[EL] Touchscreen miscalibration or fraud - does it matter? WAS: Law-election Digest, Vol 19, Issue 9

[Lillie Coney]

The more important question is--are touchscreen voting systems ready for public elections.  The underlying technology and software applications are superficially similar to bank ATM e-tellers.

What I mean by superficially similar is the level of scrutiny, standards development and daily use in the banking system when compared to the election environment.

The touchscreen voting systems have and will continue to have problems because they were not specifically designed for public elections. For example, ATMs are used by a slice of the population but not everyone.  Voting systems must accommodate a group only bounded by age--anyone 18 years or older. Direct Electronic Voting (DREs) have been around prior to 2000 most often as push button machines.  Following the 2000 election the Help America Vote Act stated that each polling location should have one accessible voting system; set criterion for voting systems; and established a Federally managed standards development process for voting technology.  The bill also provided a one time infusion of cash to purchase equipment.  Equipment purchases came in advance of any Federal work on standards and the FEC quasi-government process was insufficient for the task.  We went from about 10% DRE use to nearly 50% of registered voters in a few years.  The number swiftly declined following continued problems related to their use.  The balloting method of choice theses days are Optical Scan precinct count--in precinct tabulation as voters feed ballots into scanners.

The work done by the National Association of Elections Directors was ground breaking, but had no independent funding and relied on voting system manufacturers for technical expertise. The relationship between election administrators and voting technology vendors is complicated by limited resources and little political power (e.g. control over budget, staffs etc) and no job security.

It is likely that one voting system or method will not work, but this also introduces issues of equal treatment and access.

E-ballot marking, digital storage and tabulation came in response to the 2000 chad experience. This is not a smart computing security approach.  Computers can deceive very well--as well as have errors that reveal noting through output devices (e.g. screen, printer etc). The operating systems are commercial the shelf and ballot software is designed to rely on that software to perform voice functions.

Voting systems should be designed like mission critical systems e.g. aviation hardware and software.  I am in including medical technology intentionally.  Until this happens--software independence can work; this does not mean only paper, but the correctness of the out put does not rely upon the trustworthiness of the software.  

We should not forget there are problems with central count software for physical ballots as well as chain of custody challenges.

Ultimately the election's voting system will only be as trustworthy as the people who administer elections--partisan politics have to go.  This is not the denial of a right to hold a political view or vote, but the level of professionalism we expect from referees of professional sports.  

We should take elections at least as serious as the World Series or Superbowl.


On Nov 8, 2012, at 12:37 PM, Paul Lehto <lehto.paul at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 4:08 PM, Menzel, Ken <KMenzel at elections.il.gov> wrote:
>>   
>> It is my understanding that a miscalibration affecting an office will not necessarily impact an adjacent office in the same manner.  So the fact that the tocu recorded correctly for an adjacent candidate wouldn't "prove" that miscalibration isn't the problem.
> 
> It's not really all that relevant whether the obvious problem which is clearly visible on the video is caused by "miscalibration" or caused by something else because the damage to democracy is the same, regardless of whether that damage appears in the form of frustrated voters or incorrect vote counts.  
> 
> I presume that your comments do not reflect the official policy or attitude of Illinois elections officials to not be concerned about events like these, as if "miscalibration" as an explanation somehow makes things OK?  "Miscalibration" instead of possible fraud just moves the explanation from something one can not completely control (fraud attempts) to something under the actual or potential control of elections officials (calibration).  This arguably makes things worse for elections officials, not better.
> 
> People these days have way too much experience with touchscreens on smartphones, kiosks, and other interfaces to understand how touchscreen voting machines that are only in service a few days a year at most have the frequency of "miscalibration" events that they do, at the most inopportune times and on the most inopportune races like the presidential race. I've spoken with an engineering Ph.D. who manufactures medical touch screen devices and he does not accept run of the mill miscalibration as constituting a real explanation.  
> 
> But again, this kind of performance by touch screens is totally unacceptable regardless of whether it is a miscalibration, some other kind of engineering problem, or a form of attempted fraud.  Fraud need not be proved as a condition to actual concern and/or investigation because the video itself is sufficient to trigger both.
> 
> Paul Lehto, J.D.
> 
> -- 
> Paul R Lehto, J.D.
> P.O. Box 1 
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