[EL] Scalia's rhetoric

Rick Hasen rhasen at law.uci.edu
Fri Jun 26 08:18:15 PDT 2015


Here's Justice Scalia today in a footnote in the ssm decision:


22 If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an 
opinion for the Court that began: “The Constitution promises liberty to 
allw ithin its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights 
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity,” I would hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the 
United States has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John 
Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.

On 6/26/15 7:42 AM, JBoppjr at aol.com wrote:
> I agree these are better examples but many of these are tied to the 
> substance.  "Absurd" and "irrational," for instance. can just be an 
> accurate, if strong and direct, description of the nature of the 
> argument he is responding to. One may not agree but it is not "abuse."
> In any event, if the point is that these examples of strong language 
> can be counter productive, etc I agree.  And truly abuse language is 
> wrong.  Jim  Bopp
> In a message dated 6/26/2015 9:36:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
> rhasen at law.uci.edu writes:
>
>     You are right that this is not the best example of his
>     vituperativeness.  So here's some others from my article:
>
>     Here is Dean Chemerinsky’s catalog of some of Justice Scalia’s
>     more memorable statements:
>
>         In dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia describes the
>         majority’s approaches as “nothing short of ludicrous” and
>         “beyond the absurd,” “entirely irrational,” and not “pass[ing]
>         the most gullible scrutiny.” He has declared that a majority
>         opinion is “nothing short of preposterous” and “has no
>         foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends
>         to.” He talks about how “one must grieve for the Constitution”
>         because of a majority’s approach. He calls the approaches
>         taken in majority opinions “preposterous,” and “so unsupported
>         in reason and so absurd in application [as] unlikely to
>         survive.” He speaks of how a majority opinion “vandaliz[es] .
>         . . our people’s traditions.” In a recent dissent, Justice
>         Scalia declared:
>                 Today’s tale . . . is so transparently false that
>         professing to believe it demeans this institution. But
>         reaching a patently incorrect conclusion on the facts is a
>         relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all,
>         only the case at hand. In its vain attempt to make the
>         incredible plausible, however – or perhaps as an intended
>         second goal – today’s opinion distorts our Confrontation
>         Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles. Instead of
>         clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of
>         last resort. 8
>
>     As Dean Chemerinsky notes, much of the sarcasm in Justice Scalia’s
>     opinions is aimed at his colleagues and appears in dissenting
>     opinions. Justice Scalia has called other Justices’ opinions or
>     arguments which he has disagreed with “bizarre,” 9 “[g]rotesque,”
>     10 and “incoherent.” 11 Of the 75 sarcastic opinions referenced in
>     law journals, 42 appear in (at least partially) dissenting
>     opinions and 15 appear in (at least partially) concurring
>     opinions. Justice Scalia has remarked that “Seldom has an opinion
>     of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal
>     views of its Members.” 12 In a civil rights case, he ended his
>     dissent by stating that “The irony is that these individuals –
>     predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized – suffer this
>     injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the
>     champion of the politically impotent.”13 In a gender
>     discrimination case, he wrote: “Today’s opinion is an inspiring
>     demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we
>     Justices are in matters pertaining to the sexes (or as the Court
>     would have it, the genders), and how sternly we disapprove the
>     male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors. The price to be
>     paid for this display – a modest price, surely – is that most of
>     the opinion is quite irrelevant to the case at hand.”14
>
>     In an abortion rights case he declared: “The emptiness of the
>     ‘reasoned judgment’ that produced Roe is displayed in plain view
>     by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of
>     the brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the country,
>     after more than 10 cases upholding abortion rights in this Court,
>     and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs submitted in these
>     and other cases, the best the Court can do to explain how it is
>     that the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to include the right to
>     destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives
>     that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political
>     choice.” 15 Finally, in a concurring opinion in a substantive due
>     process case, Justice Scalia wrote: “Today’s opinion gives the lie
>     to those cynics who claim that changes in this Court’s
>     jurisprudence are attributable to changes in the Court’s
>     membership. It proves that the changes are attributable to nothing
>     but the passage of time (not much time, at that), plus application
>     of the ancient maxim, ‘That was then, this is now.
>     On 6/26/15 5:48 AM, JBoppjr at aol.com wrote:
>>     Rick calls this statement of Scalia "vituperative(ness)":
>>     There, Scalia opened his dissent with: “Today, the Court issues a
>>     sweeping holding that will have profound implications for the
>>     constitutional ideal of one person, one vote, for the future of
>>     the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and for the primacy of the State
>>     in managing its own elections. If the Court’s destination seems
>>     fantastical, just wait until you see the journey.”
>>     Vituperative is defined as
>>     "Using,containing,ormarkedbyharshlycriticaloriratelanguage"
>>     or "bitter and abusive."
>>     Scalia may not have justified this statement to Rick's
>>     satisfaction but I see nothing "harshly critical," "bitter or
>>     abusive," or particularly "irate" about this statement.
>>     I guess I could be colored by my own biases or maybe Rick is.  Jim
>>     In a message dated 6/25/2015 10:49:19 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
>>     rhasen at law.uci.edu writes:
>>
>>
>>             Exhausted by Scalia’s Rhetoric
>>             <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73787>
>>
>>         Posted onJune 25, 2015 7:42 pm
>>         <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73787>byRick Hasen
>>         <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>>
>>         I read a lot of Justice Scalia opinions to writeThe Most
>>         Sarcastic Justice
>>         <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2550923>,
>>         and I have to say I really enjoyed reading those
>>         opinions—they were pithy, smart, insightful and blunt. Much
>>         more fun than say, reading a Breyer or Souter opinion with
>>         which I was much more likely to agree substantively.
>>
>>         But something’s changed more recently.Mark Tushnet
>>         <http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/justice-scalia-as-stylist.html>puts
>>         it like this: “contrary to the seemingly widespread view that
>>         Justice Scalia is a splendid stylist, his snarkiness is
>>         getting tired.”
>>
>>         The question is this: has Justice Scalia’s rhetoric gotten
>>         more extreme, or is it just that it’s the same routine, over
>>         and over, applied in new cases.  I think it is some of both.
>>
>>         The biggest problem is a kind of Chicken Little-ism. Every
>>         majority opinion with which Scalia disagrees is dishonest, it
>>         means the end of principled jurisprudence, it will lead to
>>         horrible consequences.
>>
>>         I think of the earlier opinion this term in the /Alabama
>>         Redistricting /case
>>         <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-895_o7jq.pdf>.
>>         There, Scalia opened his dissent with: “Today, the Court
>>         issues a sweeping holding that will have profound
>>         implications for the constitutional ideal of one person, one
>>         vote, for the future of the Voting RightsAct of 1965, and for
>>         the primacy of the State in managing its own elections. If
>>         the Court’s destination seems fantastical, just wait until
>>         you see the journey.”
>>
>>         The opinion then went on to discuss standing and related
>>         issues, but NEVER explained even why he thought the opinion
>>         would lead to such dire consequences. We got the
>>         vituperativeness, but not the follow through.
>>
>>         It’s as though he’s tired.  And it is making us tired of
>>         reading him.
>>
>>         Just wait till /Obergefell./
>>
>
>     -- 
>     Rick Hasen
>     Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
>     UC Irvine School of Law
>     401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
>     Irvine, CA 92697-8000
>     949.824.3072 - office
>     949.824.0495 - fax
>     rhasen at law.uci.edu
>     http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
>     http://electionlawblog.org
>

-- 
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 - fax
rhasen at law.uci.edu
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org

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