[EL] Rousseau and McCutcheon

JBoppjr at aol.com JBoppjr at aol.com
Sun Apr 6 12:13:02 PDT 2014


Regarding this:
 
Oh, and you forgot Rwanda.
 
Yes, so many examples but so little space.  Jim Bopp
 
 
In a message dated 4/6/2014 1:22:26 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
dlublin at american.edu writes:

I haven't read all of this debate but it's always good to see _Godwin's 
law_ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin's_law)  proved  again.  


I remember Prof. Judith Shklar, whose family fled Germany, teaching my  
graduate political theory class to avoid comparisons to Hitler because "he was  
very distinguished in his field."


Surely, one can make a strong argument against campaign finance reform  
without having to go there.


Oh, and you forgot Rwanda.


David


-- 
David Lublin
Professor of Government
School of Public  Affairs
American University
4400 Massachusetts Ave.
Washington, D.C.  20016
http://davidlublin.com/





On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 10:08 AM, <_JBoppjr at aol.com_ 
(mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) > wrote:


One of the side benefits of the McCutcheon case is that it has revealed  
what the campaign finance "reformers" are really all about.
 
First, their goal is the typical liberal agenda.  Then they  identify those 
who they think are opponents to that agenda --  corporations, the "rich.".  
Then they support legislation to shut them  up.
 
Of course they dress this up as regulating the system -- the  "collective" 
voices of the people -- to make sure that the authentic  "will of the 
people" is heard by suppressing those voices that distort that  will -- by 
misleading convincing some and drowning out others.
 
This approach does have its roots deep in our history and is frequently  
the justification for tyranny.
 
The communists suppressed the bourgeoisie in the name of  the proletariat.  
Pol Pot destroyed the urban dwellers in the name  of rural dwellers.  The 
German government targeted the Jews, gypsies,  Catholics and communists as 
the enemy of the German volk. All these enemies  of the people had to be 
silenced to defend the authentic will of the  people.
 
Breyer acknowledges that he is countenancing the violation of the  First 
Amendment rights of the "rich," but justifies it as ensuring that the  
authentic will of the people will be heard through the "collective" speech  of the 
people. And he lets the government pick the voices to be  surpressed.
 
So Breyer sets it all out clearly, as does mpoweru4 below,  obviously 
limiting their retribution to be visited on the enemies of the  people to 
campaign finance limits -- while others in our history were much  more willing to 
use the full power of government against them.
 
Their problem is that the First Amendment was adopted to protect the  very 
speech that Breyer, et al are so willing to violate in the name of the  
collective.  So they have to pretend that they are the ones writing a  First 
Amendment -- balance the First Amendment interests involved  -- while this 
balancing has already been done and the First Amendment  already written by our 
Founders. And that amendment was written to  protect individual freedom 
against the efforts of the collective to suppress  their speech -- regardless of 
whether the government thinks that that speech  is helpful to democracy or 
not.  Jim Bopp
 
 

 
In a message dated 4/6/2014 8:08:56 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
_mpoweru4 at gmail.com_ (mailto:mpoweru4 at gmail.com)  writes:

To get a sense of the consequences, one might think not only  about the 
types of players, but the interests they represent. The demise  of aggregate 
limits plays mightily into the hands not only of rich people  in general, but 
of rich people who have highly focused interests.   


The "general will" if it means anything at all, would correspond to  more 
generalized interests like protecting the environment, building  economic 
strength, preventing economic collapse, helping people devastated  by weather 
emergencies, and maintaining transportation  infrastructure.


The very wealthy, operating from self-interest, are not likely to  define 
their agenda in such general terms. They would likely be focused on  very 
particularized corresponding interests, eg: resisting EPA  jurisdiction over a 
certain sector of the energy industry; tax incentives  for research and 
hedge funds; stopping a requirement for a level of  capitalization in banks; 
maintaining flood insurance program that will pay  to rebuild buildings in 
developments under construction too close to a  rising ocean; and building a 
certain unnecessary road using particular  contractors or sources for asphalt.


The right analyst for this is Prof. Mancur Olsen. He explains how  
empowering special interests causes political outcomes not consonant with  the 
interests of the people in a republic in his "Logic of Collective  Action." In 
his "Rise and Decline of Nations" he develops a theory of the  pernicious 
consequences on the republic over time.




On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 7:05 PM, John Tanner <_john.k.tanner at gmail.com_ 
(mailto:john.k.tanner at gmail.com) > wrote:

apologies.  I was skimming comments on the 2d
 
 


On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 6:47 PM, Scarberry, Mark  
<_Mark.Scarberry at pepperdine.edu_ (mailto:Mark.Scarberry at pepperdine.edu) > wrote:


My 4/2 post (scroll way down to see it) was probably too long for  most 
list members to wade through. It raised concerns about the  reference to 
Rousseau, whose pernicious concept of the general will  could find a place in an 
analysis like Justice Breyer's.


I don't think Breyer meant to suggest it, but one reason to make  sure the 
voices of the rich don't drown out other voices is so that  the people won't 
develop "false consciousness." We must be saved by  the government from 
being persuaded by the loud voices of the  rich.


I very much dislike arrogant rich people who think they know  better. I 
even more distrust a government that wants to protect my  ability to think 
clearly about what is in my interest and in the  public interest.


Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine





Sent from my Verizon  Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone



-------- Original  message --------
From: Benjamin Barr 
Date:04/04/2014  3:17 PM (GMT-08:00) 
To: John Tanner 
Cc: Election law  list 
Subject: Re: [EL] McCutcheon  


John, 
This is Breyer's usual three card monte. To collectivize  the Bill of 
Rights he relied on the writings of Benjamin Constant in  his Active Liberty tome 
(expanding all the positive "values"  implicated by the First Amendment - 
none of which seem relevant to the  American founding or history of the First 
Amendment). This dissent is  just a continuation of the same bad theme.  
This profound difference in viewing the Bill of Rights as a  charter of 
"negative" or "positive" liberties is also at root what  separates many 
reformers from free speech advocates on this listserv  and more broadly. 
Forward, 
Benjamin Barr  
Sent by my Android device. Please excuse any typographical  errors. 
On Apr 4, 2014 6:06 PM, "John Tanner" <_john.k.tanner at gmail.com_ 
(mailto:john.k.tanner at gmail.com) > wrote:

Not to change the subject, but I'm surprised that no  one has remarked on 
the dissent's invocation of Rousseau's Social  Contract, which was far more 
influential on the French Revolution  (and particularly the thought of St 
Just and Robespierre) than the  American, where the strong preference for Locke 
and Montesquieu has  pointed in a different direction.  It seems odd, 
off-key and,  wandering well away from the subject, I wonder if it prompted the  
counter-invocation of Burke - and the brandishing of the dissent's  
impolitic choice of the word, "collective." 


On Thu, Apr 3, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Tyler  Culberson 
<_tylerculberson at gmail.com_ (mailto:tylerculberson at gmail.com) > wrote:

These figures derived from a Bob Biersack piece at  OpenSecrets: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why.html
 
 


On Thu, Apr 3, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Tyler  Culberson 
<_tylerculberson at gmail.com_ (mailto:tylerculberson at gmail.com) > wrote:

Doug,   
>From Commissioners Ravel and Weintraub's statement  yesterday, "In fact, 
only 646 donors reached the biennial limit  during the 2012 cycle."




 
On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 7:24 PM, Scarberry, Mark 
<_Mark.Scarberry at pepperdine.edu_ (mailto:Mark.Scarberry at pepperdine.edu) >  wrote:




 
 
 
Can  we distinguish between two “anti-corruption” interests that  could be 
seen as being addressed by the dissent in  McCutcheon? 
The  first is the interest in keeping lines of communication open  between 
ordinary people and their elected representatives, so  as to make 
representative government responsive to the people  *between elections*. High levels 
of donations cause  representatives to listen only (or mostly) to the rich 
donors,  breaking the link between ordinary people and their  representatives. 
The voice of the ordinary person is drowned  out by the voice of the rich 
donor, because the representative  will listen only (or mostly) to the voice 
of the rich donor.  With a reference to Rousseau (which one hopes does not  
incorporate his concept of the “general will”), the dissent  treats the 
breaking of that link as a form of corruption.   
The  second is the interest in the formation of the views of the  people; 
the formation of those views may be corrupted if too  much money is spent by 
rich people to help form those views or  to finance the formation of such 
views. Here we run  dangerously close to the concept of the “general will,” a 
true  will of the people that somehow is different from what they  really 
think, because their thinking has been warped by the  spending of so much 
money by the rich (perhaps creating a  “false consciousness”). The spending of 
huge amounts of money  by the rich in furthering their own views drowns out 
the  voices of the ordinary people, as both the rich speaker and  the 
ordinary speaker try to convey their views to the people  and to persuade the 
people. 
Is  it clear that the dissent only sees the first of those  interests as an 
“anti-corruption” interest that justifies  campaign finance regulation? 
(At first I wasn’t sure,  especially given the “drowning out” imagery, but a 
more  careful reading leads me to this  conclusion.) 
Is  it also clear that the first interest has nothing to do with  which 
person is elected, but rather with who the elected  person will listen to once 
elected? Thus it has nothing to do  with any desire to level the playing 
field for the election,  right? Instead it has to do with the actions that will 
be  taken by the person once elected, which makes it similar to a  concern 
about quid pro quo  corruption. 
My  apologies if I’m asking the list to reinvent the  wheel. 
Mark 
 
Mark  S. Scarberry 
Professor  of Law 
Pepperdine  Univ. School of  Law





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