[EL] Scalia's rhetoric
JBoppjr at aol.com
JBoppjr at aol.com
Fri Jun 26 07:42:14 PDT 2015
I agree these are better examples but many of these are tied to the
substance. "Absurd" and "irrational," for instance. can just be an accurate, if
strong and direct, description of the nature of the argument he is
responding to. One may not agree but it is not "abuse."
In any event, if the point is that these examples of strong language can
be counter productive, etc I agree. And truly abuse language is wrong. Jim
Bopp
In a message dated 6/26/2015 9:36:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
rhasen at law.uci.edu writes:
You are right that this is not the best example of his vituperativeness.
So here's some others from my article:
Here is Dean Chemerinsky’s catalog of some of Justice Scalia’s more
memorable statements:
In dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia describes the majority’s approaches
as “nothing short of ludicrous” and “beyond the absurd,” “entirely
irrational,” and not “pass[ing] the most gullible scrutiny.” He has declared
that a majority opinion is “nothing short of preposterous” and “has no
foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to.” He talks
about how “one must grieve for the Constitution” because of a majority’s
approach. He calls the approaches taken in majority opinions “preposterous,”
and “so unsupported in reason and so absurd in application [as] unlikely to
survive.” He speaks of how a majority opinion “vandaliz[es] . . . our
people’s traditions.” In a recent dissent, Justice Scalia declared:
Today’s tale . . . is so transparently false that professing to believe it
demeans this institution. But reaching a patently incorrect conclusion on
the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all,
only the case at hand. In its vain attempt to make the incredible
plausible, however – or perhaps as an intended second goal – today’s opinion
distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.
Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last
resort. 8
As Dean Chemerinsky notes, much of the sarcasm in Justice Scalia’s
opinions is aimed at his colleagues and appears in dissenting opinions. Justice
Scalia has called other Justices’ opinions or arguments which he has
disagreed with “bizarre,” 9 “[g]rotesque,” 10 and “incoherent.” 11 Of the 75
sarcastic opinions referenced in law journals, 42 appear in (at least
partially) dissenting opinions and 15 appear in (at least partially) concurring
opinions. Justice Scalia has remarked that “Seldom has an opinion of this
Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”
12 In a civil rights case, he ended his dissent by stating that “The irony
is that these individuals – predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized –
suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the
champion of the politically impotent.”13 In a gender discrimination case,
he wrote: “Today’s opinion is an inspiring demonstration of how thoroughly
up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in matters pertaining to the
sexes (or as the Court would have it, the genders), and how sternly we
disapprove the male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors. The price to be
paid for this display – a modest price, surely – is that most of the
opinion is quite irrelevant to the case at hand.”14
In an abortion rights case he declared: “The emptiness of the ‘reasoned
judgment’ that produced Roe is displayed in plain view by the fact that,
after more than 19 years of effort by some of the brightest (and most
determined) legal minds in the country, after more than 10 cases upholding abortion
rights in this Court, and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs
submitted in these and other cases, the best the Court can do to explain how it
is that the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to include the right to destroy
human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply
decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.” 15 Finally, in a
concurring opinion in a substantive due process case, Justice Scalia wrote: “
Today’s opinion gives the lie to those cynics who claim that changes in this
Court’s jurisprudence are attributable to changes in the Court’s
membership. It proves that the changes are attributable to nothing but the passage
of time (not much time, at that), plus application of the ancient maxim, ‘
That was then, this is now.
On 6/26/15 5:48 AM, _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) wrote:
Rick calls this statement of Scalia "vituperative(ness)":
There, Scalia opened his dissent with: “Today, the Court issues a sweeping
holding that will have profound implications for the constitutional ideal
of one person, one vote, for the future of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
and for the primacy of the State in managing its own elections. If the Court’
s destination seems fantastical, just wait until you see the journey.”
Vituperative is defined as "Using, containing, or marked by harshly
critical or irate language" or "bitter and abusive."
Scalia may not have justified this statement to Rick's satisfaction but I
see nothing "harshly critical," "bitter or abusive," or particularly
"irate" about this statement.
I guess I could be colored by my own biases or maybe Rick is. Jim
In a message dated 6/25/2015 10:49:19 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
_rhasen at law.uci.edu_ (mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu) writes:
_Exhausted by Scalia’s Rhetoric_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73787)
Posted on _June 25, 2015 7:42 pm_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73787)
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)
I read a lot of Justice Scalia opinions to write _The Most Sarcastic
Justice_ (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2550923) , and I
have to say I really enjoyed reading those opinions—they were pithy, smart,
insightful and blunt. Much more fun than say, reading a Breyer or Souter
opinion with which I was much more likely to agree substantively.
But something’s changed more recently. _Mark Tushnet_
(http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/justice-scalia-as-stylist.html) puts it like this: “
contrary to the seemingly widespread view that Justice Scalia is a splendid
stylist, his snarkiness is getting tired.”
The question is this: has Justice Scalia’s rhetoric gotten more extreme,
or is it just that it’s the same routine, over and over, applied in new
cases. I think it is some of both.
The biggest problem is a kind of Chicken Little-ism. Every majority
opinion with which Scalia disagrees is dishonest, it means the end of principled
jurisprudence, it will lead to horrible consequences.
I think of the earlier opinion this term in the _Alabama Redistricting
case_ (http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-895_o7jq.pdf) . There,
Scalia opened his dissent with: “Today, the Court issues a sweeping holding
that will have profound implications for the constitutional ideal of one
person, one vote, for the future of the Voting RightsAct of 1965, and for the
primacy of the State in managing its own elections. If the Court’s
destination seems fantastical, just wait until you see the journey.”
The opinion then went on to discuss standing and related issues, but NEVER
explained even why he thought the opinion would lead to such dire
consequences. We got the vituperativeness, but not the follow through.
It’s as though he’s tired. And it is making us tired of reading him.
Just wait till Obergefell.
--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 - fax
_rhasen at law.uci.edu_ (mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu)
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
_http://electionlawblog.org_ (http://electionlawblog.org/)
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