[EL] SIGN ON DEADLINE: Coalition letter urging fixes to security flaws in Los Angeles' new publicly-owned voting system

[Trent Lange]

Hello again state and national partners and friends --

I just talked about the coaliton letter on the Secure Our Vote call asking
California Secretary of State Alex Padilla to require additional conditions
to fix security flaws in Los Angeles' new publicly-owned voting system
before he grants final approval.  This is the letter I circulated to these
lists last week -- thanks to those of you who've signed on already!

*Please let me know by 1pm EST (10am PST) tomorrow, Friday, 2/28 if you can
sign on to the attached coalition letter (latest signers listed) drafted by
California Clean Money Campaign, National Election Defense Coalition, and
Free Speech for People *and signed by academic election security experts
like Drs. Phil Stark, Richard DeMillo, and Doug Jones.

In summary, the letter asks for the following crucial security changes:

   - To submit their ballot, voters must put it back into the ballot
   marking device (BMD), where it passes under the printhead which gives
   hackers an opportunity to alter it.  UC Berkeley Professor Philip Stark,
   inventor of risk-limiting audits, called this a "security fail".
   - Votes are counted using QR codes that voters can't easily verify —
   which Colorado's Secretary of State correctly banned because QR codes are
   "potentially subject to manipulation".
   - The optional paper ballots require voters to handwrite everything —
   offices, candidates, etc. — which slows down voters and introduces errors
   that may disenfranchise voters.

Also, the source code has not yet been publicly disclosed as open-source or
otherwise, which was a requirement for using public funds to develop it,
further adding to concerns about a lack of transparency and security.

This isn't just a California issue.  Many parts of the new system are quite
good, but because it will be held up as a model of a publicly-owned voting
system for the rest of the country, it's especially important that not get
final certification with security flaws like being mechanically possible
for hackers to alter verified ballots and relying on QR codes to tabulate
votes.  *So please let me know if you can sign on to the letter, either as
an organization or individual if you haven't yet.*

Let me know if you have any questions,

- Trent

-- 
Trent Lange, PhD
President and Executive Director
California Clean Money Campaign
(310) 428-1556
*Sponsor of AB 249, the California DISCLOSE Act, now law!*
www.YesFairElections.org <http://www.YesFairElections.org>


*Become a member today to help end the dominance of Big Money in politics:*
www.YesFairElections.org/join
<http://www.YesFairElections.org/donate/member.php?ms=gmail-signature>
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