Case: Seyb v. Members of the Idaho Board of Medicine, et al.

Court: U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho

Citation: No. 24-cv-00244 (D. Idaho Feb. 26, 2026).

Holding: The district court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the historical evidence created a genuine issue of fact as to whether Idaho’s abortion ban—which includes no exception for pregnancies that will cause serious and permanent harm short of death or for life-threatening mental health conditions—violates a fundamental right to self-preservation protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Constitutional Claims: (1) Idaho’s ban on abortion when necessary to preserve a pregnant person’s health violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (2) The exclusion of life-threatening mental health conditions from the ban’s exceptions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Key Reasoning: Highlighting the implications of Plaintiffs’ due process claim, the court asked whether Idaho, which “could not make a mother undergo a bone marrow transplant to save her child,” could nonetheless “require a pregnant woman to give up her ovaries or her kidneys in the hopes of saving a fetus.” Slip op. at 25. This question, the court reasoned, requires considering whether the “evidence of our nation’s history, traditions, and practices” supports finding a right to abortion when necessary to preserve a pregnant person’s health. Id. As the court stressed, Dobbs did not resolve this issue. Id. at 11.

The court concluded there was significant evidence that the right to a medically indicated abortion is “deeply rooted in our nation’s history, bound up with traditional and fundamental principles such as self-defense and necessity.” Slip op. at 3. The court found historical support for the right in common law, the prevalence of life and safety exceptions to abortion bans when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, and the evidence that even historical laws containing only an exception for life-saving abortions were interpreted to extend to serious health impairments in practice. Id. at 15-23. The court rejected Defendants’ contention that an asserted substantive due process right must be expressly articulated as a “right” by historical sources, reasoning that such an approach would ignore U.S. Supreme Court guidance that rights do not remain “trapped in amber”—instead, a right may be supported by past practices and historical liberty interests. Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024)). The court acknowledged Defendants’ sources indicating states have long prohibited abortions even when medically necessary, and concluded it would properly weigh the parties’ conflicting evidence at trial. Id. at 23.

The court also concluded that Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim could not be decided on summary judgment—if the court finds a fundamental right to life-saving abortions, it will evaluate Idaho’s exclusion of abortions necessary to prevent self-harm under strict scrutiny. Id. at 23-24.

In reaching it decision on summary judgment, the court expressed uncertainties about applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s history-and-tradition test at trial. The court highlighted questions regarding whether an asserted due process right requires a “historical ‘dead ringer,’” how to weigh competing historical sources, and how much emphasis to place on practices in 1868 rather than on earlier or later traditions. Slip op. at 15. The court reasoned that these issues, which were not necessary to resolve Defendants’ summary judgment motion, may become relevant at trial.

Case Status/Subsequent History: This case is pending in the district court. Trial is scheduled for June 8, 2026.