Mark F. Grady

Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus

  • A.B. UCLA, 1970
  • J.D. UCLA School of Law, 1973
  • UCLA Faculty Since 1992

Professor Mark F. Grady specializes in law and economics and teaches Torts, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property at UCLA School of Law. He received his A.B. degree in Economics (1970) and his J.D. (1973), both from UCLA. He also held postdoctoral fellowships in law and economics at the University of Chicago Law School (1977) and the Yale Law School (1982).

After working for the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Senate, Grady began his academic career at the University of Iowa School of Law. In 1985, Northwestern University appointed him Professor of Law, and he moved to Chicago, Illinois. In the spring of 1990, Grady became the first John M. Olin Visiting Professor of Law and Economics at Duke Law School in Durham, North Carolina. In 1992 he returned to UCLA to become Professor of Law here. Five years later, he took leave from UCLA to move to Arlington, Virginia, to become the third dean of the George Mason University School of Law, University Professor of Law, Chairman of the Law and Economics Center, and Principal Investigator of the Law School’s federally funded Critical Infrastructure Protection Project, which he founded. Under Grady’s leadership, George Mason moved from an overall ranking of 75th in the nation to 38th, to become the youngest law school in the first tier and the fastest rising law school in the history of U.S. law school rankings. Also, during Grady’s tenure as dean, the George Mason Law School moved from 167th (out of 174 American law schools) to 35th in terms of the funds it was able to invest in each of its students. Grady returned to UCLA in 2004 to become Professor of Law and Director of the Law School’s new Center for Law and Economics.

Grady is a founding trustee of the American Law and Economics Association and the author of numerous books and articles on torts, intellectual property, antitrust, law and economics, and law and biology. He has served as a consultant to President Ronald Reagan, presented policy papers at President William J. Clinton’s White House, lectured to United States federal judges, given seminars to Congressional staff members, spoken to House leaders from the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, and testified to Congressional committees.

Bibliography

  • Books
    • Torts: Cases and Questions (with Ward Farnsworth). 3rd ed. Wolters Kluwer (2019).
    • Cases and Materials on Torts (with Ward Farnsworth). 3rd ed. Aspen Publishers (2009). Supplement: 1996. With Teacher’s Manual.
    • The Law and Economics of Cybersecurity (edited by Mark F. Grady and Francesco Parisi). Cambridge University Press (2005).
  • Articles And Chapters
    • Justice Luck in Negligence Law, 37 REVUS (2019). Full Text
    • The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance, (Oxford Univ. Press, 2019).
    • Causation and Foreseeability, in Research Handbook on the Economic Analysis of Torts, (edited by Jennifer H. Arlen, Edgar Elgar Publishing, 2013). Full Text
    • Unavoidable Accident, 5 (1) Review of Law & Economics Article 9 (2009). Full Text
    • Harold Demsetz, in Pioneers of Law and Economics, (edited by Lloyd Cohen & Josh Wright, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009).
    • The Paradox of the Negligence Rule, in Internationalization of the Law and its Economic Analysis, (edited by Thomas Eger et al., Gabler Edition Wissenschaft, 2008).
    • Chimpanzee Autarky (lead author with Sarah F. Brosan, other co-authors Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro, and Michael J. Beran), PLoS ONE (2008). Full Text
    • The Free Radicals of Tort, 11 Supreme Court Economic Review 189-218 (2004). Full Text
    • Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA Law Review 293-335 (2002). Abstract
    • The State and the Networked Economy, 25 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 25 (2001).
    • Two Visionary Deans of George Mason Law School, 33 University of Toledo Law Review 59-65 (2001).
    • The Nature of Constitutions (with M. T. McGuire), 1 Journal of Bioeconomics 227 (1999). Full Text
    • Efficient Negligence, 87 Georgetown Law Journal 397-419 (1998).
    • BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages (with Paul H. Rubin and John E. Calfee), 5 Supreme Court Economic Review 179 (1997). Full Text
    • A Theory of the Origin of Natural Law (with M. T. McGuire), 8 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 87-129 (1997).
    • Accident Law Seeks to Limit Insurance Effects, 1 Michigan Law & Policy Review 11 (1996).
    • Legal Evolution and Precedent, 3 Annual Review of Law & Ethics 147 (1995).
    • Politicization of Commodities: The Case of Cadaveric Organs, 20 Journal of Corporation Law 51-68 (1995).
    • Positive Theories and Grown-Order Conceptions of the Law, 23 Southwestern University Law Review 461-67 (1994).
    • A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 97 (1994). Reprinted in Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts Handbook 159 (edited by J. Viera, R. Thorne & S. Breimer, Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1994).
    • Modern Accident Law Does Not Fit Corrective Justice Theory, 7 Annual Review of Law & Ethics 2 (1994).
    • Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 887-947 (1994). Reprinted in Perspectives on Tort Law 238 (edited by Robert L. Rabin, Little Brown, 1995).
    • Better Medicine Causes More Lawsuits, and New Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 Northwestern University Law Review 1068 (1992). Reviewing Medical Malpractice on Trial, by Paul C. Weiler.
    • Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust, 30 Economic Inquiry 225 (April, 1992).
    • Patent Law and Rent Dissipation (with Jay Alexander), 78 Virginia Law Review 305-50 (1992).
    • Multiple Tortfeasors and the Economy of Prevention, 19 Journal of Legal Studies 653-78 (1990).
    • A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine (with Ronald J. Allen and Daniel Polsby), 19 Journal of Legal Studies 359 (1990).
    • Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind A Positive Economic Theory, 40 Alabama Law Review 1197-1225 (1989).
    • Untaken Precautions, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 139-56 (1989).
    • Tort Reform: An Economic Approach, 2 Journal of Forensic Economics 1 (1988).
    • Why Are People Negligent?: Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Northwestern University Law Review 293-334 (1988).
    • Discontinuities and Information Burdens, 56 George Washington Law Review 658 (1988). Reviewing The Economic Structure of Tort Law, by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner.
    • Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 Journal of Legal Studies 15-42 (1988).
    • Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 Iowa Law Review 363-449 (1984).
    • A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 Yale Law Journal 799 (1983).
    • Regulating Information Advertising Overview, in The Federal Trade Commission Since 1970: Economic Analysis and Bureaucratic Behavior, (edited by K. W. Clarkson & T. J. Muris, Cambridge University Press, 1981).
  • Other
    • Commentary on Entry Restrictions and Practice Restrictions, in Occupational Licensure and Regulation 155-57 (edited by S. Rottenberg, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Reseach, 1980).
    • Regulating Funerals, 2 Regulation 11-12 (Sept./Oct. 1978).
    • FTC Policy Planning Protocol for Deceptive and Unsubstantiated Advertising Claims (1975). Reprinted in Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection: Cases and Comments 547-550 (edited by Oppenheim et al., 4th ed., West Publishing, 1983).

Courses Available

LAW 140

Torts
LAW 240

Antitrust Law I
LAW 307

Intellectual Property
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