[EL] one person one vote

[David Ely]

Here is language from Reynolds v Simms that makes clear that when the court refers to giving equal weight to all votes, it is in fact intended as another way of describing equal population representation, required because  "our Constitution's plain objective" was that "of making equal representation [377 U.S. 533, 560] for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal . . . ."


In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 , decided earlier this Term, we held that attacks on the constitutionality of congressional districting plans enacted by state legislatures do not present nonjusticiable questions and should not be dismissed generally for "want of equity." We determined that the constitutional test for the validity of congressional districting schemes was one of substantial equality of population among the various districts established by a state legislature for the election of members of the Federal House of Representatives.

In that case we decided that an apportionment of congressional seats which "contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others" is unconstitutional, since "the Federal Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as any other vote . . . ." We concluded that the constitutional prescription for election of members of the House of Representatives "by the People," construed in its historical context, "means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." We further stated:

"It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise - equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people - for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others." 37  
We found further, in Wesberry, that "our Constitution's plain objective" was that "of making equal representation [377 U.S. 533, 560]   for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal . . . ." We concluded by stating:
"No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right." 38 

...

And our decision in Wesberry was of course grounded on that language of the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Federal House of Representatives are to be chosen "by the People," while attacks on state legislative apportionment schemes, such as that involved in the instant cases, are principally based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, Wesberry clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal [377 U.S. 533, 561]   representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State. Our problem, then, is to ascertain, in the instant cases, whether there are any constitutionally cognizable principles which would justify departures from the basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of seats in state legislatures. 



How can his possibly be read to elevate the equal vote weight theory above the equal population representation theory?

 

Sorry if I have become tiresome on the issue, but I can’t seem to let it go.

 
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