[EL] Resignations and Candidate Selection

Thu May 30 08:45:57 PDT 2013

Saving states and localities the costs of unnecessary special elections
seems a worthwhile goal.

But how to achieve it? I suppose billing the retiring member is out of the
question, especially for less financially secure members or members who
retire due to a bona fide, unexpected health problem.

Perhaps the no-lobbying waiting period could be amended, so that it would
begin to run at the end of the Congress, rather than on the effective date
of resignation? If such a rule were in place during Rep. Wynn's case, there
would be no incentive for Wynn to resign before the end of his term.
Although, as Mark points out, I'm not sure Rep. Bachmann wants to lobby, so
this idea might not have dissuaded her from resigning mid-session.

That said, The Onion is reporting that Bachmann may indeed be joining the
influence industry.
Bachmann: "God wants me to earn 7 figures for a lobbying firm"
http://www.theonion.com/articles/michele-bachmann-god-wants-me-to-earn-7-figures-fo,32618

Steve Kolbert
(202) 422-2588
steve.kolbert at gmail.com
@Pronounce_the_T
On May 30, 2013 11:19 AM, "Mark Schmitt" <schmitt.mark at gmail.com> wrote:

> The financial calculation about whether to resign early or just wait until
> the end of the current Congress  is very specifically affected by the 2007
> lobbying reform. Once you know you're going to leave, the sooner you do it,
> the sooner the one-year waiting period starts. A particularly egregious
> example of that is former Rep. Al Wynn of Maryland, who lost a primary in
> February 2008, and soon thereafter resigned and went to work at Dickstein
> Shapiro in May, forcing a special election before the regular general
> election. Donna Edwards won all three.
>
> I doubt Bachmann's going to lobby, though.
>
>
> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 10:07 AM, Gaddie, Ronald K. <rkgaddie at ou.edu>wrote:
>
>>  The LSQ piece on timing isn't mine (cite is below), though it started
>> in my seminar and I wish had written it. But, in modeling open seat
>> elections, baseline electoral competitiveness is in the model, so the
>> gerrymandering effects are endogenous.  The article I mention is:
>>  C. DOUGLAS SWEARINGEN, WALT JATKOWSKI III , 2011. "Is Timing
>> Everything? Retirement and Seat Maintenance in the U.S. House of
>> Representative." Legislative Studies Quarterly. But Chuck Bullock and I
>> deal with special elections in our 2001 book *Elections to Open Seats in
>> the US House*, and also in these articles:
>>
>> RONALD KEITH GADDIE, CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, AND SCOTT E. BUCHANAN What
>> is So Special About Special Elections?
>> Legislative Studies Quarterly XXIV:103-112
>>
>> Ronald Keith Gaddie and Charles S. Bullock, III. 1997. Structural and
>> Elite Features in Open Seat and Special
>>
>> Elections: Is There a Sexual Bias?Political Research Quarterly 50 (June):
>> 457-466.
>>
>>
>>  I've updated the analysis but not published yet -- what has happened is
>> open seat elections and special elections are falling back onto a singular
>> partisan dimension, and that dimension also dictates quality candidate
>> emergence and spending advantages. So gerrymandering and big sort effects
>> are still at work, and they are working to help wash out the traditional
>> predictors from the Jacobson/Kernell congressional elections model.
>>
>>
>>  Ronald Keith Gaddie, Michael D. Jones, and Charles S. Bullock III.
>> 2008. Elections to Open Seats in the US House, 1996-2006. Presented at the
>> annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Las
>> Vegas, NV,March.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>    Ronald Keith Gaddie, Ph.D.
>>  Professor of Political Science
>> General Editor, *Social Science Quarterly*
>> Co-editor, *The American Review of Politics*
>> The University of Oklahoma
>> 455 West Lindsey Street, Room 222
>> Norman, OK  73019-2001
>> Phone 405-325-4989
>> Fax 405-325-0718
>> E-mail: rkgaddie at ou.edu
>> http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/G/Ronald.K.Gaddie-1
>> http://socialsciencequarterly.org
>>     ------------------------------
>> *From:* law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] on behalf of Greenberg,
>> Kevin [Kevin.Greenberg at flastergreenberg.com]
>> *Sent:* Thursday, May 30, 2013 8:25 AM
>> *To:* 'law-election at uci.edu'
>> *Subject:* [EL] Resignations and Candidate Selection
>>
>>   *(subject changed to reflect that we are talking about an issue and
>> not one Congressperson)*
>>
>>
>>
>> Professor Gaddie (or others):
>>
>>
>>
>> Everything you discuss to date has had to do with partisan seat control.
>> Given that the vast majority of seats in Congress, and in virtually every
>> other legislative body in the nation, are gerrymandered beyond
>> competitiveness even with flawed candidates (um, Congressman Sanford
>> anyone), isn’t the more interesting question the selection of the nominee
>> of the dominant party?  Did you look at this in your LSQ piece?
>>
>>
>>
>> There are a few different questions that I’m interested in, and hoping
>> someone has done more interesting work than the drivel spewed on TV:
>>
>>
>>
>> (i) for states with special election primaries – do those electorates
>> differ materially and demonstrably in either composition or performance
>> from regular primaries and by when they occur?  Turnout is clearly lower
>> and thus tracks super-voters (and the demographic differences between
>> regular and supervoters).  Is there anything else there after you control
>> for that?
>>
>>
>>
>> (ii) for states where the nominees are coroneted by political
>> parties/machines/bosses/whatever, how do those processes interface with the
>> decision whether to retire or complete a term?
>>
>>
>>
>> (iii) for states with special primaries, is the cost of TV cheaper than
>> in regular primaries and, if so, to what effect?
>>
>>
>>
>> There are other resignation questions that come to mind, and I think are
>> what Professor Schultz was asking about:
>>
>>
>>
>> (iv) for resignations of choice (not Weiner, death, etc), is there a
>> difference?  In terms of whether they resign?  How long do they take to
>> resign?  Etc.?
>>
>>
>>
>> (v) at a larger level, are there correlations on why people choose to
>> resign, or not?  How do we explain Weiner resigning while Vitter remained
>> in the Senate?  Professor Schultz has focused on the immediacy of other
>> economic opportunities, but there have to be other issues.  There are also
>> questions of whether the opportunity will still be there – Marty Meehan
>> probably couldn’t have kept the chair open as Chancellor of UMassLowell,
>> but one suspects that Alabama might have kept its Government Relations seat
>> open for Jo Bonner (putting aside that his *sister* is the president of
>> the lead university – one trusts she would have had his back).  But the
>> question that Professor Schultz raises about the declining economic value
>> of political celebrity is a real one – e.g. Sarah Palin – and I’d be
>> curious if that is a larger issue for all politicians or only one that
>> comes into play for politicians with mass-market retail appeal like Palin
>> and, potentially, Bachmann (and one would have said Barney Frank – except
>> he finished his term).
>>
>>
>>
>> All that said, because the facts are so different in each case, filtering
>> is probably pretty hard, but I trust there’s some enterprising doctoral
>> candidate who has bitten at least one of these questions off….
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Kevin Greenberg
>> (215) 279-9912
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [mailto:
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] *On Behalf Of *Schultz,
>> David A.
>> *Sent:* Thursday, May 30, 2013 8:41 AM
>> *To:* Gaddie, Ronald K.
>> *Cc:* law-election at uci.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [EL] What if Bachmann resigns?
>>
>>
>>
>> My point in noting that Bachmann could resign and there would not be a
>> gubernatorial nominated replacement is to highlight the fact that the GOP
>> would not have to fear the seat going to a Democrat.   This gives Bachmann
>> options were she to decide to cash in on some opportunity and want to leave
>> office early.  I think her cash value potentially declines the longer she
>> is in office as a lame duck.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Gaddie, Ronald K. <rkgaddie at ou.edu>
>> wrote:
>>
>> The earlier you resign, the easier it is to retain. There is a piece in
>> Legislative Studies Quarterly that indicates as much, from 2011. When we
>> model special elections based on udual inputs -- spending, party baseline,
>> candidate experience -- they behave like ordinary open seats.
>>
>> Ronald Keith Gaddie, Ph.D.
>> Professor of Political Science
>> General Editor, Social Science Quarterly
>> Co-editor, The American Review of Politics
>> The University of Oklahoma
>> 455 West Lindsey Street, Room 222
>> Norman, OK  73019-2001
>> Phone 405-325-4989
>> Fax 405-325-0718
>> E-mail: rkgaddie at ou.edu
>> http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/G/Ronald.K.Gaddie-1
>> http://socialsciencequarterly.org
>>
>> ________________________________________
>> From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] on behalf of Mark Schmitt
>> [schmitt.mark at gmail.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2013 10:41 PM
>> To: law-election at uci.edu
>> Subject: Re: [EL] What if Bachmann resigns?
>>
>> Fair point. But elected officials and political strategists think special
>> elections and different turnout models matter. That's sometimes -- not
>> always -- why members of Congress resign rather than wait it out. Recent
>> evidence certainly suggests that that strategy can backfire, as it did in
>> the Weiner seat and several others where the immediate political
>> environment mattered more than turnout.
>>
>>
>>
>> Mark Schmitt
>> Senior Fellow, The Roosevelt Institute<http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/
>> >
>> 202/246-2350<tel:202%2F246-2350 <202%2F246-2350>>
>> gchat or Skype: schmitt.mark
>> twitter: mschmitt9
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 9:20 PM, Gaddie, Ronald K. <rkgaddie at ou.edu
>> <mailto:rkgaddie at ou.edu>> wrote:
>> Special elections behave like regular open seats. While turnout might be
>> lower, they most always are driven by the same factors and influences.
>>
>> Ronald Keith Gaddie, Ph.D.
>> Professor of Political Science
>> General Editor, Social Science Quarterly
>> Co-editor, The American Review of Politics
>> The University of Oklahoma
>> 455 West Lindsey Street, Room 222
>> Norman, OK  73019-2001
>> Phone 405-325-4989<tel:405-325-4989>
>> Fax 405-325-0718<tel:405-325-0718>
>> E-mail: rkgaddie at ou.edu<mailto:rkgaddie at ou.edu>
>> http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/G/Ronald.K.Gaddie-1
>> http://socialsciencequarterly.org
>> ________________________________
>> From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] on behalf of Mark
>> Schmitt [schmitt.mark at gmail.com<mailto:schmitt.mark at gmail.com>]
>>
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2013 8:15 PM
>> To: law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>
>> Subject: Re: [EL] What if Bachmann resigns?
>>
>>
>> There have been 16 mid-term resignations from the House in the past two
>> congresses. Some were for egregious scandals (like Weiner-gate), but most
>> were either for the purpose of (1) getting the clock started on the
>> lobbying waiting period or (2) betting that a low-turnout special election
>> will be better for your party or your preferred successor than an open-seat
>> general. It's really quite outrageous, given the cost of a special election.
>>
>> Bachmann did have a weird line in her video statement (which is very
>> amusing, especially the music, although you'll never get those 8-1/2
>> minutes back), where she said that "eight years is long enough to serve
>> representing one specific congressional district." Is there some other
>> district she might aim to run in? If so, or if she aims to run against
>> Franken, I think she might not resign; otherwise, I'm sure she will.
>>
>>
>> Mark Schmitt
>> Senior Fellow, The Roosevelt Institute<http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/
>> >
>> 202/246-2350<tel:202%2F246-2350 <202%2F246-2350>>
>> gchat or Skype: schmitt.mark
>> twitter: mschmitt9
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 8:34 PM, Schultz, David A. <dschultz at hamline.edu
>> <mailto:dschultz at hamline.edu>> wrote:
>> What if Michele Bachmann decides to step down instead of serving out her
>> term?  What then?
>>
>> The governor does not have the authority to fill the position and instead
>> it must go to a special election.  This would deprive Democrat Mark Dayton
>> from appointing a Democrat to fill the position.
>>
>> I am betting a dollar that Bachmann resigns before her term ends.  The
>> longer she is in office the less and less her (political) capital or
>> marketability is.
>>
>> See below.
>>
>> 204D.29 REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS VACANCY.
>> Subdivision 1.Scope; definition.
>>
>> (a) A vacancy in the office of representative in Congress must be filled
>> as specified in this section.
>>
>> (b) "Vacancy," as used in this section, means a vacancy in the office of
>> representative in Congress.
>>
>> Subd. 2.Vacancy 27 weeks or more before state primary.
>>
>> (a) If a vacancy occurs 27 weeks or more before the state primary, the
>> governor must issue a writ within three days of the vacancy for a special
>> election for that office to be held between 20 and 24 weeks of the vacancy,
>> but not fewer than 47 days before a state primary. A special primary must
>> be held 11 weeks before the special election or on the second Tuesday in
>> August if the general election is held on the first Tuesday after the first
>> Monday in November if any major party has more than one candidate after the
>> time for withdrawal has expired.
>>
>> (b) The filing period for a special election under this subdivision must
>> end on or before the 131st day before the special election. Minor party and
>> independent candidates must submit their petitions by the last day for
>> filing and signatures on the petitions must be dated from the date of the
>> vacancy through the last day for filing. There must be a one-day period for
>> withdrawal of candidates after the last day for filing.
>>
>> Subd. 3.Vacancy more than 22 weeks but fewer than 27 weeks before state
>> primary.
>>
>> (a) If a vacancy occurs more than 22 weeks but fewer than 27 weeks before
>> the state primary, the governor must issue a writ within three days of the
>> vacancy for a special election for that office to be held on the day of the
>> state primary with a special primary held 11 weeks before the state
>> primary, if any major party has more than one candidate after the time for
>> withdrawal has expired. The regularly scheduled election to fill the next
>> full term shall proceed pursuant to law.
>>
>> (b) The filing period for a special election under this subdivision must
>> end on or before the 147th day before the state primary. Minor party and
>> independent candidates must submit their petitions by the last day for
>> filing and signatures on the petitions must be dated from the date of the
>> vacancy through the last day for filing. There must be a one-day period for
>> withdrawal of candidates after the last day for filing. Candidates for a
>> special election under this subdivision are not subject to the prohibition
>> in section 204B.06<
>> https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes?year=2012&id=204B.06#stat.204B.06>
>> against having more than one affidavit of candidacy on file for the same
>> election.
>>
>> (c) The winner of a special election on the day of the state primary
>> under this subdivision shall serve the remainder of the vacant term and is
>> eligible to be seated in Congress upon issuance of the certificate of
>> election. The winner of the regularly scheduled term for that office at the
>> general election shall take office on the day new members of Congress take
>> office.
>>
>> Subd. 4.Vacancy 22 or fewer weeks before state primary but before general
>> election day.
>>
>> (a) If a vacancy occurs from 22 weeks before the state primary to the day
>> before the general election, no special election will be held. The winner
>> of the general election for the next full term for that office will serve
>> the remainder of the unexpired term and is eligible to be seated in
>> Congress immediately upon issuance of a certificate of election.
>>
>> (b) If the incumbent filed an affidavit of candidacy for reelection as
>> the candidate of a major political party and was nominated for the general
>> election ballot by that party and a vacancy occurs from the day of the
>> state primary until the date of the general election, there is a vacancy in
>> nomination to be resolved pursuant to section 204B.13<
>> https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes?year=2012&id=204B.13#stat.204B.13>.
>>
>> Subd. 5.Vacancy on or after election day and before the day new members
>> of Congress take office.
>>
>> (a) If a vacancy occurs between the day of the general election and the
>> day new members of Congress take office and the incumbent was not the
>> winner of the general election, the winner of the general election for the
>> next full term for that office is eligible to be seated in Congress
>> immediately upon issuance of a certificate of election or the vacancy,
>> whichever occurs last.
>>
>> (b) If a vacancy occurs on or after election day but before the day new
>> members of Congress take office and the incumbent was the winner of the
>> general election, the vacancy must be filled pursuant to subdivision 2.
>>
>>
>> --
>> David Schultz, Professor
>> Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
>> Hamline University
>> School of Business
>> 570 Asbury Street
>> Suite 308
>> St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
>> 651.523.2858<tel:651.523.2858> (voice)
>> 651.523.3098<tel:651.523.3098> (fax)
>> http://davidschultz.efoliomn.com/
>> http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/
>> http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/
>> Twitter:  @ProfDSchultz
>> FacultyRow SuperProfessor, 2012, 2013
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>>
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>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> David Schultz, Professor
>> Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
>> Hamline University
>> School of Business
>> 570 Asbury Street
>> Suite 308
>> St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
>> 651.523.2858 (voice)
>> 651.523.3098 (fax)
>> http://davidschultz.efoliomn.com/
>> http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/
>> http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/
>> Twitter:  @ProfDSchultz
>> FacultyRow SuperProfessor, 2012, 2013
>>
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>
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