[EL] 2nd try/Relationship between Contribution limits and third party expenditures

[Matthew Sanderson]

Prof. Schultz:



If you are interested, here is my theoretical framework for what you are
describing, published in a law journal a few years ago:
http://www.capdale.com/files/upload/Voodoo%20Economics%20Final%20Print.pdf.
My take is (1) we've essentially placed a price control on contributions
that results in some--although not perfect--displacement to IEs; (2) we can
likely draw some money away from IEs by raising the level of that price
control (ie. amount limitation) on contributions.  Obviously, there is some
work to be done to prove the theoretical framework correct, but this
article was my initial stab at it.



I hope this is helpful.


Matt



Matthew T. Sanderson
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
(202) 862-5046 (direct)
One Thomas Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20005
msanderson at capdale.com<https://mail.google.com/mail/html/compose/static_files/msanderson@capdale.com>
www.capdale.com/msanderson/


On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 8:57 AM, David A. Schultz
<dschultz at gw.hamline.edu>wrote:

> Since I received no responses on my previous query, let me try it again.
>
> I am curious to whether there are any studies examining the relationship
> between contribution limits and third party independent expenditures.
> Specifically, is there evidence that in cases where contribution limits to
> candidates are higher there is less third party spending?  Framed another
> way, I see some arguing that if we increase contribution limits to
> candidates it will channel spending away from independent expenditures and
> toward candidates instead.  Thus the case for raising contribution limits
> to candidates is seen as a means of reducing third party spending or at
> least redirecting it candidates.
>
> Is anyone willing to comment on this or direct me to any studies that
> support these claims?
>
> Here is my original post.
>
> Thank you.
>
> Let me pose a question in terms of a hypothesis.
>
> Raising contribution limits to candidates for office lessens the impact
> that third party (independent spending) has on campaigns.
>
> Conversely,
>
> By raising contribution limits to candidates it decreases the amount of
> spending by third parties.
>
> Does anyone have evidence or research that tests these or a similarly
> related hypothesis.
>
> Thank you.
>
> David Schultz, Professor
> Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
> Hamline University
> School of Business
> 570 Asbury Street
> Suite 308
> St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
> 651.523.2858 (voice)
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> Named one of the inaugural 2012 FacultyRow SuperProfessors
>
>
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