded from across the political spectrum, I would expect a dramatic increase in IE activity by 2015.

There is no likelihood of meaningful limit reform statewide for 2015, nor are we likely to see the Philadelphia change its rules materially, at least as long as Mayor Nutter (who pushed these bills as a Councilman) remains in office.

Kevin Greenberg
Flaster/Greenberg PC<http://www.flastergreenberg.com/>

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From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of David A. Schultz
Sent: Friday, December 14, 2012 8:58 AM
To: law-election at uci.edu
Subject: [EL] 2nd try/Relationship between Contribution limits and third party expenditures

Since I received no responses on my previous query, let me try it again.

I am curious to whether there are any studies examining the relationship between contribution limits and third party independent expenditures.  Specifically, is there evidence that in cases where contribution limits to candidates are higher there is less third party spending?  Framed another way, I see some arguing that if we increase contribution limits to candidates it will channel spending away from independent expenditures and toward candidates instead.  Thus the case for raising contribution limits to candidates is seen as a means of reducing third party spending or at least redirecting it candidates.

Is anyone willing to comment on this or direct me to any studies that support these claims?

Here is my original post.

Thank you.

Let me pose a question in terms of a hypothesis.

Raising contribution limits to candidates for office lessens the impact that third party (independent spending) has on campaigns.

Conversely,

By raising contribution limits to candidates it decreases the amount of spending by third parties.

Does anyone have evidence or research that tests these or a similarly related hypothesis.

Thank you.
David Schultz, Professor
Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
Hamline University
School of Business
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