[EL] one person one vote

Mon Jun 1 11:35:47 PDT 2015

Thanks for providing these quotes David.

>From my perspective as an advocate of replacing geographic quotas that are
based on winner-take-all voting rules with multi-winner systmes with
non-winner-take-all rules where voters get to define their representation,
I can find some of these quotes can make a cogent case *against* the status
quo.

For instance, you cite the line: "It would defeat the principle solemnly
embodied in the Great Compromise - equal representation in the House for
equal numbers of people - for us to hold that, within the States,
legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as
to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others."

Such language has led to the highly misleading phrase "one person, one
vote" as a means to summarize these rulings. But as we all know, equal
population of residents may in fact have little correlation to equality of
eligible voters -- by margins of more than two to one even directly after
an election, let alone  over the course  of a decade ad populations can
shift dramatically. Thus, it  in fact is eminently easy in the current
system to "draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to
give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others."
 It's even easier when you get down to state legislative and local
districts, with huge  disparities -- for instance, the great work of Prisoners
of the Censu <http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/>s has dramatic examples
of distortions in voting power based on counting ineligible voters in
prison for the purposes of apportionment.

Forms of proportional representation - -including the candidate-based
systems like single transferable vote (STV) that we  support -- truly do
lead to equality of votes for representatives. (With STV, the equality in
fact is exact if voters choose to rank enough candidates.) So when look at
the logic of the Court through that lens, it's quite different than when
you do so through the limitation of winner-take-all rules.

I might also add that defenders of winner-take-all could still have true
equality of voters if they really did embrace "one person, one vote" and
end all prohibitions  against suffrage. I'm not holding my breath, but
perhaps that's what those far-sighted founders really envisioned when they
established this principle of equality of residents!

Rob

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On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 2:01 PM, David Ely <ely at compass-demographics.com>
wrote:

> Here is language from Reynolds v Simms that makes clear that when the
> court refers to giving equal weight to all votes, it is in fact intended as
> another way of describing equal population representation, required because
>  *"our Constitution's plain objective" was that "of making equal
> representation [377 U.S. 533, 560] for equal numbers of people the
> fundamental goal . . . ."*
>
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> *In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 , decided earlier this Term, we held
> that attacks on the constitutionality of congressional districting plans
> enacted by state legislatures do not present nonjusticiable questions and
> should not be dismissed generally for "want of equity." We determined that
> the constitutional test for the validity of congressional districting
> schemes was one of substantial equality of population among the various
> districts established by a state legislature for the election of members of
> the Federal House of Representatives.In that case we decided that an
> apportionment of congressional seats which "contracts the value of some
> votes and expands that of others" is unconstitutional, since "the Federal
> Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress
> each vote be given as much weight as any other vote . . . ." We concluded
> that the constitutional prescription for election of members of the House
> of Representatives "by the People," construed in its historical context,
> "means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional
> election is to be worth as much as another's." We further stated:"It would
> defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise - equal
> representation in the House for equal numbers of people - for us to hold
> that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional
> districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing
> a Congressman than others." 37  We found further, in Wesberry, that "our
> Constitution's plain objective" was that "of making equal representation
> [377 U.S. 533, 560]   for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal . .
> . ." We concluded by stating:"No right is more precious in a free country
> than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
> under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most
> basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution
> leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
> abridges this right." 38 ...And our decision in Wesberry was of course
> grounded on that language of the Constitution which prescribes that members
> of the Federal House of Representatives are to be chosen "by the People,"
> while attacks on state legislative apportionment schemes, such as that
> involved in the instant cases, are principally based on the Equal
> Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, Wesberry
> clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative
> government in this country is one of equal [377 U.S. 533, 561]
> representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex,
> economic status, or place of residence within a State. Our problem, then,
> is to ascertain, in the instant cases, whether there are any
> constitutionally cognizable principles which would justify departures from
> the basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of seats
> in state legislatures.*
>
> How can his possibly be read to elevate the equal vote weight theory above
> the equal population representation theory?
>
>
>
> Sorry if I have become tiresome on the issue, but I can’t seem to let it
> go.
>
>
>
>
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