Mark Greenberg

Professor of Law
Professor of Philosophy

  • B.A. Johns Hopkins University, 1982
  • J.D. UC Berkeley-Boalt Hall, 1985
  • B.Phil. University of Oxford, 1990
  • D.Phil. University of Oxford, 2000
  • UCLA Faculty Since 2004

Mark Greenberg is Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy. His areas of expertise include philosophy of law, philosophy of mind and psychology, ethics, and criminal law. He is co-director of the UCLA Law and Philosophy Program.

After receiving his B.A. from Johns Hopkins University (at age 18) and his J.D. from Boalt Hall School of Law of the University of California, Berkeley (at age 21), Greenberg served as law clerk to the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He was subsequently a Marshall Scholar at Oxford University, where he earned both his B.Phil. and D.Phil. in philosophy. In addition, he has been a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Stockholm, a research fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University, and a Harrington Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.

Before coming to UCLA, Greenberg taught at Princeton University and the University of Oxford. Prior to that, in the late 1990s, he also served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice, where his work focused on criminal law and policy, constitutional law (especially equal protection and First Amendment issues), and appellate litigation. During this period, he also worked as a federal prosecutor. Greenberg has written numerous articles and book chapters. His article, “How Facts Make Law” won the American Philosophical Association’s 2007 Berger Memorial Prize for work in philosophy of law published in 2004 and 2005, and his article, “The Meaning of Original Meaning” (co-authored with Harry Litman) was the runner-up for the 2001 Berger prize.

Greenberg addressed "Trials in the Time of Social Distancing" on the Talking Feds podcast, May 2020.

Many of his papers are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/author=336071

Bibliography

  • Articles And Chapters
    • Beyond Textualism, UCLA School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 19-41 (2019). Full Text
    • Legal Interpretation, UCLA School of Law, Public Law & Legal Research Paper No. 19-40 (2019). Full Text
    • How Law Affects Behaviour, 9 Jurisprudence 374 (2018).
    • Trump's Corrupt Use of the Pardon Power (with Harry Litman), LawFare (June 19, 2018). Full Text
    • Can Trump Obstruct Justice?, NYR Daily (Jan. 4, 2018). Full Text
    • The Moral Impact Theory, The Dependence View, and Natural Law, in Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence, (edited by G. Duke and R. George, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017). Full Text
    • What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 Harvard Law Review Forum 105 (2017).
    • Book Review, How to Explain things With Force, 129 Harvard Law Review 1932-79 (2016). Review of The Force of Law, by Frederick Schauer. Full Text
    • Explaining the Asymmetry between Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact, 6 (1) Jurisprudence 95-111 (2015). Full Text
    • Philosophy of Law: Some Directions, 36 Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho (forthcoming).
    • Troubles for Content II: Explaining Grounding, in New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, (edited by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, Oxford Univ. Prress, 2014).
    • Troubles for Content I, in Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, (edited by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, Oxford Univ. Press, 2014).
    • The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale Law Journal 1288-1342 (2014). Full Text
    • “How Facts Make Law” and the Nature of Moral Facts, 40 Direito, Estado, e Sociedade (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro) 165 (2012).
    • Law through the Prism of Planning, review of Scott Shapiro, Legality, in Jotwell (September 2011).
    • Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, (edited by A. Marmor and S. Soames, Oxford University Press, 2011).
    • Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II, 30 Law and Philosophy (2011). Corrected version: Erratum: Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II, Law and Philosophy, 31: 619-642 (2012).
    • The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law: Vol. 1, (edited by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter, Oxford University Press, 2011). Full Text
    • Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law, 30 Law and Philosophy 419-451 (2011).
    • The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation and Objective Notions of Communicative Content, UCLA School of Law Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 10-35 (2010). Full Text
    • Moral Concepts and Motivation, 23 Philosophical Perspectives 137-64 (2009). Full Text
    • Explaining Legal Facts, UCLA School of Law Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 08-19 (2008). Full Text
    • The Prism of Rules, UCLA School of Law Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 07- 31 (2007). Full Text
    • Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought, UCLA School of Law Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 07-30 (2007). Full Text
    • Reasons without Values?, 2 Social Political and Legal Philosophy 133 (2007). Full Text
    • On Practices and the Law, 12 Legal Theory 113-136 (2006). Reprinted in "Law: Metaphysics Meaning and Objectivity," 2 Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 95 (2007).
    • Hartian Positivism and Normative Facts: How Facts Make Law II, in Exploring Law's Empire, (edited by Scott Hershovitz, Oxford University Press, 2006). Full Text
    • Conceptual Role Semantics (with Gilbert Harman), in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, (edited by Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith, Oxford University Press, 2006). Full Text
    • Setting Asymmetric Dependence Straight, UCLA School of Law Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 06-03 (2006). Full Text
    • A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories, 15 Philosophical Issues 299-320 (2005). Full Text
    • Goals versus Memes: Explanation in the Theory of Cultural Evolution, in Perspectives on Imitation, (edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, MIT Press, 2005). Full Text
    • Proving Rationality, in Perspectives on Imitation, (edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, MIT Press, 2005). Full Text
    • How Facts Make Law, 10 Legal Theory 157-98 (2004). Reprinted in 1) Scott Hershovitz, ed., Exploring Law’s Empire (Oxford University Press, 2006); 2) 2 Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy (forthcoming); 3) E. Caceres, I. Flores, J. Saldana, and E. Villanueva, eds., Problemas Contemporaneos de la Filosofia del Derecho (Universidad Nacional Autonoma De Mexico, 2005); 4) 1 Problema (2006). Full Text
    • Apocalypse Not Just Now, 21 London Review of Books 19 (July 1, 1999). Reprinted (in Portugese) in Best of (1999). Full Text
    • The Meaning of Original Meaning (with Harry Litman), 86 Georgetown Law Journal 569-619 (1998). (Runner-up, American Philosophical Association’s Berger Memorial Prize in Philosophy of Law.) Full Text
    • Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes (with Harry Litman), 47 Case Western Reserve Law Review 921-78 (1997).
    • Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction (with Harry Litman), in The Federal Role in Criminal Law (543 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 72-84 (1996).
    • Reporters' Draft for the Working Group on Federal-State Cooperation, 46 Hastings Law Journal 1319-38 (1995).
    • The Appropriate Source of Law for Forum Non Conveniens Decisions in International Cases: A Proposal for the Development of Federal Common Law, 4 Berkeley Journal of International Law 155-197 (1986). (Formerly International Tax & Business Lawyer)
  • Other
    • Can Trump pardon his way out of trouble after the Manafort indictment? (with Harry Litman), L.A. Times (Oct. 30, 2017). Full Text
    • All the President's Defenses (with Harry Litman), Lawfare (Sept. 10, 2017). Full Text
    • Life's a Game, The Economist (July 13, 2000). Reviewing Nonzero, by Robert Wright. Full Text
    • What Connects Thought and Action?, Times Literary Supplement (June 23, 1995). Reviewing The Elm and the Expert, by Jerry Fodor.
    • Book Review, 108 Law Quarterly Review 164-169 (1992). Reviewing Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction, by M. Kramer.  (Co-author)