[EL] ELB News and Commentary 12/9/15

Rick Hasen rhasen at law.uci.edu
Tue Dec 8 21:26:22 PST 2015


    “Justices will get no satisfaction with a new ‘one person, one vote’
    rule” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78170>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 9:22 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78170>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

I have writtenthis oped 
<http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1210-hasen-evenwel-voting-district-20151208-story.html>on 
Evenwel for the LA Times oped page.  It begins:

    At the Supreme Court on Tuesday, the justices struggled over the
    meaning of the 1960s-era “one person, one vote” rule. Should Texas
    legislative districts contain an equal number of people — as they do
    now — or an equal number of eligible voters, as the plaintiffs
    inEvenwel vs. Abbott
    <http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-940_c07e.pdf>demand?
    Ultimately, the justices may have no choice but to heed some other
    words written in the 1960s: You can’t always get what you want.

    Another snippet:

    At the oral argument Tuesday, JusticeAnthony Kennedy
    <http://www.latimes.com/topic/crime-law-justice/justice-system/anthony-kennedy-PEPLT00008042-topic.html>tried
    to split the difference. He pondered whether Texas — and other
    states — could draw districts with an equal number of people and an
    equal number of voters. “Why can’t you have both?” he asked Texas
    Solicitor General Scott Keller.

    And this is where the Rolling Stones principle comes in: A total
    population standard isn’t what everyone wants, but it’s what we need
    to avoid chaos.

    A legislative map equalizing both total voters and total population
    would violate all sound redistricting principles, breaking up
    cities, separating communities of interests and producing grotesque
    shapes. Indeed, after Keller made these points, Kennedy seemed to
    concede the point: “That sounds highly probable to me.”

    An attempt to equalize both population and voters would have
    especially bad consequences for minority representation. In a
    forthcomingpaper<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm%3Fabstract_id=2631666>Vanderbilt
    law and mathematics professor Paul Edelman shows that it is
    mathematically possible to draw districts that equalize both voters
    and population — but only at a big cost. He concludes that “dual
    districting may well be antithetical to achieving majority-minority
    districts,” a cornerstone of the Voting Rights Act.

    It’s also impossible at this point to reliably draw districts with
    an equal number of voters. As Nathaniel Persily of Stanford Law
    School has argued, we simply don’t have the data to do it.

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Posted inredistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>,Supreme Court 
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    “Argument analysis: Justices hard to read on Arizona redistricting
    plan” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78168>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 9:19 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78168>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Amy Howe 
<http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-analysis-justices-hard-to-read-on-arizona-redistricting-plan/>on 
Harris oral argument:

    “Where’s the beef?” That was the question from Washington attorney
    Paul Smith, arguing at the Court today on behalf of the five-member
    independent commission charged with drawing new state legislative
    maps for Arizona.  The Justices heard oral arguments in a challenge
    by several Arizona voters to the maps that the commission drew after
    the 2010 census; the voters allege that the commission violated the
    principle of “one person, one vote” when it intentionally put too
    many residents into Republican-leaning districts while putting too
    few into Democratic-leaning districts.  The Court’s four more
    liberal Justices seemed inclined to agree with Smith, but some of
    the Court’s more conservative Justices were harder to read.  Because
    a ruling in favor of the challengers could potentially affect
    redistricting maps around the country, both sides could be on
    tenterhooks waiting for the Court’s eventual decision.

My own read of the transcript was that Thor was really getting hung up 
even with the conservatives in dealing with the lower court’s factual 
finding that the Commission’s predominant motivation in deviating from 
perfect equality in drawing the districts was a good faith belief it was 
required by the Voting Rights Act. That, and the fact that he offered no 
good standard for determining how much partisanship in districting is 
too much to allow deviations from one person, one vote made me think the 
challengers are likely to lose this one.

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Posted inredistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>,Supreme Court 
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    “Supreme Court Landmark Case Baker v. Carr”
    <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78166>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 9:15 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78166>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Well-timed 
<http://www.c-span.org/video/?327719-1/supreme-court-landmark-case-baker-v-carr>C-SPAN 
landmark case discussion.

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Posted inredistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>,Supreme Court 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>


    Evenwel Oral Argument News Roundup <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78164>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 9:14 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78164>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

NYT 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-arguments-on-one-person-one-vote.html>

LAT 
<http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-supreme-court-election-districts-20151208-story.html>

WSJ 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-to-hear-two-disputes-over-how-to-draw-political-maps-1449576004>

NPR 
<http://www.npr.org/2015/12/08/458795687/when-drawing-districts-should-states-count-each-person-or-each-voter>

Buzzfeed 
<http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/supreme-court-considers-what-one-person-one-vote-means-today?utm_term=.svAzr1GMj#.dgAxjBrD9>

USA Today 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/08/supreme-court-voting-rights-texas-population-voters/76982334/>

AP 
<http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_SUPREME_COURT_VOTING_RIGHTS?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT>

Reuters 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-election-idUSKBN0TR25A20151208>

SCOTUSBlog 
<http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-analysis-the-choice-be-bold-or-practical/>

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Posted inredistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>,Supreme Court 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>


    “What Exactly Does ‘One Person, One Vote’ Mean, Anyway? The Supreme
    Court justices turn a simple question into something more
    complicated.” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78162>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 9:08 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78162>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Dahlia Lithwick 
writes<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2015/12/evenwel_v_abbott_the_supreme_court_hears_arguments_in_a_voter_apportionment.html>for 
Slate.

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    “At the Supreme Court, Equal Representation Is in Danger”
    <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78160>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 8:53 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78160>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

David Gans writes 
<https://newrepublic.com/article/125362/supreme-court-equal-representation-danger>for 
TNR.

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Posted inredistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>,Supreme Court 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>


    WI AG: “John Doe II Must End” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78158>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 8:52 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78158>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Statement <https://www.doj.state.wi.us/blog/john-doe-ii-should-end>:

    The Wisconsin Supreme Court has issued yet another decision in John
    Doe II, the protracted and secret investigation into whether a
    political group exercising free political speech rights improperly
    coordinated with Governor Walker during the recall election. For the
    second time this year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court directed that the
    John Doe proceeding be halted based upon the Court’s conclusion that
    prosecutors did not have a legal basis to investigate these
    political groups when they commenced John Doe II. The Court found
    that campaign finance statutes upon which the prosecutors relied
    violate free political speech rights guaranteed by both the United
    States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution.

    Thus, the Court said that the matter is closed, and the evidence
    seized through subpoenas and search warrants issued as part of the
    investigation must be returned. That has not yet occurred, and the
    owners of that property are understandably upset.

    The special prosecutor has indicated that he intends to appeal. The
    only level of appeal left is to the Supreme Court of the United
    States (SCOTUS), but it is very unlikely SCOTUS would take the case.
    In the unlikely scenario that SCOTUS were to accept the case, it
    would more than likely uphold the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision.

    I write because I have indirectly been asked as Wisconsin Attorney
    General to intervene on behalf of the John Doe targets. The
    Wisconsin DOJ played a role in the proceedings before the Wisconsin
    Supreme Court, although it was not a leading role. DOJ represented
    the judge who was assigned to John Doe II after the initial judge
    recused herself. The new judge quashed subpoenas issued in the John
    Doe proceeding, finding that the special prosecutor’s theory of the
    case was not supported by Wisconsin law. The special prosecutor
    appealed that ruling, and DOJ represented the judge in the Wisconsin
    Supreme Court.

    Last week, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again ordered that the seized
    evidence be returned to its owners. Given that DOJ represented the
    judge who first found that the John Doe proceeding was invalid, DOJ
    certainly has no intention of standing in the way of those orders.
    The Supreme Court’s order should be carried out forthwith. DOJ has
    no authority to represent those individual property owners in their
    effort to enforce the Supreme Court’s order.

This has been a long, unfortunate chapter in Wisconsin’s history. The 
courts have unequivocally rejected the John Doe investigation, both in 
the manner in which it was carried out, as well as the legal arguments 
brought by the prosecutors. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has now ordered 
that the property seized be returned. For everyone involved, the special 
prosecutor should end the case, and the property seized from the 
individuals in this case should be returned immediately.

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Posted inchicanery <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12>


    “Be careful what you wish for in Evenwel, Justice Kennedy”
    <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78156>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 8:47 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78156>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Joey Fishkin blogs. 
<http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/12/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-in-evenwel.html>

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Posted inredistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>,Supreme Court 
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    Six Takeaways from the Evenwel Argument
    <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78154>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 4:07 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78154>byRichard Pildes 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=7>

The argument, which I attended this morning, was unusually subdued.  I 
think that’s because the prior case, challenging the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission’s plan, was tedious and frustrating to the 
Court, with the lawyers challenging the Commission’s plan not able to 
give the Court clear, consistent answers regarding their basic theory of 
the case.  The Court was energetic in the first case but then seemed a 
bit worn down from the unsatisyfing first argument.  But in terms of 
how/Evenwel/is likely to come out, here are my views on six central points:

 1.   The Court is not going to hold that voter equality (equal numbers
    of eligible voters per district) is constitutionally required. 
    Justice Kennedy showed no interest in that position and asked no
    questions that suggested he was wrestling with embracing that view.
    That is consistent with my view going into the case that it was
    always unlikely this Court would conclude that voter equality is
    required.  Some early journalistic coverage of the argument, such
    ashere,
    <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-supreme-court-election-districts-20151208-story.html>portray
    the Court as likely to adopt the voter equality standard, but I
    think those stories misunderstand the nature of the questions
    Justice Kennedy was asking.
 2. The Court is not going to embrace the other clean, polar position
    either, which is that the Constitution requires that total
    population be the measure. That issue was not properly teed up for
    the Court, with none of the counsel before the Court arguing that
    the Court should adopt total population.  The issue here is whether
    the Court will expressly leave this question open and keep alive the
    possibility that, if and when the Court has to confront that
    question, the Court would then clearly be free to decide that total
    population is the required standard.
 3. So the Court will either affirm the status quo or adopt an
    intermediate position to which Justice Kennedy appears drawn.  That
    is the view that states have to at least/consider/voter equality
    as/one factor/to take into account.  He consistently returned to
    this question and it seemed his central instinct about the case. 
    Texas acknowledges that it did not take voter equality into account
    at all (the State Constitution prohibits that) and this case was
    tossed out at the very first stage of the litigation, on a motion to
    dismiss.  Justice Kennedy asked more than once whether, given this
    context, states should have at least the/minimal/obligation to see
    whether they could do a better job at diminishing inequalities among
    eligible voters across districts, without perhaps sacrificing too
    much other constitutional and redistricting values. If the Court
    adopts this approach, that would be slicing the issues pretty thinly
    between the two sides.  If this view prevails, it would impose a
    process-oriented obligation:  voter equality is a factor that must
    be “considered.”
 4. This would look like a victory for the appellants, but it would be a
    win on the most minimal grounds.   Moreover, even that holding might
    be accompanied by qualifications concerning the reliability of the
    ACS data that counts citizens and non-citizens.  There is a debate
    among the briefs, reflected at the argument, over the reliability of
    this data, and I don’t know if the Court would want to resolve that
    issue for itself in the first instance.  So even this narrow holding
    might come in this form:  states have to at least consider voter
    equality, to the extent there is accurate and reliable data on that,
    and we leave it to the lower courts in specific cases to address
    that reliability question.
 5. If the Court holds that states have to take voter equality “into
    account” as “a factor,” what would that mean on the ground?  The key
    question would then become:  how much weight do states have to give
    this factor, compared to total population, once they start “taking
    it into account?”  The Court is not likely to answer that question
    and it will likely take years of litigation to sort it out.  But I
    think the most the Court would ultimately hold is that if states can
    do more to promote voter equality, while not allowing their
    districts to vary in total population by more than 10% and while not
    violating traditional districting principles, then/within those
    constraints/, states would need to avoid unnecessary departures from
    voter equality.  That is a long way away from a requirement that
    districts be based on voter equality — as a practical matter, even
    if there is a majority for the position Justice Kennedy was
    debating, I think the practical effect would be very modest changes
    in outcomes concerning how districts are designed and how the
    distribution of political power is affected.
 6. The most important effect of/Evenwel/is not, therefore, likely to be
    doctrinal.  The case itself — as is often true of Supreme Court
    cases — raises the visibility of an option that many jurisdictions
    might well not have considered before.  Redistricters have been
    routinely using the Census data, which is total population data.  In
    some areas where the politics over immigration are particularly
    heated, some states or local government bodies might now start
    talking about shifting to CVAP data in the next redistricting
    cycle.  Will the litigation itself become a catalyst for some states
    to choose of their own accord to start districting based on voter
    equality, rather than total population — even if the Court’s
    decision does nothing more than affirm the status quo, in which this
    option has always been possible. That is the most politically
    consequential question surrounding this case, given that the Court
    is not going to hold that districting based on voter equality is
    constitutionally required.

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Posted inUncategorized <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=1>


    Clearing the Brush in Today’s One-Person, One-Vote Case
    <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78146>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 2:22 pm 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78146>bynpersily 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=8>

The oral argument today in/Evenwel v. Abbott/was revealing in many 
respects, as such arguments often are,  in highlighting which points in 
the briefs command the most attention from the Justices.  However, as is 
also often the case, the oral argument can serve to obscure certain 
points, as advocates attempt to use their time to complicate issues that 
really are quite simple.  Such is the case, I believe, with the debate 
in/Evenwel/over whether redistricting on some basis other than total 
population is possible.  On this question, I should note I am hardly a 
disinterested observer, having filed anamicus brief 
<http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/evenwel-persily-Brief.pdf>based 
on my experience as a Special Master and court-appointed redistricting 
expert, and having written about the issue inPolitico 
<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/the-supreme-courts-big-data-problem-118568>,Scotusblog 
<http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/symposium-evenwel-v-abbott-and-the-constitutions-big-data-problem/>, 
and theWashington Post 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/10/19/theres-nothing-conservative-about-destabilizing-our-election-system/>.

To be clear, the issue is not whether one is physically able to draw 
districts on the basis on some data source other than the census 
population numbers. Of course, one could.  The question is whether the 
available data are consistent with the theory of one person, one vote – 
even according to the Appellants’ novel interpretation of that rule.   
There is a fundamental incongruity between the interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause proposed by the Appellants and the data they use 
to demonstrate a constitutional violation and suggest as a remedy.

First, no dataset of eligible voters exists.  All of the debate about 
the American Community Survey’s (ACS) citizen voting age population 
(CVAP) data is somewhat beside the point.  Even that dataset does not 
pretend to capture the relevant statistic — eligible voters —  that the 
Appellants contend is necessary for compliance with one person, one 
vote.  The ACS data do not account for 168,000 people in Texas prisons 
or the roughly 350,000 others who are disfranchised because of a felony 
conviction.  Nor do they account for the roughly half million eligible 
voters who live abroad but can vote in Texas elections.  These large 
  categories of persons do not amount to rounding errors or statistical 
nit-picks – even if the ACS were accurate, it does not satisfy 
Appellants own constitutional standard for one person, one vote compliance.

Second, the problem with the ACS CVAP data is not that you are unable to 
put it into a computer and use it for redistricting.  You could do that 
with any dataset.  Rather, what you would be putting into the computer 
at the time of redistricting are old estimates of what the population 
was, not what it is.  Everyone, including Appellants, agrees that the 
yearly ACS surveys are not usable for redistricting because they only 
sample 2.5% of households and are released only for communities in 
excess of 65,000 people.  Therefore, they say, you should use the 
averages of the ACS surveys from the previous five years – that is, use 
five-year old data to redistrict for a ten-year redistricting cycle!  At 
the time of the 2011 redistricting, for example, you would have had to 
use data averaged from the 2006 to 2010 surveys.  Some of the 17 year 
olds not counted in the 2006 CVAP numbers, for example, would be 23 
years old by the time of the first elections held under the new lines.

Third, the granularity of the data and the presence of error margins 
introduce novel questions regarding one person, one vote.  Again, the 
point here is not whether one is/able/to redistrict on the basis of 
survey results: You could draw lines to equalize between districts the 
number of Donald Trump supporters according to presidential preference 
surveys.  Rather, the idea of a survey – as compared to a census – is in 
tension with the notion of one-person, one-vote.  The linedrawer who 
draws a district using the ACS survey data is, in effect, saying that he 
or she is 90 percent certain (the ACS’s reported confidence intervals) 
  that the population in that district is within the margin of error as 
reported by the survey.  As explained in myamicus brief 
<http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/evenwel-persily-Brief.pdf>, 
these error margins are sometimes quite large, especially at the local 
level.  Such errors will increase further in size, if one needs to break 
up the block groups into blocks, as one often would do, in order to 
accommodate any number of other redistricting considerations. (Even the 
five-year averages of ACS data are not released below the block group 
level.)  When it comes to ACS citizenship data, moreover, some of the 
data are imputed by the Census Bureau, itself:  For five percent of 
respondents in the 2013 ACS, the Bureau “allocated” (i.e., filled in) 
the answer to the citizenship question.

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the ACS can be eliminated at any 
time.  This is not a theoretical possibility:  the House of 
Representatives voted to eliminate it in 2012.  Further, because of the 
government shutdown in 2013 and a reduction in funding in 2004, ACS 
surveys in those years suffered from a high margin of error.

I hope the ACS stays around, as it is an invaluable tool to inform 
public policy, including the redistricting process.  But the possibility 
that it might disappear highlights the irony in the/Evenwel/Appellants’ 
argument.   They maintain that the only constitutionally required 
population dataset – namely, the census enumeration of persons – is 
actually forbidden by the Constitution for use in redistricting.  That 
just cannot be right.

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Posted inUncategorized <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=1>


    Evewel and Harris Transcripts Now Available
    <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78142>

Posted onDecember 8, 2015 10:59 am 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=78142>byRick Hasen 
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Tuesday, December 08

14-232 <http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-00232qp.pdf> 	Harris v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n 	Transcript 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-232_c0ne.pdf> 
	
14-940 <http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-00940qp.pdf> 	Evenwel v. 
Abbott 	Transcript 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-940_c07e.pdf> 
	

I’m off to a long meeting and to give a talk, so commentary from me 
about these tonight or tomorrow.

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Posted inUncategorized <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=1>

-- 
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 - fax
rhasen at law.uci.edu
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org

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