[EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method, and geographic concentration
Mark Rush
markrush7983 at gmail.com
Mon Jun 19 11:45:57 PDT 2017
Hi all--
The seats-votes curves are appealing for their simplicity. But, they do
assume that all party votes--regardless of candidate--are essentially the
same.
On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 1:29 PM, Eric McGhee <mcghee at ppic.org> wrote:
> Michael:
>
>
> If this is what you meant by "simple transformation," then I would agree:
> for a given distribution of seats (and corresponding seats-votes curve),
> each measure can be derived from every other measure. It's just that the
> precise relationship between the different measures is conditional on that
> seat distribution.
>
>
> Moreover, I would also agree that a range of outcomes is more informative
> than any single number. That's why Nick and I have recommended sensitivity
> testing with the EG. In fact, for the AK case you mention below, you could
> do exactly the same analysis with the EG. The only difference is that the
> EG suggests a particular seat share that AK Republicans ought to have,
> given their share of the vote. There would be no need to evaluate what
> happens when both parties have equal vote shares unless that was considered
> a plausible outcome.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Eric
>
>
> Eric McGhee
> Research Fellow
>
> PUBLIC POLICY
> INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA
> 500 Washington Street, Suite 600
> San Francisco, CA 94111
> tel 415 291 4439
> fax 415 291 4401
> web www.ppic.org<../../owa/redir.aspx?C=77b183a3bc734de5b9da280534391e
> 2a&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ppic.org%2f>
>
> Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author alone and
> do not necessarily reflect any position of the Public Policy Institute of
> California.
> ________________________________
> From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu <law-election-bounces@
> department-lists.uci.edu> on behalf of Michael McDonald <
> dr.michael.p.mcdonald at gmail.com>
> Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2017 6:01 PM
> To: Nicholas Stephanopoulos
> Cc: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu; Cover, Benjamin (
> bcover at uidaho.edu)
> Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method,
> and geographic concentration
>
> All partisan gerrymandering measures are a projection of the
> two-dimensional seats to votes curve onto a single-dimension summary
> statistic. This is what I meant earlier by a "simple transformation" as
> these are not complex calculations, as one might see in physics or
> topology. It is therefore not at all surprising to find a relationship
> between two purportedly different measures because they all fundamentally
> condense information from the same two-dimensional curve into a single
> dimension statistic. My conjecture (admittedly, without proof) is that all
> partisan gerrymandering measures can be related to one another. Some pairs
> of measures will be in a one-way directional relationship: for example, the
> majoritarian principle that the party that wins 50%+1 of the vote should
> get 50%+1 of the seats cannot be transformed into a traditional partisan
> bias measure, but one can "compute" the majoritarian principle from a
> partisan bias measure.
>
> For 14th Amendment(ish) partisan gerrymandering claims I prefer to
> evaluate the seats to votes curve for observed and hypothetical elections
> rather than rely on single summary statistics measures. (I say "ish" since
> some claims may arise from state constitutions or statutes.)
> Characteristics of the partisan gerrymander, such as how bias an
> responsiveness are being used to further a political goal are more readily
> apparent when evaluating all the available information rather than
> condensing to a single statistic. For example, in one of my first cases in
> defending the work of the Alaska Apportionment Board, I noted that the
> Republican plaintiffs put forth an alternative map that had essentially
> zero partisan bias at a hypothetical 50% of the vote, but had a high degree
> of responsiveness such that Republicans could expect to win a
> super-majority of seats in a typical Alaskan election. This was the
> apparent goal of the plan: to create a veto-proof super-majority. I don't
> believe that an efficiency gap - or any single-statistic summary measure -
> would reveal this characteristic of plaintiffs' map in this case. (For a
> similar reason, I don't subscribe to partisan symmetry as a standard. If a
> party typically wins 60% of the vote, it is uninformative to consider what
> will happen in the extremely low-probability event that the party wins 40%
> of the vote.)
>
> ============
> Dr. Michael P. McDonald
> Associate Professor, University of Florida
> 352-273-2371
> www.electproject.org<http://www.electproject.org>
> @ElectProject
>
> On Sun, Jun 18, 2017 at 7:44 PM, Nicholas Stephanopoulos <
> nicholas.stephanopoulos at gmail.com<mailto:nicholas.stephanopoulos at gmail.com>>
> wrote:
> In his article, Benji proves mathematically that (assuming equal district
> turnout) the efficiency gap is equal to the difference between the parties'
> respective average margins of victory (weighted by the number of seats won
> by each party). This is quite a useful proof. It means, in particular, that
> the differential competitiveness measure advanced by some scholars isn't
> actually a separate metric. Rather, it's identical to the efficiency gap.
> As measures of partisan gerrymandering proliferate, this is a nice move in
> the direction of convergence.
>
> On Sun, Jun 18, 2017 at 6:17 PM, Cover, Benjamin (bcover at uidaho.edu
> <mailto:bcover at uidaho.edu>) <bcover at uidaho.edu<mailto:bcover at uidaho.edu>>
> wrote:
>
> I have an article forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review that evaluates
> the efficiency gap measure. I hope to post a draft to SSRN soon, after
> incorporating helpful feedback on earlier versions from several reviewers,
> including Eric.
>
>
>
> The efficiency gap is conceptually distinct from, but mathematically
> related to, competitiveness.
>
>
>
> At the level of an individual district, the disparity in wasted votes is a
> linear function of the margin of victory. When the victor prevails 75-25,
> both parties waste an equal number of votes; the winning party wastes more
> votes if the margin is greater, and fewer votes if the margin is smaller.
>
>
>
> A plan's efficiency gap is an average of the wasted vote disparities
> across all districts. Thus, a plan's efficiency gap is a function of the
> difference in average margin of victory between D-won and R-won districts.
> This accords with the logic of packing and cracking - a plan favors one
> party over another when the favored party wins many districts by small
> margins and the disfavored party wins a few districts by large margins.
> Note that a plan's efficiency gap is a function of differential average
> competitiveness - not overall competitiveness. A zero-gap plan can be
> highly competitive or highly uncompetitive, so long as it is not
> differentially competitive. This means that there are two ways to eliminate
> or reduce an efficiency gap. One method – which I call “unpacking” – will
> increase overall competitiveness. The other method – “decracking” – will
> decrease overall competitiveness.
>
>
>
> However, the sensitivity of the efficiency gap is also a function of the
> plan’s competitiveness. Ignoring turnout effects, the efficiency gap (G) is
> a simple function of the statewide vote margin (V) and the statewide seat
> margin (S).
>
>
>
> G = S – 2V
>
>
>
> The derivative of this function with respect to V is:
>
>
>
> dG/dV = R – 2
>
>
>
> Where R is responsiveness (the derivative of S with respect to V – the
> slope of the tangent to the seats-votes curve), another measure of
> competitiveness.
>
>
>
> To produce a low efficiency gap over a range of vote share, the plan must
> approximate both double proportionality and double responsiveness over that
> range. This limits how competitive – or uncompetitive – the plan can be.
>
>
>
> The draft I will soon post contains a detailed discussion of this and
> other aspects of the efficiency gap measure. I would welcome feedback on
> the draft as I continue to revise the piece.
>
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Benji
>
>
>
> Benjamin Plener Cover
>
> University of Idaho College of Law
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
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> department-lists.uci.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2017 1:00 PM
> To: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election@
> department-lists.uci.edu>
> Subject: Law-election Digest, Vol 74, Issue 14
>
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> Today's Topics:
>
>
>
> 1. Re: Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method, and
>
> geographic concentration (Daniel A. Smith)
>
> 2. Re: Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method, and
>
> geographic concentration (Eric McGhee)
>
> 3. Re: Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method, and
>
> geographic concentration (Nicholas Stephanopoulos)
>
>
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> Message: 1
>
> Date: Sat, 17 Jun 2017 17:44:04 -0400
>
> From: "Daniel A. Smith" <dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>
>
> To: <law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-
> election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> method, and geographic concentration
>
> Message-ID: <d969f266-7a56-7da4-5ad3-00fa6a17ddb9 at ufl.edu<mailto:d9
> 69f266-7a56-7da4-5ad3-00fa6a17ddb9 at ufl.edu>>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>
>
>
> I've always been perplexed by the logic of the efficiency gap...
>
>
>
> Nick and Eric provide an example of how the efficiency gap works in their
> Chicago Law Review article.
>
>
>
> They write (p. 851-852) (notes and italics omitted):
>
>
>
> The efficiency gap, then, is simply the difference between the
>
> parties? respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of
>
> votes cast in the election. Wasted votes include both ?lost? votes
>
> (those cast for a losing candidate) and ?surplus votes? (those cast
>
> for a winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to
>
> prevail). Each party?s wasted votes are totaled, one sum is
>
> subtracted from the other, and then, for the sake of comparability
>
> across systems, this difference is divided by the total number of
>
> votes cast. Figure 1 below shows how this calculation is carried out
>
> for the hypothetical district plan discussed in the Introduction.
>
> The bottom line is that there are 200 fewer wasted votes for Party A
>
> than for Party B (out of 1000 total votes), resulting in an
>
> efficiency gap of 20% in Party A?s favor.
>
>
>
> Here's their Figure 1:
>
>
>
>
>
> Let's leave aside for a moment some of the assumptions that go into
> calculating the efficiency gap and the creation of their table (such as no
> minor party candidates contesting the 10 seats, or that each seat actually
> has two candidates on the ballot (as opposed to uncontested seats that have
> to have imputed result totals)).
>
>
>
> Let's instead fill in the table with what on the face seem to be very
> competitive districts: Every seat is decided by just 2 percentage points,
> but Party A wins each of the 10 districts, 51% to 49%.
>
>
>
> Sure, Party B loses all the seats, but they all are competitive; each of
> the seats could potentially flip to Party B in subsequent elections.
>
>
>
> If I were Party B, or a candidate or supporter of Party B, I'd take these
> districts any day of the week. Even if Party A strategically gerrymandered
> them, each district is winnable given a wave election, the right
> candidates, better messaging, higher (or lower) turnout, etc.
>
>
>
> Yet, the efficiency gap in my hypothetical scenario is 48%, more than
> twice that of Nick and Eric's example. Despite the overall competitiveness
> of my example, it would be a clear target for litigation according to the
> efficiency gap logic.
>
>
>
> I guess my question to Eric and Nick and the broader listserv is, how does
> the efficiency gap serve as a useful step in identifying a partisan
> gerrymander given this obvious flaw?
>
>
>
> dan
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> daniel a. smith, ph.d.
>
> professor & university of florida research foundation professor political
> science internship program coordinator department of political science
>
> 303 anderson hall | phone: 352-273-2346
> <tel:(352)%20273-2346>
>
> po box 117325 | fax: 352-392-8127
> <tel:(352)%20392-8127>
>
> university of florida | email: dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith
> @ufl.edu>
>
> gainesville, fl 32611-7325 | http://people.clas.ufl.edu/
> dasmith/dasmith/<http://people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/>
>
>
>
> https://twitter.com/electionsmith<https://twitter.com/electionsmith>
>
>
>
> On 6/16/2017 7:21 PM, Eric McGhee wrote:
>
> >
>
> > I invented the efficiency gap, yet I would still agree with Michael
>
> > that it seems unlikely a ruling for the plaintiffs in Whitford would
>
> > rely exclusively on that metric. (I would take issue with Michael?s
>
> > claim that the efficiency gap is a ?simple transformation? of existing
>
> > measures under all conditions, but that?s another story.) It?s also
>
> > worth noting that the legal standard Nick Stephanopoulos and I
>
> > proposed (see http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/<
> http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/>)
>
> > would still treat a plan?s observed efficiency gap as only one step in
>
> > a process that would also allow a state to defend its plan as
>
> > unavoidable for other reasons.
>
> >
>
> > Fortunately for the Whitford plaintiffs, every conceivable measure of
>
> > bias or intent suggests the WI plan is a strong outlier. This includes
>
> > a variety of tests that account for the state?s underlying political
>
> > geography. To my mind, this makes the Whitford case less a test of a
>
> > particular standard or measure, and more a test of whether the court
>
> > really wants to get involved in partisan gerrymandering in the first
>
> > place.
>
> >
>
> > Eric McGhee
>
> >
>
> > *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>
>
> > [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] *On Behalf Of
>
> > *Michael McDonald
>
> > *Sent:* Wednesday, June 14, 2017 4:12 PM
>
> > *To:* Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:l
> aw-election at uci.edu>>
>
> > *Subject:* Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> > method, and geographic concentration
>
> >
>
> > The efficiency gap is a simple transformation of prior seats to votes
>
> > partisan bias (gerrymandering detection) measures. If one party wins
>
> > more than 50% of the seats with 50% of the vote, all measures will
>
> > indicate that the party is favored in a redistricting plan. For this
>
> > reason, the efficiency gap is no more or less challenged than other
>
> > partisan bias measures and I suspect Justice Kennedy will find it
>
> > wanting for a bright line that identifies when a constitutional
>
> > violation has occurred, as he has done with every other measure
>
> > presented before him.
>
> >
>
> > Simulations are problematic for another reason. Redistricting is such
>
> > a complex graph partitioning problem that enumeration of all feasible
>
> > redistricting plans is impossible in finite time. As a consequence, we
>
> > cannot know the properties of any simulation algorithm that does not
>
> > generate all feasible plans with equal probability. The only algorithm
>
> > that is guaranteed to create plans with equal probability is one that
>
> > randomly assigns blocks to districts and rejects resultant plans than
>
> > are not legal. (This is similar to random sampling from a survey
>
> > perspective.) Unfortunately, this algorithm produces feasible plans
>
> > with exceedingly low frequency as to make it impossible to use in
>
> > finite time. All other proposed simulation algorithms have never been
>
> > proven that they can randomly sample. Indeed, we have shown that two
>
> > proposed algorithms fail random sampling on a small toy example (see:
>
> > https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528<
> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528>). Failure
>
> > to demonstrate the ability to randomly sample means that an algorithm
>
> > could be biased in unknown ways, and might indicate the presence of a
>
> > gerrymander when none exists, or fail to detect a gerrymander when one
>
> > exists.
>
> >
>
> > The paper I link to describes the method of revealed preferences that
>
> > the Florida and Wisconsin courts applied to determine a partisan
>
> > gerrymander occurred. The method of revealed preferences simply looks
>
> > at the adopted plans as they were developed and traces how partisan
>
> > goals were elevated over traditional redistricting principles. In both
>
> > cases, the courts waved legislative privilege to enable plaintiffs to
>
> > see how the legislature incrementally traded off state constitutional
>
> > or other traditional redistricting principles for partisan advantage
>
> > through the course of generating test maps. In Florida, the efficiency
>
> > gap was not put before the court in evidence, and simulations failed
>
> > so spectacularly that the district court judge did not even bother to
>
> > describe the evidence in his ruling. In Wisconsin, the court found a
>
> > traditional partisan bias measure created by a consultant to the
>
> > legislature was informative, as was the efficiency gap, in tracing out
>
> > the legislature's preferences. I suspect that if Kennedy rules
>
> > favorably for the Wisconsin plaintiffs, it will be on on the strength
>
> > of the revealed preferences illuminated by applying both partisan bias
>
> > measures to the test plans defendants produced in discovery, and not
>
> > on the efficiency gap alone.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > ============
>
> > Dr. Michael P. McDonald
>
> > Associate Professor, University of Florida
>
> > 352-273-2371<tel:(352)%20273-2371>
>
> > www.electproject.org<http://www.electproject.org> <
> http://www.electproject.org<http://www.electproject.org>> @ElectProject
>
> >
>
> > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Mark Scarberry
>
> > <mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu <mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu
> <mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu%20%3cmailto:mark.scarberry@
> pepperdine.edu>>>
>
> > wrote:
>
> >
>
> > My thanks to Bruce and to another list member who replied
>
> > off-list. Has this point been made in any of the briefs?
>
> >
>
> > Mark
>
> >
>
> > Mark S. Scarberry
>
> > Pepperdine University School of Law
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > --
>
> >
>
> > *From:*Bruce E Cain <bcain at stanford.edu <mailto:bcain at stanford.edu<
> mailto:bcain at stanford.edu%20%3cmailto:bcain at stanford.edu>>>
>
> > *Sent:* Wednesday, June 14, 2017 1:43:49 PM
>
> > *To:* Mark Scarberry; Election Law Listserv
>
> > *Subject:* Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> > method, and geographic concentration
>
> >
>
> > Mark
>
> >
>
> > The efficiency gap is highly problematic for many reasons, and
>
> > would be especially bogus for the reason you suggest if
>
> > cross-sectional, over time data are used rather than simulations,
>
> > as is the case in Whitford?see Wendy Tam Cho?s web page or email
>
> > her at <wendycho at illinois.edu <mailto:wendycho at illinois.edu<mailto:
> wendycho at illinois.edu%20%3cmailto:wendycho at illinois.edu>>> for
>
> > several forthcoming publications on this topic?
>
> >
>
> > B
>
> >
>
> > *From: *Mark Scarberry <mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:
> mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu>
>
> > <mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu>>
>
> > *Date: *Wednesday, June 14, 2017 at 1:30 PM
>
> > *To: *Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:l
> aw-election at uci.edu>
>
> > <mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>
>
> > *Subject: *[EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> > method, and geographic concentration
>
> >
>
> > I'm sure someone must have made the following point (if it is right).
>
> >
>
> > The wasted votes / efficiency method for measuring partisan
>
> > gerrymandering would seem to take "one person one vote" to the
>
> > next level. It would benefit parties (currently the Democratic
>
> > party) whose supporters are geographically concentrated.
>
> >
>
> > Is that observation correct? Cites would be appreciated.
>
> >
>
> > Mark
>
> >
>
> > Mark S. Scarberry
>
> > Pepperdine University School of Law
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > _______________________________________________
>
> > Law-election mailing list
>
> > Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election@
> department-lists.uci.edu>
>
> > <mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
>
> > http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election<
> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election>
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > _______________________________________________
>
> > Law-election mailing list
>
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> department-lists.uci.edu>
>
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>
>
> Message: 2
>
> Date: Sat, 17 Jun 2017 21:58:36 +0000
>
> From: Eric McGhee <mcghee at ppic.org<mailto:mcghee at ppic.org>>
>
> To: "Daniel A. Smith" <dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>
>
> Cc: "law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-
> election at department-lists.uci.edu>"
>
> <law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-
> election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> method, and geographic concentration
>
> Message-ID: <0C4479F8-5C16-4A78-A4B2-3B9121E34986 at ppic.org<mailto:0
> C4479F8-5C16-4A78-A4B2-3B9121E34986 at ppic.org>>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
>
>
>
> Sensitivity testing can identify such plans ("dummymanders" as Bernie
> Grofman has called them). We cover that topic at length in the Chicago Law
> Review piece, and the plaintiffs have taken it very seriously as well.
> Thus, while technically one *can* calculate the EG without such analysis, I
> wouldn't recommend it or you might be surprised by plans like this.
>
>
>
> Eric McGhee
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
>
> On Jun 17, 2017, at 2:45 PM, Daniel A. Smith <dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:
> dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu%3cmailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> I've always been perplexed by the logic of the efficiency gap...
>
>
>
> Nick and Eric provide an example of how the efficiency gap works in their
> Chicago Law Review article.
>
>
>
> They write (p. 851-852) (notes and italics omitted):
>
>
>
> The efficiency gap, then, is simply the difference between the parties?
> respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast in the
> election. Wasted votes include both ?lost? votes (those cast for a losing
> candidate) and ?surplus votes? (those cast for a winning candidate but in
> excess of what she needed to prevail). Each party?s wasted votes are
> totaled, one sum is subtracted from the other, and then, for the sake of
> comparability across systems, this difference is divided by the total
> number of votes cast. Figure 1 below shows how this calculation is carried
> out for the hypothetical district plan discussed in the Introduction. The
> bottom line is that there are 200 fewer wasted votes for Party A than for
> Party B (out of 1000 total votes), resulting in an efficiency gap of 20% in
> Party A?s favor.
>
>
>
> Here's their Figure 1:
>
>
>
>
>
> <fekjibkodaaonkda.png>
>
>
>
> Let's leave aside for a moment some of the assumptions that go into
> calculating the efficiency gap and the creation of their table (such as no
> minor party candidates contesting the 10 seats, or that each seat actually
> has two candidates on the ballot (as opposed to uncontested seats that have
> to have imputed result totals)).
>
>
>
> Let's instead fill in the table with what on the face seem to be very
> competitive districts: Every seat is decided by just 2 percentage points,
> but Party A wins each of the 10 districts, 51% to 49%.
>
>
>
> Sure, Party B loses all the seats, but they all are competitive; each of
> the seats could potentially flip to Party B in subsequent elections.
>
>
>
> If I were Party B, or a candidate or supporter of Party B, I'd take these
> districts any day of the week. Even if Party A strategically gerrymandered
> them, each district is winnable given a wave election, the right
> candidates, better messaging, higher (or lower) turnout, etc.
>
>
>
> Yet, the efficiency gap in my hypothetical scenario is 48%, more than
> twice that of Nick and Eric's example. Despite the overall competitiveness
> of my example, it would be a clear target for litigation according to the
> efficiency gap logic.
>
>
>
> I guess my question to Eric and Nick and the broader listserv is, how does
> the efficiency gap serve as a useful step in identifying a partisan
> gerrymander given this obvious flaw?
>
>
>
> dan
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> daniel a. smith, ph.d.
>
> professor & university of florida research foundation professor political
> science internship program coordinator department of political science
>
> 303 anderson hall | phone: 352-273-2346
> <tel:(352)%20273-2346>
>
> po box 117325 | fax: 352-392-8127
> <tel:(352)%20392-8127>
>
> university of florida | email: dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith
> @ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu%3cmailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>
>
> gainesville, fl 32611-7325 | http://people.clas.ufl.edu/
> dasmith/dasmith/<http://people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/<
> http://people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/%3chttp:/people.clas.ufl.edu/
> dasmith/dasmith/>>
>
>
>
> https://twitter.com/electionsmith<https://twitter.com/electionsmith<
> https://twitter.com/electionsmith%3chttps:/twitter.com/electionsmith>>
>
>
>
> On 6/16/2017 7:21 PM, Eric McGhee wrote:
>
> I invented the efficiency gap, yet I would still agree with Michael that
> it seems unlikely a ruling for the plaintiffs in Whitford would rely
> exclusively on that metric. (I would take issue with Michael?s claim that
> the efficiency gap is a ?simple transformation? of existing measures under
> all conditions, but that?s another story.) It?s also worth noting that the
> legal standard Nick Stephanopoulos and I proposed (see
> http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/<
> http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/<
> http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/%3chttp:/
> chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/>>) would still treat a
> plan?s observed efficiency gap as only one step in a process that would
> also allow a state to defend its plan as unavoidable for other reasons.
>
>
>
> Fortunately for the Whitford plaintiffs, every conceivable measure of bias
> or intent suggests the WI plan is a strong outlier. This includes a
> variety of tests that account for the state?s underlying political
> geography. To my mind, this makes the Whitford case less a test of a
> particular standard or measure, and more a test of whether the court really
> wants to get involved in partisan gerrymandering in the first place.
>
>
>
> Eric McGhee
>
>
>
> From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces@
> department-lists.uci.edu%3cmailto:law-election-bounces@
> department-lists.uci.edu>> [mailto:law-election-bounces@
> department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Michael McDonald
>
> Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 4:12 PM
>
> To: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:l
> aw-election at uci.edu>><mailto:law-election at uci.edu>
>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method,
> and geographic concentration
>
>
>
> The efficiency gap is a simple transformation of prior seats to votes
> partisan bias (gerrymandering detection) measures. If one party wins more
> than 50% of the seats with 50% of the vote, all measures will indicate that
> the party is favored in a redistricting plan. For this reason, the
> efficiency gap is no more or less challenged than other partisan bias
> measures and I suspect Justice Kennedy will find it wanting for a bright
> line that identifies when a constitutional violation has occurred, as he
> has done with every other measure presented before him.
>
>
>
> Simulations are problematic for another reason. Redistricting is such a
> complex graph partitioning problem that enumeration of all feasible
> redistricting plans is impossible in finite time. As a consequence, we
> cannot know the properties of any simulation algorithm that does not
> generate all feasible plans with equal probability. The only algorithm that
> is guaranteed to create plans with equal probability is one that randomly
> assigns blocks to districts and rejects resultant plans than are not legal.
> (This is similar to random sampling from a survey perspective.)
> Unfortunately, this algorithm produces feasible plans with exceedingly low
> frequency as to make it impossible to use in finite time. All other
> proposed simulation algorithms have never been proven that they can
> randomly sample. Indeed, we have shown that two proposed algorithms fail
> random sampling on a small toy example (see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
> papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa<
> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
> 2583528%3chttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa>
>
> pers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528>). Failure to demonstrate the ability to
> randomly sample means that an algorithm could be biased in unknown ways,
> and might indicate the presence of a gerrymander when none exists, or fail
> to detect a gerrymander when one exists.
>
>
>
> The paper I link to describes the method of revealed preferences that the
> Florida and Wisconsin courts applied to determine a partisan gerrymander
> occurred. The method of revealed preferences simply looks at the adopted
> plans as they were developed and traces how partisan goals were elevated
> over traditional redistricting principles. In both cases, the courts waved
> legislative privilege to enable plaintiffs to see how the legislature
> incrementally traded off state constitutional or other traditional
> redistricting principles for partisan advantage through the course of
> generating test maps. In Florida, the efficiency gap was not put before the
> court in evidence, and simulations failed so spectacularly that the
> district court judge did not even bother to describe the evidence in his
> ruling. In Wisconsin, the court found a traditional partisan bias measure
> created by a consultant to the legislature was informative, as was the
> efficiency gap, in tracing out the legislature's pref erences. I suspect
> that if Kennedy rules favorably for the Wisconsin plaintiffs, it will be on
> on the strength of the revealed preferences illuminated by applying both
> partisan bias measures to the test plans defendants produced in discovery,
> and not on the efficiency gap alone.
>
>
>
> ============
>
> Dr. Michael P. McDonald
>
> Associate Professor, University of Florida
>
> 352-273-2371<tel:(352)%20273-2371>
>
> www.electproject.org<http://www.electproject.org<http://
> www.electproject.org%3chttp:/www.electproject.org>>
>
> @ElectProject
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Mark Scarberry <
> mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:
> mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu%3cmailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu>>>
> wrote:
>
> My thanks to Bruce and to another list member who replied off-list. Has
> this point been made in any of the briefs?
>
>
>
> Mark
>
>
>
> Mark S. Scarberry
>
> Pepperdine University School of Law
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: Bruce E Cain <bcain at stanford.edu<mailto:bcain at stanford.edu<mailto:
> bcain at stanford.edu%3cmailto:bcain at stanford.edu>>>
>
> Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 1:43:49 PM
>
> To: Mark Scarberry; Election Law Listserv
>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method,
> and geographic concentration
>
>
>
> Mark
>
>
>
> The efficiency gap is highly problematic for many reasons, and would be
> especially bogus for the reason you suggest if cross-sectional, over time
> data are used rather than simulations, as is the case in Whitford?see
> Wendy Tam Cho?s web page or email her at <wendycho at illinois.edu<mailto:
> wendycho at illinois.edu<mailto:wendycho at illinois.edu%3cmailto:
> wendycho at illinois.edu>>> for several forthcoming publications on this
> topic?
>
>
>
> B
>
>
>
> From: Mark Scarberry <mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:mark.scarberry@
> pepperdine.edu<mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu%3cmai
> lto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu>>>
>
> Date: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 at 1:30 PM
>
> To: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:l
> aw-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu%3cmailto:
> law-election at uci.edu>>>
>
> Subject: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method, and
> geographic concentration
>
>
>
> I'm sure someone must have made the following point (if it is right).
>
>
>
> The wasted votes / efficiency method for measuring partisan gerrymandering
> would seem to take "one person one vote" to the next level. It would
> benefit parties (currently the Democratic party) whose supporters are
> geographically concentrated.
>
>
>
> Is that observation correct? Cites would be appreciated.
>
>
>
> Mark
>
>
>
> Mark S. Scarberry
>
> Pepperdine University School of Law
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> Law-election mailing list
>
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> department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu%
> 3cmailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
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> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election<http://
> department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election%
> 3chttp:/department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election>>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> Law-election mailing list
>
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> department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu%
> 3cmailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
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> department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election%
> 3chttp:/department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election>>
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>
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> department-lists.uci.edu/pipermail/law-election/
> attachments/20170617/bce75dad/attachment-0001.png>>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> Message: 3
>
> Date: Sat, 17 Jun 2017 22:07:28 +0000
>
> From: Nicholas Stephanopoulos <nicholas.stephanopoulos at gmail.com<mailto:
> nicholas.stephanopoulos at gmail.com>>
>
> To: "Daniel A. Smith" <dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>, Eric
> McGhee <mcghee at ppic.org<mailto:mcghee at ppic.org>>
>
> Cc: "law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-
> election at department-lists.uci.edu>"
>
> <law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-
> election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> method, and geographic concentration
>
> Message-ID:
>
> <CAKZh_83k+3CgSQ2A0E+BozC+vfWu2faFuq-A-OSdF=1o7PmKZw@
> mail.gmail.com<mailto:CAKZh_83k+3CgSQ2A0E+BozC+vfWu2faFuq-A-OSdF=
> 1o7PmKZw at mail.gmail.com>>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>
>
> Additionally, it's important to avoid conflating partisan symmetry and
> competitiveness. The courts have held that there's nothing wrong with
> creating uncompetitive plans that treat the major parties symmetrically
> (see Gaffney v. Cummings). The crux of a partisan gerrymander is partisan
> asymmetry, not a lack of competitiveness. Fortunately, all of the standard
> measures of partisan symmetry (including but not limited to the efficiency
>
> gap) are conceptually and empirically distinct from competitiveness.
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jun 17, 2017 at 2:59 PM Eric McGhee <mcghee at ppic.org<mailto:mcghee
> @ppic.org>> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Sensitivity testing can identify such plans ("dummymanders" as Bernie
>
> > Grofman has called them). We cover that topic at length in the Chicago
>
> > Law Review piece, and the plaintiffs have taken it very seriously as
> well.
>
> > Thus, while technically one *can* calculate the EG without such
>
> > analysis, I wouldn't recommend it or you might be surprised by plans
> like this.
>
> >
>
> > Eric McGhee
>
> >
>
> > Sent from my iPhone
>
> >
>
> > On Jun 17, 2017, at 2:45 PM, Daniel A. Smith <dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:
> dasmith at ufl.edu><mailto:
>
> > dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>> wrote:
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > I've always been perplexed by the logic of the efficiency gap...
>
> >
>
> > Nick and Eric provide an example of how the efficiency gap works in
>
> > their Chicago Law Review article.
>
> >
>
> > They write (p. 851-852) (notes and italics omitted):
>
> >
>
> > The efficiency gap, then, is simply the difference between the parties?
>
> > respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast in
>
> > the election. Wasted votes include both ?lost? votes (those cast for a
>
> > losing
>
> > candidate) and ?surplus votes? (those cast for a winning candidate but
>
> > in excess of what she needed to prevail). Each party?s wasted votes
>
> > are totaled, one sum is subtracted from the other, and then, for the
>
> > sake of comparability across systems, this difference is divided by
>
> > the total number of votes cast. Figure 1 below shows how this
>
> > calculation is carried out for the hypothetical district plan
>
> > discussed in the Introduction. The bottom line is that there are 200
>
> > fewer wasted votes for Party A than for Party B (out of 1000 total
>
> > votes), resulting in an efficiency gap of 20% in Party A?s favor.
>
> >
>
> > Here's their Figure 1:
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > <fekjibkodaaonkda.png>
>
> >
>
> > Let's leave aside for a moment some of the assumptions that go into
>
> > calculating the efficiency gap and the creation of their table (such
>
> > as no minor party candidates contesting the 10 seats, or that each
>
> > seat actually has two candidates on the ballot (as opposed to
>
> > uncontested seats that have to have imputed result totals)).
>
> >
>
> > Let's instead fill in the table with what on the face seem to be very
>
> > competitive districts: Every seat is decided by just 2 percentage
>
> > points, but Party A wins each of the 10 districts, 51% to 49%.
>
> >
>
> > Sure, Party B loses all the seats, but they all are competitive; each
>
> > of the seats could potentially flip to Party B in subsequent elections.
>
> >
>
> > If I were Party B, or a candidate or supporter of Party B, I'd take
>
> > these districts any day of the week. Even if Party A strategically
>
> > gerrymandered them, each district is winnable given a wave election,
>
> > the right candidates, better messaging, higher (or lower) turnout, etc.
>
> >
>
> > Yet, the efficiency gap in my hypothetical scenario is 48%, more than
>
> > twice that of Nick and Eric's example. Despite the overall
>
> > competitiveness of my example, it would be a clear target for
>
> > litigation according to the efficiency gap logic.
>
> >
>
> > I guess my question to Eric and Nick and the broader listserv is, how
>
> > does the efficiency gap serve as a useful step in identifying a
>
> > partisan gerrymander given this obvious flaw?
>
> >
>
> > dan
>
> >
>
> > --
>
> >
>
> > daniel a. smith, ph.d.
>
> > professor & university of florida research foundation professor
>
> > political science internship program coordinator department of
>
> > political science
>
> > 303 anderson hall | phone: 352-273-2346<tel:(352)%20273-
> 2346>
>
> > po box 117325 | fax: 352-392-8127<tel:(352)%20392-
> 8127>
>
> > university of florida | email: dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto<mailto:
> dasmith at ufl.edu%3cmailto>:
>
> > dasmith at ufl.edu<mailto:dasmith at ufl.edu>>
>
> > gainesville, fl 32611-7325 |
>
> > http://people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/<<http://
> people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/%3c>
>
> > http://people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/<http://
> people.clas.ufl.edu/dasmith/dasmith/>>
>
> >
>
> > https://twitter.com/electionsmith<https://twitter.com/electionsmith<
> https://twitter.com/electionsmith%3chttps:/twitter.com/electionsmith>>
>
> >
>
> > On 6/16/2017 7:21 PM, Eric McGhee wrote:
>
> > I invented the efficiency gap, yet I would still agree with Michael
>
> > that it seems unlikely a ruling for the plaintiffs in Whitford would
>
> > rely exclusively on that metric. (I would take issue with Michael?s
>
> > claim that the efficiency gap is a ?simple transformation? of existing
>
> > measures under all conditions, but that?s another story.) It?s also
>
> > worth noting that the legal standard Nick Stephanopoulos and I
>
> > proposed (see http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/<<
> http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/%3c>
>
> > http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/<
> http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4/>>) would still
>
> > treat a plan?s observed efficiency gap as only one step in a process
>
> > that would also allow a state to defend its plan as unavoidable for
>
> > other reasons.
>
> >
>
> > Fortunately for the Whitford plaintiffs, every conceivable measure of
>
> > bias or intent suggests the WI plan is a strong outlier. This
>
> > includes a variety of tests that account for the state?s underlying
>
> > political geography. To my mind, this makes the Whitford case less a
>
> > test of a particular standard or measure, and more a test of whether
>
> > the court really wants to get involved in partisan gerrymandering in the
> first place.
>
> >
>
> > Eric McGhee
>
> >
>
> > From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto<mailto:
> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu%3cmailto>:
>
> > law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>> [mailto:
>
> > law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:
> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] On Behalf Of Michael
>
> > McDonald
>
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 4:12 PM
>
> > To: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:l
> aw-election at uci.edu>><mailto:
>
> > law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>
>
> > Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> > method, and geographic concentration
>
> >
>
> > The efficiency gap is a simple transformation of prior seats to votes
>
> > partisan bias (gerrymandering detection) measures. If one party wins
>
> > more than 50% of the seats with 50% of the vote, all measures will
>
> > indicate that the party is favored in a redistricting plan. For this
>
> > reason, the efficiency gap is no more or less challenged than other
>
> > partisan bias measures and I suspect Justice Kennedy will find it
>
> > wanting for a bright line that identifies when a constitutional
>
> > violation has occurred, as he has done with every other measure
> presented before him.
>
> >
>
> > Simulations are problematic for another reason. Redistricting is such
>
> > a complex graph partitioning problem that enumeration of all feasible
>
> > redistricting plans is impossible in finite time. As a consequence, we
>
> > cannot know the properties of any simulation algorithm that does not
>
> > generate all feasible plans with equal probability. The only algorithm
>
> > that is guaranteed to create plans with equal probability is one that
>
> > randomly assigns blocks to districts and rejects resultant plans than
> are not legal.
>
> > (This is similar to random sampling from a survey perspective.)
>
> > Unfortunately, this algorithm produces feasible plans with exceedingly
>
> > low frequency as to make it impossible to use in finite time. All
>
> > other proposed simulation algorithms have never been proven that they
>
> > can randomly sample. Indeed, we have shown that two proposed
>
> > algorithms fail random sampling on a small toy example (see:
>
> > https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528<<
> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528%3c>
>
> > https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528<
> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583528>>). Failure
>
> > to demonstrate the ability to randomly sample means that an algorithm
>
> > could be biased in unknown ways, and might indicate the presence of a
>
> > gerrymander when none exists, or fail to detect a gerrymander when one
> exists.
>
> >
>
> > The paper I link to describes the method of revealed preferences that
>
> > the Florida and Wisconsin courts applied to determine a partisan
>
> > gerrymander occurred. The method of revealed preferences simply looks
>
> > at the adopted plans as they were developed and traces how partisan
>
> > goals were elevated over traditional redistricting principles. In both
>
> > cases, the courts waved legislative privilege to enable plaintiffs to
>
> > see how the legislature incrementally traded off state constitutional
>
> > or other traditional redistricting principles for partisan advantage
>
> > through the course of generating test maps. In Florida, the efficiency
>
> > gap was not put before the court in evidence, and simulations failed
>
> > so spectacularly that the district court judge did not even bother to
>
> > describe the evidence in his ruling. In Wisconsin, the court found a
>
> > traditional partisan bias measure created by a consultant to the
>
> > legislature was informative, as was the efficiency gap, in tracing out
>
> > the legislature's preferences. I suspect that if Kennedy rules
>
> > favorably for the Wisconsin plaintiffs, it will be on on the strength
>
> > of the revealed preferences illuminated by applying both partisan bias
>
> > measures to the test plans defendants produced in discovery, and not on
> the efficiency gap alone.
>
> >
>
> > ============
>
> > Dr. Michael P. McDonald
>
> > Associate Professor, University of Florida
>
> > 352-273-2371<tel:(352)%20273-2371>
>
> > www.electproject.org<http://www.electproject.org<http://
> www.electproject.org%3chttp:/www.electproject.org>>
>
> > @ElectProject
>
> >
>
> > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Mark Scarberry <
>
> > mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu
> <mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu%3cmailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.
> edu>>>
>
> > wrote:
>
> > My thanks to Bruce and to another list member who replied off-list.
>
> > Has this point been made in any of the briefs?
>
> >
>
> > Mark
>
> >
>
> > Mark S. Scarberry
>
> > Pepperdine University School of Law
>
> > ________________________________
>
> > From: Bruce E Cain <bcain at stanford.edu<mailto:bcain at stanford.edu<mailto:
> bcain at stanford.edu%3cmailto:bcain at stanford.edu>>>
>
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 1:43:49 PM
>
> > To: Mark Scarberry; Election Law Listserv
>
> > Subject: Re: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency
>
> > method, and geographic concentration
>
> >
>
> > Mark
>
> >
>
> > The efficiency gap is highly problematic for many reasons, and would
>
> > be especially bogus for the reason you suggest if cross-sectional,
>
> > over time data are used rather than simulations, as is the case in
>
> > Whitford?see Wendy Tam Cho?s web page or email her at <
> wendycho at illinois.edu<mailto:wendycho at illinois.edu><mailto:
>
> > wendycho at illinois.edu<mailto:wendycho at illinois.edu>>> for several
> forthcoming publications on this
>
> > topic?
>
> >
>
> > B
>
> >
>
> > From: Mark Scarberry <mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:
> mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu><mailto:
>
> > mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu<mailto:mark.scarberry at pepperdine.edu>>>
>
> > Date: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 at 1:30 PM
>
> > To: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:l
> aw-election at uci.edu><mailto:
>
> > law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>>
>
> > Subject: [EL] Gerrymandering, the wasted votes / efficiency method,
>
> > and geographic concentration
>
> >
>
> > I'm sure someone must have made the following point (if it is right).
>
> >
>
> > The wasted votes / efficiency method for measuring partisan
>
> > gerrymandering would seem to take "one person one vote" to the next
>
> > level. It would benefit parties (currently the Democratic party) whose
>
> > supporters are geographically concentrated.
>
> >
>
> > Is that observation correct? Cites would be appreciated.
>
> >
>
> > Mark
>
> >
>
> > Mark S. Scarberry
>
> > Pepperdine University School of Law
>
> >
>
> > _______________________________________________
>
> > Law-election mailing list
>
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> election at department-lists.uci.edu%3cmailto>:
>
> > Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election@
> department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
> > http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election<<
> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election%3c>
>
> > http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election<
> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election>>
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > _______________________________________________
>
> > Law-election mailing list
>
> > Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto<mailto:Law-
> election at department-lists.uci.edu%3cmailto>:
>
> > Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election@
> department-lists.uci.edu>>
>
> > http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election<<
> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election%3c>
>
> > http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election<
> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election>>
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> election at department-lists.uci.edu%3cmailto>:
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> department-lists.uci.edu>>
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> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos
>
> Assistant Professor of Law
>
> University of Chicago Law School
>
> nsteph at uchicago.edu<mailto:nsteph at uchicago.edu>
>
> (773) 702-4226<tel:(773)%20702-4226>
>
> http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/stephanopoulos<http://
> www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/stephanopoulos>
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> End of Law-election Digest, Vol 74, Issue 14
>
> ********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
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>
>
> --
> Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos
> Assistant Professor of Law
> University of Chicago Law School
> nsteph at uchicago.edu<mailto:nsteph at uchicago.edu>
> (773) 702-4226<tel:(773)%20702-4226>
> http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/stephanopoulos<http://
> www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/stephanopoulos>
>
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--
Mark Rush
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